| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/qedr: Fix qedr_create_user_qp error flow
Avoid the following warning by making sure to free the allocated
resources in case that qedr_init_user_queue() fail.
-----------[ cut here ]-----------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 143192 at drivers/infiniband/core/rdma_core.c:874 uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0xcf/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
Modules linked in: tls target_core_user uio target_core_pscsi target_core_file target_core_iblock ib_srpt ib_srp scsi_transport_srp nfsd nfs_acl rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs 8021q garp mrp stp llc ext4 mbcache jbd2 opa_vnic ib_umad ib_ipoib sunrpc rdma_ucm ib_isert iscsi_target_mod target_core_mod ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm hfi1 intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common mgag200 qedr sb_edac drm_shmem_helper rdmavt x86_pkg_temp_thermal drm_kms_helper intel_powerclamp ib_uverbs coretemp i2c_algo_bit kvm_intel dell_wmi_descriptor ipmi_ssif sparse_keymap kvm ib_core rfkill syscopyarea sysfillrect video sysimgblt irqbypass ipmi_si ipmi_devintf fb_sys_fops rapl iTCO_wdt mxm_wmi iTCO_vendor_support intel_cstate pcspkr dcdbas intel_uncore ipmi_msghandler lpc_ich acpi_power_meter mei_me mei fuse drm xfs libcrc32c qede sd_mod ahci libahci t10_pi sg crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel qed libata tg3
ghash_clmulni_intel megaraid_sas crc8 wmi [last unloaded: ib_srpt]
CPU: 0 PID: 143192 Comm: fi_rdm_tagged_p Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-408.el9.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R430/03XKDV, BIOS 2.14.0 01/25/2022
RIP: 0010:uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0xcf/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
Code: 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e e9 0f 26 1b dd 48 89 df e8 67 6a ff ff 49 8b 86 10 01 00 00 48 85 c0 74 9c 4c 89 e7 e8 83 c0 cb dd eb 92 <0f> 0b eb be 0f 0b be 04 00 00 00 48 89 df e8 8e f5 ff ff e9 6d ff
RSP: 0018:ffffb7c6cadfbc60 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: ffff8f0889ee3f60 RBX: ffff8f088c1a5200 RCX: 00000000802a0016
RDX: 00000000802a0017 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8f0880042600
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8f11fffd5000 R11: 0000000000039000 R12: ffff8f0d5b36cd80
R13: ffff8f088c1a5250 R14: ffff8f1206d91000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8f11d7c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000147069200e20 CR3: 00000001c7210002 CR4: 00000000001706f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
? ib_uverbs_close+0x1f/0xb0 [ib_uverbs]
? uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0xcf/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
? __warn+0x81/0x110
? uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0xcf/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
? report_bug+0x10a/0x140
? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0xcf/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_close+0x1f/0xb0 [ib_uverbs]
__fput+0x94/0x250
task_work_run+0x5c/0x90
do_exit+0x270/0x4a0
do_group_exit+0x2d/0x90
get_signal+0x87c/0x8c0
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x25/0x100
? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc2/0x110 [ib_uverbs]
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x9c/0x130
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xb6/0x100
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x40
do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
? syscall_exit_work+0x103/0x130
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x22/0x40
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
? syscall_exit_work+0x103/0x130
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x22/0x40
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
? common_interrupt+0x43/0xa0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
RIP: 0033:0x1470abe3ec6b
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x1470abe3ec41.
RSP: 002b:00007fff13ce9108 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: fffffffffffffffc RBX: 00007fff13ce9218 RCX: 00001470abe3ec6b
RDX: 00007fff13ce9200 RSI: 00000000c0181b01 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007fff13ce91e0 R08: 0000558d9655da10 R09: 0000558d9655dd00
R10: 00007fff13ce95c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff13ce9358
R13: 0000000000000013 R14: 0000558d9655db50 R15: 00007fff13ce9470
</TASK>
--[ end trace 888a9b92e04c5c97 ]-- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: smartpqi: Fix disable_managed_interrupts
Correct blk-mq registration issue with module parameter
disable_managed_interrupts enabled.
When we turn off the default PCI_IRQ_AFFINITY flag, the driver needs to
register with blk-mq using blk_mq_map_queues(). The driver is currently
calling blk_mq_pci_map_queues() which results in a stack trace and possibly
undefined behavior.
