| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dma-direct: Leak pages on dma_set_decrypted() failure
On TDX it is possible for the untrusted host to cause
set_memory_encrypted() or set_memory_decrypted() to fail such that an
error is returned and the resulting memory is shared. Callers need to
take care to handle these errors to avoid returning decrypted (shared)
memory to the page allocator, which could lead to functional or security
issues.
DMA could free decrypted/shared pages if dma_set_decrypted() fails. This
should be a rare case. Just leak the pages in this case instead of
freeing them. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: reduce rtnl pressure in smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list()
Many syzbot reports show extreme rtnl pressure, and many of them hint
that smc acquires rtnl in netns creation for no good reason [1]
This patch returns early from smc_pnet_net_init()
if there is no netdevice yet.
I am not even sure why smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list() even exists,
because smc_pnet_netdev_event() is also calling
smc_pnet_add_base_pnetid() when handling NETDEV_UP event.
[1] extract of typical syzbot reports
2 locks held by syz-executor.3/12252:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.4/12253:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.1/12257:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.2/12261:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.0/12265:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.3/12268:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.4/12271:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.1/12274:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.2/12280:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: prevent division by zero in blk_rq_stat_sum()
The expression dst->nr_samples + src->nr_samples may
have zero value on overflow. It is necessary to add
a check to avoid division by zero.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
of: module: prevent NULL pointer dereference in vsnprintf()
In of_modalias(), we can get passed the str and len parameters which would
cause a kernel oops in vsnprintf() since it only allows passing a NULL ptr
when the length is also 0. Also, we need to filter out the negative values
of the len parameter as these will result in a really huge buffer since
snprintf() takes size_t parameter while ours is ssize_t...
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with the Svace static
analysis tool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/coco: Require seeding RNG with RDRAND on CoCo systems
There are few uses of CoCo that don't rely on working cryptography and
hence a working RNG. Unfortunately, the CoCo threat model means that the
VM host cannot be trusted and may actively work against guests to
extract secrets or manipulate computation. Since a malicious host can
modify or observe nearly all inputs to guests, the only remaining source
of entropy for CoCo guests is RDRAND.
If RDRAND is broken -- due to CPU hardware fault -- the RNG as a whole
is meant to gracefully continue on gathering entropy from other sources,
but since there aren't other sources on CoCo, this is catastrophic.
This is mostly a concern at boot time when initially seeding the RNG, as
after that the consequences of a broken RDRAND are much more
theoretical.
So, try at boot to seed the RNG using 256 bits of RDRAND output. If this
fails, panic(). This will also trigger if the system is booted without
RDRAND, as RDRAND is essential for a safe CoCo boot.
Add this deliberately to be "just a CoCo x86 driver feature" and not
part of the RNG itself. Many device drivers and platforms have some
desire to contribute something to the RNG, and add_device_randomness()
is specifically meant for this purpose.
Any driver can call it with seed data of any quality, or even garbage
quality, and it can only possibly make the quality of the RNG better or
have no effect, but can never make it worse.
Rather than trying to build something into the core of the RNG, consider
the particular CoCo issue just a CoCo issue, and therefore separate it
all out into driver (well, arch/platform) code.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix UAF in smb2_reconnect_server()
The UAF bug is due to smb2_reconnect_server() accessing a session that
is already being teared down by another thread that is executing
__cifs_put_smb_ses(). This can happen when (a) the client has
connection to the server but no session or (b) another thread ends up
setting @ses->ses_status again to something different than
SES_EXITING.
To fix this, we need to make sure to unconditionally set
@ses->ses_status to SES_EXITING and prevent any other threads from
setting a new status while we're still tearing it down.
The following can be reproduced by adding some delay to right after
the ipc is freed in __cifs_put_smb_ses() - which will give
smb2_reconnect_server() worker a chance to run and then accessing
@ses->ipc:
kinit ...
mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt/1 -o sec=krb5,nohandlecache,echo_interval=10
[disconnect srv]
ls /mnt/1 &>/dev/null
sleep 30
kdestroy
[reconnect srv]
sleep 10
umount /mnt/1
...
