| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Graphics Kernel allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Win32K - GRFX allows an authorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows UI XAML Maps MapControlSettings allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eeprom: at24: fix memory corruption race condition
If the eeprom is not accessible, an nvmem device will be registered, the
read will fail, and the device will be torn down. If another driver
accesses the nvmem device after the teardown, it will reference
invalid memory.
Move the failure point before registering the nvmem device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4/pNFS: Fix a race to wake on NFS_LAYOUT_DRAIN
We found a few different systems hung up in writeback waiting on the same
page lock, and one task waiting on the NFS_LAYOUT_DRAIN bit in
pnfs_update_layout(), however the pnfs_layout_hdr's plh_outstanding count
was zero.
It seems most likely that this is another race between the waiter and waker
similar to commit ed0172af5d6f ("SUNRPC: Fix a race to wake a sync task").
Fix it up by applying the advised barrier. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i40e: fix vf may be used uninitialized in this function warning
To fix the regression introduced by commit 52424f974bc5, which causes
servers hang in very hard to reproduce conditions with resets races.
Using two sources for the information is the root cause.
In this function before the fix bumping v didn't mean bumping vf
pointer. But the code used this variables interchangeably, so stale vf
could point to different/not intended vf.
Remove redundant "v" variable and iterate via single VF pointer across
whole function instead to guarantee VF pointer validity. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()
Garbage collector does not take into account the risk of embryo getting
enqueued during the garbage collection. If such embryo has a peer that
carries SCM_RIGHTS, two consecutive passes of scan_children() may see a
different set of children. Leading to an incorrectly elevated inflight
count, and then a dangling pointer within the gc_inflight_list.
sockets are AF_UNIX/SOCK_STREAM
S is an unconnected socket
L is a listening in-flight socket bound to addr, not in fdtable
V's fd will be passed via sendmsg(), gets inflight count bumped
connect(S, addr) sendmsg(S, [V]); close(V) __unix_gc()
---------------- ------------------------- -----------
NS = unix_create1()
skb1 = sock_wmalloc(NS)
L = unix_find_other(addr)
unix_state_lock(L)
unix_peer(S) = NS
// V count=1 inflight=0
NS = unix_peer(S)
skb2 = sock_alloc()
skb_queue_tail(NS, skb2[V])
// V became in-flight
// V count=2 inflight=1
close(V)
// V count=1 inflight=1
// GC candidate condition met
for u in gc_inflight_list:
if (total_refs == inflight_refs)
add u to gc_candidates
// gc_candidates={L, V}
for u in gc_candidates:
scan_children(u, dec_inflight)
// embryo (skb1) was not
// reachable from L yet, so V's
// inflight remains unchanged
__skb_queue_tail(L, skb1)
unix_state_unlock(L)
for u in gc_candidates:
if (u.inflight)
scan_children(u, inc_inflight_move_tail)
// V count=1 inflight=2 (!)
If there is a GC-candidate listening socket, lock/unlock its state. This
makes GC wait until the end of any ongoing connect() to that socket. After
flipping the lock, a possibly SCM-laden embryo is already enqueued. And if
there is another embryo coming, it can not possibly carry SCM_RIGHTS. At
this point, unix_inflight() can not happen because unix_gc_lock is already
taken. Inflight graph remains unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath9k: delay all of ath9k_wmi_event_tasklet() until init is complete
The ath9k_wmi_event_tasklet() used in ath9k_htc assumes that all the data
structures have been fully initialised by the time it runs. However, because of
the order in which things are initialised, this is not guaranteed to be the
case, because the device is exposed to the USB subsystem before the ath9k driver
initialisation is completed.
We already committed a partial fix for this in commit:
8b3046abc99e ("ath9k_htc: fix NULL pointer dereference at ath9k_htc_tx_get_packet()")
However, that commit only aborted the WMI_TXSTATUS_EVENTID command in the event
tasklet, pairing it with an "initialisation complete" bit in the TX struct. It
seems syzbot managed to trigger the race for one of the other commands as well,
so let's just move the existing synchronisation bit to cover the whole
tasklet (setting it at the end of ath9k_htc_probe_device() instead of inside
ath9k_tx_init()). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netrom: Fix data-races around sysctl_net_busy_read
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_qfq: Fix race condition on qfq_aggregate
A race condition can occur when 'agg' is modified in qfq_change_agg
(called during qfq_enqueue) while other threads access it
concurrently. For example, qfq_dump_class may trigger a NULL
dereference, and qfq_delete_class may cause a use-after-free.