Stack Trace:
[ 7.860089] scsi host2: smartpqi
[ 7.871934] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 238 at block/blk-mq-pci.c:52 blk_mq_pci_map_queues+0xca/0xd0
[ 7.889231] Modules linked in: sd_mod t10_pi sg uas smartpqi(+) crc32c_intel scsi_transport_sas usb_storage dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler fuse
[ 7.924755] CPU: 0 PID: 238 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 4.18.0-372.88.1.el8_6_smartpqi_test.x86_64 #1
[ 7.944336] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL380 Gen10/ProLiant DL380 Gen10, BIOS U30 03/08/2022
[ 7.963026] Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
[ 7.978275] RIP: 0010:blk_mq_pci_map_queues+0xca/0xd0
[ 7.978278] Code: 48 89 de 89 c7 e8 f6 0f 4f 00 3b 05 c4 b7 8e 01 72 e1 5b 31 c0 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f e9 7d df 73 00 31 c0 e9 76 df 73 00 <0f> 0b eb bc 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 49 89 ff 41 56 41 55 41 54
[ 7.978280] RSP: 0018:ffffa95fc3707d50 EFLAGS: 00010216
[ 7.978283] RAX: 00000000ffffffff RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000010
[ 7.978284] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9190c32d4310
[ 7.978286] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffa95fc3707d38 R09: ffff91929b81ac00
[ 7.978287] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffa95fc3707ac0 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 7.978288] R13: ffff9190c32d4000 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: ffff9190c4c950a8
[ 7.978290] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9193efc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 7.978292] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 8.172814] CR2: 000055d11166c000 CR3: 00000002dae10002 CR4: 00000000007706f0
[ 8.172816] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 8.172817] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 8.172818] PKRU: 55555554
[ 8.172819] Call Trace:
[ 8.172823] blk_mq_alloc_tag_set+0x12e/0x310
[ 8.264339] scsi_add_host_with_dma.cold.9+0x30/0x245
[ 8.279302] pqi_ctrl_init+0xacf/0xc8e [smartpqi]
[ 8.294085] ? pqi_pci_probe+0x480/0x4c8 [smartpqi]
[ 8.309015] pqi_pci_probe+0x480/0x4c8 [smartpqi]
[ 8.323286] local_pci_probe+0x42/0x80
[ 8.337855] work_for_cpu_fn+0x16/0x20
[ 8.351193] process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
[ 8.364462] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 8.379252] worker_thread+0x1ce/0x390
[ 8.392623] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 8.406295] kthread+0x10a/0x120
[ 8.418428] ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50
[ 8.431532] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 8.444137] ---[ end trace 1bf0173d39354506 ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dccp/tcp: Unhash sk from ehash for tb2 alloc failure after check_estalblished().
syzkaller reported a warning [0] in inet_csk_destroy_sock() with no
repro.
WARN_ON(inet_sk(sk)->inet_num && !inet_csk(sk)->icsk_bind_hash);
However, the syzkaller's log hinted that connect() failed just before
the warning due to FAULT_INJECTION. [1]
When connect() is called for an unbound socket, we search for an
available ephemeral port. If a bhash bucket exists for the port, we
call __inet_check_established() or __inet6_check_established() to check
if the bucket is reusable.
If reusable, we add the socket into ehash and set inet_sk(sk)->inet_num.
Later, we look up the corresponding bhash2 bucket and try to allocate
it if it does not exist.
Although it rarely occurs in real use, if the allocation fails, we must
revert the changes by check_established(). Otherwise, an unconnected
socket could illegally occupy an ehash entry.
Note that we do not put tw back into ehash because sk might have
already responded to a packet for tw and it would be better to free
tw earlier under such memory presure.