CIFS: VFS: Verify user has a krb5 ticket and keyutils is installed
CIFS: VFS: \\srv Send error in SessSetup = -126
CIFS: VFS: Verify user has a krb5 ticket and keyutils is installed
CIFS: VFS: \\srv Send error in SessSetup = -126
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 3 PID: 50 Comm: kworker/3:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-1.fc39
04/01/2014
Workqueue: cifsiod smb2_reconnect_server [cifs]
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x33/0xf0
Code: 4f 08 48 85 d2 74 42 48 85 c9 74 59 48 b8 00 01 00 00 00 00 ad
de 48 39 c2 74 61 48 b8 22 01 00 00 00 00 74 69 <48> 8b 01 48 39 f8 75
7b 48 8b 72 08 48 39 c6 0f 85 88 00 00 00 b8
RSP: 0018:ffffc900001bfd70 EFLAGS: 00010a83
RAX: dead000000000122 RBX: ffff88810da53838 RCX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b
RDX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RSI: ffffffffc02f6878 RDI: ffff88810da53800
RBP: ffff88810da53800 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88810c064000
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff88810c064000 R15: ffff8881039cc000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888157c00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fe3728b1000 CR3: 000000010caa4000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? die_addr+0x36/0x90
? exc_general_protection+0x1c1/0x3f0
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x33/0xf0
__cifs_put_smb_ses+0x1ae/0x500 [cifs]
smb2_reconnect_server+0x4ed/0x710 [cifs]
process_one_work+0x205/0x6b0
worker_thread+0x191/0x360
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xe2/0x110
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: guarantee refcounted children from parent session
Avoid potential use-after-free bugs when walking DFS referrals,
mounting and performing DFS failover by ensuring that all children
from parent @tcon->ses are also refcounted. They're all needed across
the entire DFS mount. Get rid of @tcon->dfs_ses_list while we're at
it, too. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix potential UAF in cifs_stats_proc_show()
Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to
avoid UAF. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix potential UAF in cifs_dump_full_key()
Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to
avoid UAF. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix potential UAF in smb2_is_valid_oplock_break()
Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to
avoid UAF. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix potential UAF in is_valid_oplock_break()
Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to
avoid UAF. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix potential UAF in smb2_is_network_name_deleted()
Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to
avoid UAF. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix potential UAF in cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect()
Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to
avoid UAF. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Use device rbtree in iopf reporting path
The existing I/O page fault handler currently locates the PCI device by
calling pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot(). This function searches the list
of all PCI devices until the desired device is found. To improve lookup
efficiency, replace it with device_rbtree_find() to search the device
within the probed device rbtree.
The I/O page fault is initiated by the device, which does not have any
synchronization mechanism with the software to ensure that the device
stays in the probed device tree. Theoretically, a device could be released
by the IOMMU subsystem after device_rbtree_find() and before
iopf_get_dev_fault_param(), which would cause a use-after-free problem.
Add a mutex to synchronize the I/O page fault reporting path and the IOMMU
release device path. This lock doesn't introduce any performance overhead,
as the conflict between I/O page fault reporting and device releasing is
very rare. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: udc: remove warning when queue disabled ep
It is possible trigger below warning message from mass storage function,
WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 3839 at drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c:294 usb_ep_queue+0x7c/0x104
pc : usb_ep_queue+0x7c/0x104
lr : fsg_main_thread+0x494/0x1b3c
Root cause is mass storage function try to queue request from main thread,
but other thread may already disable ep when function disable.
As there is no function failure in the driver, in order to avoid effort
to fix warning, change WARN_ON_ONCE() in usb_ep_queue() to pr_debug(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI/PM: Drain runtime-idle callbacks before driver removal
A race condition between the .runtime_idle() callback and the .remove()
callback in the rtsx_pcr PCI driver leads to a kernel crash due to an
unhandled page fault [1].
The problem is that rtsx_pci_runtime_idle() is not expected to be running
after pm_runtime_get_sync() has been called, but the latter doesn't really
guarantee that. It only guarantees that the suspend and resume callbacks
will not be running when it returns.
However, if a .runtime_idle() callback is already running when
pm_runtime_get_sync() is called, the latter will notice that the runtime PM
status of the device is RPM_ACTIVE and it will return right away without
waiting for the former to complete. In fact, it cannot wait for
.runtime_idle() to complete because it may be called from that callback (it
arguably does not make much sense to do that, but it is not strictly
prohibited).
Thus in general, whoever is providing a .runtime_idle() callback needs
to protect it from running in parallel with whatever code runs after
pm_runtime_get_sync(). [Note that .runtime_idle() will not start after
pm_runtime_get_sync() has returned, but it may continue running then if it
has started earlier.]
One way to address that race condition is to call pm_runtime_barrier()
after pm_runtime_get_sync() (not before it, because a nonzero value of the
runtime PM usage counter is necessary to prevent runtime PM callbacks from
being invoked) to wait for the .runtime_idle() callback to complete should
it be running at that point. A suitable place for doing that is in
pci_device_remove() which calls pm_runtime_get_sync() before removing the
driver, so it may as well call pm_runtime_barrier() subsequently, which
will prevent the race in question from occurring, not just in the rtsx_pcr
driver, but in any PCI drivers providing .runtime_idle() callbacks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm snapshot: fix lockup in dm_exception_table_exit
There was reported lockup when we exit a snapshot with many exceptions.
Fix this by adding "cond_resched" to the loop that frees the exceptions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nouveau: lock the client object tree.
It appears the client object tree has no locking unless I've missed
something else. Fix races around adding/removing client objects,
mostly vram bar mappings.
