| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| TapinRadio 2.13.7 contains a denial of service vulnerability in the application proxy settings that allows attackers to crash the program by overflowing input fields. Attackers can paste a large buffer of 20,000 characters into the username and address fields to cause the application to become unresponsive and require reinstallation. |
| A vulnerability has been found in rachelos WeRSS we-mp-rss up to 1.4.8. This impacts the function fix_html of the file tools/fix.py of the component Article Module. The manipulation leads to cross site scripting. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. |
| Missing authentication and authorization in print_membership_card.php in CodeAstro Membership Management System 1.0 allows unauthenticated attackers to access membership card data of arbitrary users via direct requests with a manipulated id parameter, resulting in insecure direct object reference (IDOR). |
| WordPress Plugin "Survey Maker" versions 5.1.7.7 and prior contain a cross-site scripting vulnerability. If this vulnerability is exploited, an arbitrary script may be executed in the user's web browser. |
| In Splunk Enterprise versions below 10.2.0, 10.0.3, 9.4.5, 9.3.7, and 9.2.9, and Splunk Cloud Platform versions below 10.1.2507.0, 10.0.2503.9, 9.3.2411.112, and 9.3.2408.122, a low-privileged user who does not hold the "admin" or "power" Splunk roles could bypass the SPL safeguards for risky commands when they create a Data Model that contains an injected SPL query within an object. They can bypass the safeguards by exploiting a path traversal vulnerability. |
| In Splunk Enterprise versions below 10.2.0, 10.0.2, 9.4.7, 9.3.9, and 9.2.11, a user of a Splunk Search Head Cluster (SHC) deployment who holds a role with access to the Splunk `_internal` index could view the `integrationKey`, `secretKey`, and `appSecretKey` secrets, generated by [Duo Two-Factor Authentication for Splunk Enterprise](https://duo.com/docs/splunk), in plain text. |
| OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, OpenClaw embedded the current working directory (workspace path) into the agent system prompt without sanitization. If an attacker can cause OpenClaw to run inside a directory whose name contains control/format characters (for example newlines or Unicode bidi/zero-width markers), those characters could break the prompt structure and inject attacker-controlled instructions. Starting in version 2026.2.15, the workspace path is sanitized before it is embedded into any LLM prompt output, stripping Unicode control/format characters and explicit line/paragraph separators. Workspace path resolution also applies the same sanitization as defense-in-depth. |
| LibreNMS is an auto-discovering PHP/MySQL/SNMP based network monitoring tool. In versions 26.1.1 and below, the device group name is not sanitized, allowing attackers with admin privileges to perform Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. When a user adds a device group, an HTTP POST request is sent to the Request-URI "/device-groups". The name of the newly created device group is stored in the value of the name parameter. After the device group is created, the entry is displayed along with relevant buttons such as Rediscover Devices, Edit, and Delete. This issue has been fixed in version 26.2.0. |
| OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.14, authenticated attackers can read arbitrary files from the Gateway host by supplying absolute paths or path traversal sequences to the browser tool's `upload` action. The server passed these paths to Playwright's `setInputFiles()` APIs without restricting them to a safe root. An attacker must reach the Gateway HTTP surface (or otherwise invoke the same browser control hook endpoints); present valid Gateway auth (bearer token / password), as required by the Gateway configuration (In common default setups, the Gateway binds to loopback and the onboarding wizard generates a gateway token even for loopback); and have the `browser` tool permitted by tool policy for the target session/context (and have browser support enabled). If an operator exposes the Gateway beyond loopback (LAN/tailnet/custom bind, reverse proxy, tunnels, etc.), the impact increases accordingly. Starting in version 2026.2.14, the upload paths are now confined to OpenClaw's temp uploads root (`DEFAULT_UPLOAD_DIR`) and traversal/escape paths are rejected. |
| OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.14, a mismatch between `rawCommand` and `command[]` in the node host `system.run` handler could cause allowlist/approval evaluation to be performed on one command while executing a different argv. This only impacts deployments that use the node host / companion node execution path (`system.run` on a node), enable allowlist-based exec policy (`security=allowlist`) with approval prompting driven by allowlist misses (for example `ask=on-miss`), allow an attacker to invoke `system.run`. Default/non-node configurations are not affected. Version 2026.2.14 enforces `rawCommand`/`command[]` consistency (gateway fail-fast + node host validation). |
| OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to 2026.2.14, browser-facing localhost mutation routes accepted cross-origin browser requests without explicit Origin/Referer validation. Loopback binding reduces remote exposure but does not prevent browser-initiated requests from malicious origins. A malicious website can trigger unauthorized state changes against a victim's local OpenClaw browser control plane (for example opening tabs, starting/stopping the browser, mutating storage/cookies) if the browser control service is reachable on loopback in the victim's browser context. Starting in version 2026.2.14, mutating HTTP methods (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) are rejected when the request indicates a non-loopback Origin/Referer (or `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`). Other mitigations include enabling browser control auth (token/password) and avoid running with auth disabled. |
| systeminformation is a System and OS information library for node.js. In versions prior to 5.30.8, a command injection vulnerability in the `wifiNetworks()` function allows an attacker to execute arbitrary OS commands via an unsanitized network interface parameter in the retry code path. In `lib/wifi.js`, the `wifiNetworks()` function sanitizes the `iface` parameter on the initial call (line 437). However, when the initial scan returns empty results, a `setTimeout` retry (lines 440-441) calls `getWifiNetworkListIw(iface)` with the **original unsanitized** `iface` value, which is passed directly to `execSync('iwlist ${iface} scan')`. Any application passing user-controlled input to `si.wifiNetworks()` is vulnerable to arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the Node.js process. Version 5.30.8 fixes the issue. |
| fast-xml-parser allows users to validate XML, parse XML to JS object, or build XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries and no callback. In versions 4.1.3 through 5.3.5, the XML parser can be forced to do an unlimited amount of entity expansion. With a very small XML input, it’s possible to make the parser spend seconds or even minutes processing a single request, effectively freezing the application. Version 5.3.6 fixes the issue. As a workaround, avoid using DOCTYPE parsing by `processEntities: false` option. |
| soroban-sdk is a Rust SDK for Soroban contracts. Prior to versions 22.0.10, 23.5.2, and 25.1.1, the `#[contractimpl]` macro contains a bug in how it wires up function calls. `#[contractimpl]` generates code that uses `MyContract::value()` style calls even when it's processing the trait version. This means if an inherent function is also defined with the same name, the inherent function gets called instead of the trait function. This means the Wasm-exported entry point silently calls the wrong function when two conditions are met simultaneously: First, an `impl Trait for MyContract` block is defined with one or more functions, with `#[contractimpl]` applied. Second, an `impl MyContract` block is defined with one or more identically named functions, without `#[contractimpl]` applied. If the trait version contains important security checks, such as verifying the caller is authorized, that the inherent version does not, those checks are bypassed. Anyone interacting with the contract through its public interface will call the wrong function. The problem is patched in `soroban-sdk-macros` versions 22.0.10, 23.5.2, and 25.1.1. The fix changes the generated call from `<Type>::func()` to `<Type as Trait>::func()` when processing trait implementations, ensuring Rust resolves to the trait associated function regardless of whether an inherent function with the same name exists. Users should upgrade to `soroban-sdk-macros` 22.0.10, 23.5.2, or 25.1.1 and recompile their contracts. If upgrading is not immediately possible, contract developers can avoid the issue by ensuring that no inherent associated function on the contract type shares a name with any function in the trait implementation. Renaming or removing the conflicting inherent function eliminates the ambiguity and causes the macro-generated code to correctly resolve to the trait function. |
| Penpot is an open-source design tool for design and code collaboration. Prior to version 2.13.2, an authenticated user can read arbitrary files from the server by supplying a local file path (e.g. `/etc/passwd`) as a font data chunk in the `create-font-variant` RPC endpoint, resulting in the file contents being stored and retrievable as a "font" asset. This is an arbitrary file read vulnerability. Any authenticated user with team edit permissions can read arbitrary files accessible to the Penpot backend process on the host filesystem. This can lead to exposure of sensitive system files, application secrets, database credentials, and private keys, potentially enabling further compromise of the server. In containerized deployments, the blast radius may be limited to the container filesystem, but environment variables, mounted secrets, and application configuration are still at risk. Version 2.13.2 contains a patch for the issue. |