This patch addresses the issue by:
1. Moved qfq_destroy_class into the critical section.
2. Added sch_tree_lock protection to qfq_dump_class and
qfq_dump_class_stats. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
interconnect: Don't access req_list while it's being manipulated
The icc_lock mutex was split into separate icc_lock and icc_bw_lock
mutexes in [1] to avoid lockdep splats. However, this didn't adequately
protect access to icc_node::req_list.
The icc_set_bw() function will eventually iterate over req_list while
only holding icc_bw_lock, but req_list can be modified while only
holding icc_lock. This causes races between icc_set_bw(), of_icc_get(),
and icc_put().
Example A:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
icc_set_bw(path_a)
mutex_lock(&icc_bw_lock);
icc_put(path_b)
mutex_lock(&icc_lock);
aggregate_requests()
hlist_for_each_entry(r, ...
hlist_del(...
<r = invalid pointer>
Example B:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
icc_set_bw(path_a)
mutex_lock(&icc_bw_lock);
path_b = of_icc_get()
of_icc_get_by_index()
mutex_lock(&icc_lock);
path_find()
path_init()
aggregate_requests()
hlist_for_each_entry(r, ...
hlist_add_head(...
<r = invalid pointer>
Fix this by ensuring icc_bw_lock is always held before manipulating
icc_node::req_list. The additional places icc_bw_lock is held don't
perform any memory allocations, so we should still be safe from the
original lockdep splats that motivated the separate locks.
[1] commit af42269c3523 ("interconnect: Fix locking for runpm vs reclaim") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix race between quota enable and quota rescan ioctl
When enabling quotas, at btrfs_quota_enable(), after committing the
transaction, we change fs_info->quota_root to point to the quota root we
created and set BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED at fs_info->flags. Then we try
to start the qgroup rescan worker, first by initializing it with a call
to qgroup_rescan_init() - however if that fails we end up freeing the
quota root but we leave fs_info->quota_root still pointing to it, this
can later result in a use-after-free somewhere else.
We have previously set the flags BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED and
BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_ON, so we can only fail with -EINPROGRESS at
btrfs_quota_enable(), which is possible if someone already called the
quota rescan ioctl, and therefore started the rescan worker.
So fix this by ignoring an -EINPROGRESS and asserting we can't get any
other error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: dlm: fix race in lowcomms
This patch fixes a race between queue_work() in
_dlm_lowcomms_commit_msg() and srcu_read_unlock(). The queue_work() can
take the final reference of a dlm_msg and so msg->idx can contain
garbage which is signaled by the following warning:
[ 676.237050] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 676.237052] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1060 at include/linux/srcu.h:189 dlm_lowcomms_commit_msg+0x41/0x50
[ 676.238945] Modules linked in: dlm_locktorture torture rpcsec_gss_krb5 intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support qxl kvm_intel drm_ttm_helper vmw_vsock_virtio_transport kvm vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common ttm irqbypass crc32_pclmul joydev crc32c_intel serio_raw drm_kms_helper vsock virtio_scsi virtio_console virtio_balloon snd_pcm drm syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt snd_timer fb_sys_fops i2c_i801 lpc_ich snd i2c_smbus soundcore pcspkr
[ 676.244227] CPU: 0 PID: 1060 Comm: lock_torture_wr Not tainted 5.19.0-rc3+ #1546
[ 676.245216] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL-AV, BIOS 1.16.0-2.module+el8.7.0+15506+033991b0 04/01/2014
[ 676.246460] RIP: 0010:dlm_lowcomms_commit_msg+0x41/0x50
[ 676.247132] Code: fe ff ff ff 75 24 48 c7 c6 bd 0f 49 bb 48 c7 c7 38 7c 01 bd e8 00 e7 ca ff 89 de 48 c7 c7 60 78 01 bd e8 42 3d cd ff 5b 5d c3 <0f> 0b eb d8 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48
[ 676.249253] RSP: 0018:ffffa401c18ffc68 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 676.249855] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 00000000ffff8b76 RCX: 0000000000000006
[ 676.250713] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffbccf3a10 RDI: ffffffffbcc7b62e