[0]:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 350830 at net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193 inet_csk_destroy_sock (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193)
Modules linked in:
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:inet_csk_destroy_sock (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193)
Code: 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e e9 2d 4a 3d fd e8 28 4a 3d fd 48 89 ef e8 f0 cd 7d ff 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e e9 13 4a 3d fd e8 0e 4a 3d fd <0f> 0b e9 61 fe ff ff e8 02 4a 3d fd 4c 89 e7 be 03 00 00 00 e8 05
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b21fd38 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000009e78 RCX: ffffffff840bae40
RDX: ffff88806e46c600 RSI: ffffffff840bb012 RDI: ffff88811755cca8
RBP: ffff88811755c880 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000009e78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88811755c8e0
R13: ffff88811755c892 R14: ffff88811755c918 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f03e5243800(0000) GS:ffff88811ae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b32f21000 CR3: 0000000112ffe001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? inet_csk_destroy_sock (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193)
dccp_close (net/dccp/proto.c:1078)
inet_release (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:434)
__sock_release (net/socket.c:660)
sock_close (net/socket.c:1423)
__fput (fs/file_table.c:377)
__fput_sync (fs/file_table.c:462)
__x64_sys_close (fs/open.c:1557 fs/open.c:1539 fs/open.c:1539)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:129)
RIP: 0033:0x7f03e53852bb
Code: 03 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 43 c9 f5 ff 8b 7c 24 0c 41 89 c0 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 89 44 24 0c e8 a1 c9 f5 ff 8b 44
RSP: 002b:00000000005dfba0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007f03e53852bb
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000167c
R10: 0000000008a79680 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007f03e4e43000
R13: 00007f03e4e43170 R14: 00007f03e4e43178 R15: 00007f03e4e43170
</TASK>
[1]:
FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure.
name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0
CPU: 0 PID: 350833 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.7.0-12272-g2121c43f88f5 #9
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 1))
should_fail_ex (lib/fault-inject.c:52 lib/fault-inject.c:153)
should_failslab (mm/slub.c:3748)
kmem_cache_alloc (mm/slub.c:3763 mm/slub.c:3842 mm/slub.c:3867)
inet_bind2_bucket_create
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_mirred: use the backlog for mirred ingress
The test Davide added in commit ca22da2fbd69 ("act_mirred: use the backlog
for nested calls to mirred ingress") hangs our testing VMs every 10 or so
runs, with the familiar tcp_v4_rcv -> tcp_v4_rcv deadlock reported by
lockdep.
The problem as previously described by Davide (see Link) is that
if we reverse flow of traffic with the redirect (egress -> ingress)
we may reach the same socket which generated the packet. And we may
still be holding its socket lock. The common solution to such deadlocks
is to put the packet in the Rx backlog, rather than run the Rx path
inline. Do that for all egress -> ingress reversals, not just once
we started to nest mirred calls.
In the past there was a concern that the backlog indirection will
lead to loss of error reporting / less accurate stats. But the current
workaround does not seem to address the issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/pseries/iommu: DLPAR add doesn't completely initialize pci_controller
When a PCI device is dynamically added, the kernel oopses with a NULL
pointer dereference:
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000030
Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000006bbe5c
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
Modules linked in: rpadlpar_io rpaphp rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs xsk_diag bonding nft_compat nf_tables nfnetlink rfkill binfmt_misc dm_multipath rpcrdma sunrpc rdma_ucm ib_srpt ib_isert iscsi_target_mod target_core_mod ib_umad ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_ipoib rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core pseries_rng drm drm_panel_orientation_quirks xfs libcrc32c mlx5_core mlxfw sd_mod t10_pi sg tls ibmvscsi ibmveth scsi_transport_srp vmx_crypto pseries_wdt psample dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
CPU: 17 PID: 2685 Comm: drmgr Not tainted 6.7.0-203405+ #66
Hardware name: IBM,9080-HEX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NH1060_008) hv:phyp pSeries
NIP: c0000000006bbe5c LR: c000000000a13e68 CTR: c0000000000579f8
REGS: c00000009924f240 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (6.7.0-203405+)
MSR: 8000000000009033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24002220 XER: 20040006
CFAR: c000000000a13e64 DAR: 0000000000000030 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0
...
