OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.14, authenticated attackers can read arbitrary files from the Gateway host by supplying absolute paths or path traversal sequences to the browser tool's `upload` action. The server passed these paths to Playwright's `setInputFiles()` APIs without restricting them to a safe root. An attacker must reach the Gateway HTTP surface (or otherwise invoke the same browser control hook endpoints); present valid Gateway auth (bearer token / password), as required by the Gateway configuration (In common default setups, the Gateway binds to loopback and the onboarding wizard generates a gateway token even for loopback); and have the `browser` tool permitted by tool policy for the target session/context (and have browser support enabled). If an operator exposes the Gateway beyond loopback (LAN/tailnet/custom bind, reverse proxy, tunnels, etc.), the impact increases accordingly. Starting in version 2026.2.14, the upload paths are now confined to OpenClaw's temp uploads root (`DEFAULT_UPLOAD_DIR`) and traversal/escape paths are rejected.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
Advisories
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Github GHSA |
GHSA-cv7m-c9jx-vg7q | OpenClaw has a path traversal in browser upload allows local file read |
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Fri, 20 Feb 2026 10:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Openclaw
Openclaw openclaw |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Openclaw
Openclaw openclaw |
Thu, 19 Feb 2026 23:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.14, authenticated attackers can read arbitrary files from the Gateway host by supplying absolute paths or path traversal sequences to the browser tool's `upload` action. The server passed these paths to Playwright's `setInputFiles()` APIs without restricting them to a safe root. An attacker must reach the Gateway HTTP surface (or otherwise invoke the same browser control hook endpoints); present valid Gateway auth (bearer token / password), as required by the Gateway configuration (In common default setups, the Gateway binds to loopback and the onboarding wizard generates a gateway token even for loopback); and have the `browser` tool permitted by tool policy for the target session/context (and have browser support enabled). If an operator exposes the Gateway beyond loopback (LAN/tailnet/custom bind, reverse proxy, tunnels, etc.), the impact increases accordingly. Starting in version 2026.2.14, the upload paths are now confined to OpenClaw's temp uploads root (`DEFAULT_UPLOAD_DIR`) and traversal/escape paths are rejected. | |
| Title | OpenClaw has a path traversal in browser upload allows local file read | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-22 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-02-19T23:06:37.962Z
Reserved: 2026-02-13T16:27:51.809Z
Link: CVE-2026-26329
No data.
Status : Awaiting Analysis
Published: 2026-02-20T00:16:15.687
Modified: 2026-02-20T13:49:47.623
Link: CVE-2026-26329
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-02-20T09:53:31Z
Weaknesses
Github GHSA