[ 676.251610] RBP: ffffa401c18ffc70 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 676.252481] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000005
[ 676.253421] R13: ffff8b76786ec370 R14: ffff8b76786ec370 R15: ffff8b76786ec480
[ 676.254257] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8b7777800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 676.255239] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 676.255897] CR2: 00005590205d88b8 CR3: 000000017656c003 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[ 676.256734] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 676.257567] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 676.258397] PKRU: 55555554
[ 676.258729] Call Trace:
[ 676.259063] <TASK>
[ 676.259354] dlm_midcomms_commit_mhandle+0xcc/0x110
[ 676.259964] queue_bast+0x8b/0xb0
[ 676.260423] grant_pending_locks+0x166/0x1b0
[ 676.261007] _unlock_lock+0x75/0x90
[ 676.261469] unlock_lock.isra.57+0x62/0xa0
[ 676.262009] dlm_unlock+0x21e/0x330
[ 676.262457] ? lock_torture_stats+0x80/0x80 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 676.263183] torture_unlock+0x5a/0x90 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 676.263815] ? preempt_count_sub+0xba/0x100
[ 676.264361] ? complete+0x1d/0x60
[ 676.264777] lock_torture_writer+0xb8/0x150 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 676.265555] kthread+0x10a/0x130
[ 676.266007] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[ 676.266616] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 676.267097] </TASK>
[ 676.267381] irq event stamp: 9579855
[ 676.267824] hardirqs last enabled at (9579863): [<ffffffffbb14e6f8>] __up_console_sem+0x58/0x60
[ 676.268896] hardirqs last disabled at (9579872): [<ffffffffbb14e6dd>] __up_console_sem+0x3d/0x60
[ 676.270008] softirqs last enabled at (9579798): [<ffffffffbc200349>] __do_softirq+0x349/0x4c7
[ 676.271438] softirqs last disabled at (9579897): [<ffffffffbb0d54c0>] irq_exit_rcu+0xb0/0xf0
[ 676.272796] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
I reproduced this warning with dlm_locktorture test which is currently
not upstream. However this patch fix the issue by make a additional
refcount between dlm_lowcomms_new_msg() and dlm_lowcomms_commit_msg().
In case of the race the kref_put() in dlm_lowcomms_commit_msg() will be
the final put. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix warning in ext4_iomap_begin as race between bmap and write
We got issue as follows:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 9310 at fs/ext4/inode.c:3441 ext4_iomap_begin+0x182/0x5d0
RIP: 0010:ext4_iomap_begin+0x182/0x5d0
RSP: 0018:ffff88812460fa08 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffff88811f168000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff97793c12
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: ffff88812c669160 R08: ffff88811f168000 R09: ffffed10258cd20f
R10: ffff88812c669077 R11: ffffed10258cd20e R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 00000000000000a4 R14: 000000000000000c R15: ffff88812c6691ee
FS: 00007fd0d6ff3740(0000) GS:ffff8883af180000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fd0d6dda290 CR3: 0000000104a62000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
iomap_apply+0x119/0x570
iomap_bmap+0x124/0x150
ext4_bmap+0x14f/0x250
bmap+0x55/0x80
do_vfs_ioctl+0x952/0xbd0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xc6/0x170
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Above issue may happen as follows:
bmap write
bmap
ext4_bmap
iomap_bmap
ext4_iomap_begin
ext4_file_write_iter
ext4_buffered_write_iter
generic_perform_write
ext4_da_write_begin
ext4_da_write_inline_data_begin
ext4_prepare_inline_data
ext4_create_inline_data
ext4_set_inode_flag(inode,
EXT4_INODE_INLINE_DATA);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ext4_has_inline_data(inode))) ->trigger bug_on
To solved above issue hold inode lock in ext4_bamp. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binder: fix UAF of ref->proc caused by race condition
A transaction of type BINDER_TYPE_WEAK_HANDLE can fail to increment the
reference for a node. In this case, the target proc normally releases
the failed reference upon close as expected. However, if the target is
dying in parallel the call will race with binder_deferred_release(), so
the target could have released all of its references by now leaving the
cleanup of the new failed reference unhandled.