NIP sysfs_add_link_to_group+0x34/0x94
LR iommu_device_link+0x5c/0x118
Call Trace:
iommu_init_device+0x26c/0x318 (unreliable)
iommu_device_link+0x5c/0x118
iommu_init_device+0xa8/0x318
iommu_probe_device+0xc0/0x134
iommu_bus_notifier+0x44/0x104
notifier_call_chain+0xb8/0x19c
blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x64/0x98
bus_notify+0x50/0x7c
device_add+0x640/0x918
pci_device_add+0x23c/0x298
of_create_pci_dev+0x400/0x884
of_scan_pci_dev+0x124/0x1b0
__of_scan_bus+0x78/0x18c
pcibios_scan_phb+0x2a4/0x3b0
init_phb_dynamic+0xb8/0x110
dlpar_add_slot+0x170/0x3b8 [rpadlpar_io]
add_slot_store.part.0+0xb4/0x130 [rpadlpar_io]
kobj_attr_store+0x2c/0x48
sysfs_kf_write+0x64/0x78
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1b0/0x290
vfs_write+0x350/0x4a0
ksys_write+0x84/0x140
system_call_exception+0x124/0x330
system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
Commit a940904443e4 ("powerpc/iommu: Add iommu_ops to report capabilities
and allow blocking domains") broke DLPAR add of PCI devices.
The above added iommu_device structure to pci_controller. During
system boot, PCI devices are discovered and this newly added iommu_device
structure is initialized by a call to iommu_device_register().
During DLPAR add of a PCI device, a new pci_controller structure is
allocated but there are no calls made to iommu_device_register()
interface.
Fix is to register the iommu device during DLPAR add as well. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix racing between bpf_timer_cancel_and_free and bpf_timer_cancel
The following race is possible between bpf_timer_cancel_and_free
and bpf_timer_cancel. It will lead a UAF on the timer->timer.
bpf_timer_cancel();
spin_lock();
t = timer->time;
spin_unlock();
bpf_timer_cancel_and_free();
spin_lock();
t = timer->timer;
timer->timer = NULL;
spin_unlock();
hrtimer_cancel(&t->timer);
kfree(t);
/* UAF on t */
hrtimer_cancel(&t->timer);
In bpf_timer_cancel_and_free, this patch frees the timer->timer
after a rcu grace period. This requires a rcu_head addition
to the "struct bpf_hrtimer". Another kfree(t) happens in bpf_timer_init,
this does not need a kfree_rcu because it is still under the
spin_lock and timer->timer has not been visible by others yet.
In bpf_timer_cancel, rcu_read_lock() is added because this helper
can be used in a non rcu critical section context (e.g. from
a sleepable bpf prog). Other timer->timer usages in helpers.c
have been audited, bpf_timer_cancel() is the only place where
timer->timer is used outside of the spin_lock.
Another solution considered is to mark a t->flag in bpf_timer_cancel
and clear it after hrtimer_cancel() is done. In bpf_timer_cancel_and_free,
it busy waits for the flag to be cleared before kfree(t). This patch
goes with a straight forward solution and frees timer->timer after
a rcu grace period. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
afs: Increase buffer size in afs_update_volume_status()
The max length of volume->vid value is 20 characters.
So increase idbuf[] size up to 24 to avoid overflow.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
[DH: Actually, it's 20 + NUL, so increase it to 24 and use snprintf()] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: sr: fix possible use-after-free and null-ptr-deref
The pernet operations structure for the subsystem must be registered
before registering the generic netlink family. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
devlink: fix possible use-after-free and memory leaks in devlink_init()
The pernet operations structure for the subsystem must be registered
before registering the generic netlink family.
Make an unregister in case of unsuccessful registration. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arp: Prevent overflow in arp_req_get().
syzkaller reported an overflown write in arp_req_get(). [0]
When ioctl(SIOCGARP) is issued, arp_req_get() looks up an neighbour
entry and copies neigh->ha to struct arpreq.arp_ha.sa_data.
The arp_ha here is struct sockaddr, not struct sockaddr_storage, so
the sa_data buffer is just 14 bytes.
In the splat below, 2 bytes are overflown to the next int field,
arp_flags. We initialise the field just after the memcpy(), so it's
not a problem.
However, when dev->addr_len is greater than 22 (e.g. MAX_ADDR_LEN),
arp_netmask is overwritten, which could be set as htonl(0xFFFFFFFFUL)
in arp_ioctl() before calling arp_req_get().
To avoid the overflow, let's limit the max length of memcpy().
Note that commit b5f0de6df6dc ("net: dev: Convert sa_data to flexible
array in struct sockaddr") just silenced syzkaller.