| calibre is a cross-platform e-book manager for viewing, converting, editing, and cataloging e-books. Versions 9.2.1 and below contain a Path Traversal vulnerability that allows arbitrary file writes anywhere the user has write permissions. On Windows, this leads to Remote Code Execution by writing a payload to the Startup folder, which executes on next login. Function extract_pictures only checks startswith('Pictures'), and does not sanitize '..' sequences. calibre's own ZipFile.extractall() in utils/zipfile.py does sanitize '..' via _get_targetpath(), but extract_pictures() bypasses this by using manual zf.read() + open(). This issue has been fixed in version 9.3.0. |
| Skill Scanner is a security scanner for AI Agent Skills that detects prompt injection, data exfiltration, and malicious code patterns. A vulnerability in the API Server of Skill Scanner could allow a unauthenticated, remote attacker to interact with the server API and either trigger a denial of service (DoS) condition or upload arbitrary files. This vulnerability is due to an erroneous binding to multiple interfaces. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending API requests to a device exposing the affected API Server. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to consume an excessive amount of resources (memory starvation) or to upload files to arbitrary folders on the affected device. This vulnerability affects Skill-scanner 1.0.1 and earlier releases when the API Server is enabled. The API Server is not enabled by default. Skill-scanner software releases 1.0.2 and later contain the fix for this vulnerability. |
| strongMan is a management interface for strongSwan, an OpenSource IPsec-based VPN. When storing credentials in the database (private keys, EAP secrets), strongMan encrypts the corresponding database fields. So far it used AES in CTR mode with a global database key. Together with an initialization vector (IV), a key stream is generated to encrypt the data in the database fields. But because strongMan did not generate individual IVs, every database field was encrypted using the same key stream. An attacker that has access to the database can use this to recover the encrypted credentials. In particular, because certificates, which have to be considered public information, are also encrypted using the same mechanism, an attacker can directly recover a large chunk of the key stream, which allows them to decrypt basically all other secrets especially ECDSA private keys and EAP secrets, which are usually a lot shorter. Version 0.2.0 fixes the issue by switching to AES-GCM-SIV encryption with a random nonce and an individually derived encryption key, using HKDF, for each encrypted value. Database migrations are provided to automatically re-encrypt all credentials. |
| Indico is an event management system that uses Flask-Multipass, a multi-backend authentication system for Flask. Versions prior to 3.3.10 are vulnerable to cross-site scripting when uploading certain file types as materials. Users should upgrade to version 3.3.10 to receive a patch. To apply the fix itself updating is sufficient, but to benefit from the strict Content Security Policy (CSP) Indico now applies by default for file downloads, update the webserver config in case one uses nginx with Indico's `STATIC_FILE_METHOD` set to `xaccelredirect`. For further directions, consult the GitHub Security advisory or Indico setup documentation. Some workarounds are available. Use the webserver config to apply a strict CSP for material download endpoints, and/or only let trustworthy users create content (including material uploads, which speakers can typically do as well) on Indico. |
| Cosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. In versions 3.0.4 and below, an issuing certificate with a validity that expires before the leaf certificate will be considered valid during verification even if the provided timestamp would mean the issuing certificate should be considered expired. When verifying artifact signatures using a certificate, Cosign first verifies the certificate chain using the leaf certificate's "not before" timestamp and later checks expiry of the leaf certificate using either a signed timestamp provided by the Rekor transparency log or from a timestamp authority, or using the current time. The root and all issuing certificates are assumed to be valid during the leaf certificate's validity. There is no impact to users of the public Sigstore infrastructure. This may affect private deployments with customized PKIs. This issue has been fixed in version 3.0.5. |