The transaction then ends and the target proc gets released making the
ref->proc now a dangling pointer. Later on, ref->node is closed and we
attempt to take spin_lock(&ref->proc->inner_lock), which leads to the
use-after-free bug reported below. Let's fix this by cleaning up the
failed reference on the spot instead of relying on the target to do so.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xa8/0x150
Write of size 4 at addr ffff5ca207094238 by task kworker/1:0/590
CPU: 1 PID: 590 Comm: kworker/1:0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc8 #10
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Workqueue: events binder_deferred_func
Call trace:
dump_backtrace.part.0+0x1d0/0x1e0
show_stack+0x18/0x70
dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84
print_report+0x2e4/0x61c
kasan_report+0xa4/0x110
kasan_check_range+0xfc/0x1a4
__kasan_check_write+0x3c/0x50
_raw_spin_lock+0xa8/0x150
binder_deferred_func+0x5e0/0x9b0
process_one_work+0x38c/0x5f0
worker_thread+0x9c/0x694
kthread+0x188/0x190
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm ioctl: fix misbehavior if list_versions races with module loading
__list_versions will first estimate the required space using the
"dm_target_iterate(list_version_get_needed, &needed)" call and then will
fill the space using the "dm_target_iterate(list_version_get_info,
&iter_info)" call. Each of these calls locks the targets using the
"down_read(&_lock)" and "up_read(&_lock)" calls, however between the first
and second "dm_target_iterate" there is no lock held and the target
modules can be loaded at this point, so the second "dm_target_iterate"
call may need more space than what was the first "dm_target_iterate"
returned.
The code tries to handle this overflow (see the beginning of
list_version_get_info), however this handling is incorrect.
The code sets "param->data_size = param->data_start + needed" and
"iter_info.end = (char *)vers+len" - "needed" is the size returned by the
first dm_target_iterate call; "len" is the size of the buffer allocated by
userspace.
"len" may be greater than "needed"; in this case, the code will write up
to "len" bytes into the buffer, however param->data_size is set to
"needed", so it may write data past the param->data_size value. The ioctl
interface copies only up to param->data_size into userspace, thus part of
the result will be truncated.
Fix this bug by setting "iter_info.end = (char *)vers + needed;" - this
guarantees that the second "dm_target_iterate" call will write only up to
the "needed" buffer and it will exit with "DM_BUFFER_FULL_FLAG" if it
overflows the "needed" space - in this case, userspace will allocate a
larger buffer and retry.
Note that there is also a bug in list_version_get_needed - we need to add
"strlen(tt->name) + 1" to the needed size, not "strlen(tt->name)". |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: pcm: oss: Fix race at SNDCTL_DSP_SYNC
There is a small race window at snd_pcm_oss_sync() that is called from
OSS PCM SNDCTL_DSP_SYNC ioctl; namely the function calls
snd_pcm_oss_make_ready() at first, then takes the params_lock mutex
for the rest. When the stream is set up again by another thread
between them, it leads to inconsistency, and may result in unexpected
results such as NULL dereference of OSS buffer as a fuzzer spotted
recently.
The fix is simply to cover snd_pcm_oss_make_ready() call into the same
params_lock mutex with snd_pcm_oss_make_ready_locked() variant. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rcu-tasks: Fix race in schedule and flush work
While booting secondary CPUs, cpus_read_[lock/unlock] is not keeping
online cpumask stable. The transient online mask results in below
calltrace.
[ 0.324121] CPU1: Booted secondary processor 0x0000000001 [0x410fd083]
[ 0.346652] Detected PIPT I-cache on CPU2
[ 0.347212] CPU2: Booted secondary processor 0x0000000002 [0x410fd083]
[ 0.377255] Detected PIPT I-cache on CPU3
[ 0.377823] CPU3: Booted secondary processor 0x0000000003 [0x410fd083]
[ 0.379040] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 0.383662] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10 at kernel/workqueue.c:3084 __flush_work+0x12c/0x138
[ 0.384850] Modules linked in:
[ 0.385403] CPU: 0 PID: 10 Comm: rcu_tasks_rude_ Not tainted 5.17.0-rc3-v8+ #13
[ 0.386473] Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B Rev 1.4 (DT)
[ 0.387289] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 0.388308] pc : __flush_work+0x12c/0x138
[ 0.388970] lr : __flush_work+0x80/0x138
[ 0.389620] sp : ffffffc00aaf3c60