4562.099306] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6677ed422bceb80c: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[ 4562.099314] CPU: 2 PID: 23171 Comm: deqp-vk Not tainted 6.8.0-rc6+ #27
[ 4562.099324] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI/Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI-CF, BIOS F8 11/05/2021
[ 4562.099330] RIP: 0010:nvkm_object_search+0x1d/0x70 [nouveau]
[ 4562.099503] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 66 0f 1f 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 85 f6 74 39 48 8b 87 a0 00 00 00 48 85 c0 74 12 <48> 8b 48 f8 48 39 ce 73 15 48 8b 40 10 48 85 c0 75 ee 48 c7 c0 fe
[ 4562.099506] RSP: 0000:ffffa94cc420bbf8 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 4562.099512] RAX: 6677ed422bceb814 RBX: ffff98108791f400 RCX: ffff9810f26b8f58
[ 4562.099517] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9810f26b9158 RDI: ffff98108791f400
[ 4562.099519] RBP: ffff9810f26b9158 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 4562.099521] R10: ffffa94cc420bc48 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff9810f02a7cc0
[ 4562.099526] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000000000ff R15: 0000000000000007
[ 4562.099528] FS: 00007f629c5017c0(0000) GS:ffff98142c700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 4562.099534] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 4562.099536] CR2: 00007f629a882000 CR3: 000000017019e004 CR4: 00000000003706f0
[ 4562.099541] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 4562.099542] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 4562.099544] Call Trace:
[ 4562.099555] <TASK>
[ 4562.099573] ? die_addr+0x36/0x90
[ 4562.099583] ? exc_general_protection+0x246/0x4a0
[ 4562.099593] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
[ 4562.099600] ? nvkm_object_search+0x1d/0x70 [nouveau]
[ 4562.099730] nvkm_ioctl+0xa1/0x250 [nouveau]
[ 4562.099861] nvif_object_map_handle+0xc8/0x180 [nouveau]
[ 4562.099986] nouveau_ttm_io_mem_reserve+0x122/0x270 [nouveau]
[ 4562.100156] ? dma_resv_test_signaled+0x26/0xb0
[ 4562.100163] ttm_bo_vm_fault_reserved+0x97/0x3c0 [ttm]
[ 4562.100182] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x2a/0x270
[ 4562.100189] nouveau_ttm_fault+0x69/0xb0 [nouveau]
[ 4562.100356] __do_fault+0x32/0x150
[ 4562.100362] do_fault+0x7c/0x560
[ 4562.100369] __handle_mm_fault+0x800/0xc10
[ 4562.100382] handle_mm_fault+0x17c/0x3e0
[ 4562.100388] do_user_addr_fault+0x208/0x860
[ 4562.100395] exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x200
[ 4562.100402] asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
[ 4562.100412] RIP: 0033:0x9b9870
[ 4562.100419] Code: 85 a8 f7 ff ff 8b 8d 80 f7 ff ff 89 08 e9 18 f2 ff ff 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 44 89 32 e9 90 fa ff ff 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 <44> 89 32 e9 f8 f1 ff ff 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 44 89 32 e9 e7
[ 4562.100422] RSP: 002b:00007fff9ba2dc70 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 4562.100426] RAX: 0000000000000004 RBX: 000000000dd65e10 RCX: 000000fff0000000
[ 4562.100428] RDX: 00007f629a882000 RSI: 00007f629a882000 RDI: 0000000000000066
[ 4562.100432] RBP: 00007fff9ba2e570 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000123ddf000
[ 4562.100434] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000007fffffff
[ 4562.100436] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 4562.100446] </TASK>
[ 4562.100448] Modules linked in: nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set nf_tables libcrc32c nfnetlink cmac bnep sunrpc iwlmvm intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common snd_sof_pci_intel_cnl x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp snd_sof_intel_hda_common mac80211 coretemp snd_soc_acpi_intel_match kvm_intel snd_soc_acpi snd_soc_hdac_hda snd_sof_pci snd_sof_xtensa_dsp snd_sof_intel_hda_mlink
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: ensure offloading TID queue exists
The resume code path assumes that the TX queue for the offloading TID
has been configured. At resume time it then tries to sync the write
pointer as it may have been updated by the firmware.
In the unusual event that no packets have been send on TID 0, the queue
will not have been allocated and this causes a crash. Fix this by
ensuring the queue exist at suspend time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Squashfs: check the inode number is not the invalid value of zero
Syskiller has produced an out of bounds access in fill_meta_index().
That out of bounds access is ultimately caused because the inode
has an inode number with the invalid value of zero, which was not checked.
The reason this causes the out of bounds access is due to following
sequence of events:
1. Fill_meta_index() is called to allocate (via empty_meta_index())
and fill a metadata index. It however suffers a data read error
and aborts, invalidating the newly returned empty metadata index.
It does this by setting the inode number of the index to zero,
which means unused (zero is not a valid inode number).
2. When fill_meta_index() is subsequently called again on another
read operation, locate_meta_index() returns the previous index
because it matches the inode number of 0. Because this index
has been returned it is expected to have been filled, and because
it hasn't been, an out of bounds access is performed.
This patch adds a sanity check which checks that the inode number
is not zero when the inode is created and returns -EINVAL if it is.
[phillip@squashfs.org.uk: whitespace fix] |