[ 0.390139] x29: ffffffc00aaf3d20 x28: ffffffc009c16af0 x27: ffffff80f761df48
[ 0.391316] x26: 0000000000000004 x25: 0000000000000003 x24: 0000000000000100
[ 0.392493] x23: ffffffffffffffff x22: ffffffc009c16b10 x21: ffffffc009c16b28
[ 0.393668] x20: ffffffc009e53861 x19: ffffff80f77fbf40 x18: 00000000d744fcc9
[ 0.394842] x17: 000000000000000b x16: 00000000000001c2 x15: ffffffc009e57550
[ 0.396016] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffffffffffffffff x12: 0000000100000000
[ 0.397190] x11: 0000000000000462 x10: ffffff8040258008 x9 : 0000000100000000
[ 0.398364] x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : ffffffc0093c8bf4 x6 : 0000000000000000
[ 0.399538] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffffffc00a976e40 x3 : ffffffc00810444c
[ 0.400711] x2 : 0000000000000004 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 0.401886] Call trace:
[ 0.402309] __flush_work+0x12c/0x138
[ 0.402941] schedule_on_each_cpu+0x228/0x278
[ 0.403693] rcu_tasks_rude_wait_gp+0x130/0x144
[ 0.404502] rcu_tasks_kthread+0x220/0x254
[ 0.405264] kthread+0x174/0x1ac
[ 0.405837] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 0.406456] irq event stamp: 102
[ 0.406966] hardirqs last enabled at (101): [<ffffffc0093c8468>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x78/0xb4
[ 0.408304] hardirqs last disabled at (102): [<ffffffc0093b8270>] el1_dbg+0x24/0x5c
[ 0.409410] softirqs last enabled at (54): [<ffffffc0081b80c8>] local_bh_enable+0xc/0x2c
[ 0.410645] softirqs last disabled at (50): [<ffffffc0081b809c>] local_bh_disable+0xc/0x2c
[ 0.411890] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 0.413000] smp: Brought up 1 node, 4 CPUs
[ 0.413762] SMP: Total of 4 processors activated.
[ 0.414566] CPU features: detected: 32-bit EL0 Support
[ 0.415414] CPU features: detected: 32-bit EL1 Support
[ 0.416278] CPU features: detected: CRC32 instructions
[ 0.447021] Callback from call_rcu_tasks_rude() invoked.
[ 0.506693] Callback from call_rcu_tasks() invoked.
This commit therefore fixes this issue by applying a single-CPU
optimization to the RCU Tasks Rude grace-period process. The key point
here is that the purpose of this RCU flavor is to force a schedule on
each online CPU since some past event. But the rcu_tasks_rude_wait_gp()
function runs in the context of the RCU Tasks Rude's grace-period kthread,
so there must already have been a context switch on the current CPU since
the call to either synchronize_rcu_tasks_rude() or call_rcu_tasks_rude().
So if there is only a single CPU online, RCU Tasks Rude's grace-period
kthread does not need to anything at all.
It turns out that the rcu_tasks_rude_wait_gp() function's call to
schedule_on_each_cpu() causes problems during early boot. During that
time, there is only one online CPU, namely the boot CPU. Therefore,
applying this single-CPU optimization fixes early-boot instances of
this problem. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nbd: fix race between nbd_alloc_config() and module removal
When nbd module is being removing, nbd_alloc_config() may be
called concurrently by nbd_genl_connect(), although try_module_get()
will return false, but nbd_alloc_config() doesn't handle it.
The race may lead to the leak of nbd_config and its related
resources (e.g, recv_workq) and oops in nbd_read_stat() due
to the unload of nbd module as shown below:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000040
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 5 PID: 13840 Comm: kworker/u17:33 Not tainted 5.14.0+ #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
Workqueue: knbd16-recv recv_work [nbd]
RIP: 0010:nbd_read_stat.cold+0x130/0x1a4 [nbd]
Call Trace:
recv_work+0x3b/0xb0 [nbd]
process_one_work+0x1ed/0x390
worker_thread+0x4a/0x3d0
kthread+0x12a/0x150
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
Fixing it by checking the return value of try_module_get()
in nbd_alloc_config(). As nbd_alloc_config() may return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV),
assign nbd->config only when nbd_alloc_config() succeeds to ensure
the value of nbd->config is binary (valid or NULL).
Also adding a debug message to check the reference counter
of nbd_config during module removal. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: pcm: Fix races among concurrent prealloc proc writes
We have no protection against concurrent PCM buffer preallocation
changes via proc files, and it may potentially lead to UAF or some
weird problem. This patch applies the PCM open_mutex to the proc
write operation for avoiding the racy proc writes and the PCM stream
open (and further operations). |