[0]:
memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 16) of single field "r->arp_ha.sa_data" at net/ipv4/arp.c:1128 (size 14)
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 144638 at net/ipv4/arp.c:1128 arp_req_get+0x411/0x4a0 net/ipv4/arp.c:1128
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 144638 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.1.74 #31
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-debian-1.16.0-5 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:arp_req_get+0x411/0x4a0 net/ipv4/arp.c:1128
Code: fd ff ff e8 41 42 de fb b9 0e 00 00 00 4c 89 fe 48 c7 c2 20 6d ab 87 48 c7 c7 80 6d ab 87 c6 05 25 af 72 04 01 e8 5f 8d ad fb <0f> 0b e9 6c fd ff ff e8 13 42 de fb be 03 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 a6
RSP: 0018:ffffc900050b7998 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88803a815000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8641a44a RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffffc900050b7a98 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 203a7970636d656d R12: ffff888039c54000
R13: 1ffff92000a16f37 R14: ffff88803a815084 R15: 0000000000000010
FS: 00007f172bf306c0(0000) GS:ffff88805aa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f172b3569f0 CR3: 0000000057f12005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
arp_ioctl+0x33f/0x4b0 net/ipv4/arp.c:1261
inet_ioctl+0x314/0x3a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:981
sock_do_ioctl+0xdf/0x260 net/socket.c:1204
sock_ioctl+0x3ef/0x650 net/socket.c:1321
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x220 fs/ioctl.c:856
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x37/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x64/0xce
RIP: 0033:0x7f172b262b8d
Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f172bf300b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f172b3abf80 RCX: 00007f172b262b8d
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000000008954 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f172b2d3493 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f172b3abf80 R15: 00007f172bf10000
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: implement lockless setsockopt(SO_PEEK_OFF)
syzbot reported a lockdep violation [1] involving af_unix
support of SO_PEEK_OFF.
Since SO_PEEK_OFF is inherently not thread safe (it uses a per-socket
sk_peek_off field), there is really no point to enforce a pointless
thread safety in the kernel.
After this patch :
- setsockopt(SO_PEEK_OFF) no longer acquires the socket lock.
- skb_consume_udp() no longer has to acquire the socket lock.
- af_unix no longer needs a special version of sk_set_peek_off(),
because it does not lock u->iolock anymore.
As a followup, we could replace prot->set_peek_off to be a boolean
and avoid an indirect call, since we always use sk_set_peek_off().
[1]
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-00267-g0f1dd5e91e2b #0 Not tainted
syz-executor.2/30025 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff8880765e7d80 (&u->iolock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: unix_set_peek_off+0x26/0xa0 net/unix/af_unix.c:789
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1691 [inline]
ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1060 [inline]
ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sk_setsockopt+0xe52/0x3360 net/core/sock.c:1193
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}:
lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
lock_sock_nested+0x48/0x100 net/core/sock.c:3524
lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1691 [inline]
__unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x1275/0x12c0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2415
sock_recvmsg_nosec+0x18e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:1046
____sys_recvmsg+0x3c0/0x470 net/socket.c:2801
___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline]
do_recvmmsg+0x474/0xae0 net/socket.c:2939
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3018 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3034 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3034
do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
-> #0 (&u->iolock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
validate_chain+0x18ca/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
__lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x136/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
unix_set_peek_off+0x26/0xa0 net/unix/af_unix.c:789
sk_setsockopt+0x207e/0x3360
do_sock_setsockopt+0x2fb/0x720 net/socket.c:2307
__sys_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(sk_lock-AF_UNIX);
lock(&u->iolock);
lock(sk_lock-AF_UNIX);
lock(&u->iolock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by syz-executor.2/30025:
#0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1691 [inline]
#0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1060 [inline]
#0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sk_setsockopt+0xe52/0x3360 net/core/sock.c:1193
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 30025 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-00267-g0f1dd5e91e2b #0
Hardware name: Google Google C
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (nct6775) Fix access to temperature configuration registers
The number of temperature configuration registers does
not always match the total number of temperature registers.
This can result in access errors reported if KASAN is enabled.
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in nct6775_probe+0x5654/0x6fe9 nct6775_core |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Fix potential null pointer dereference in dc_dmub_srv
Fixes potential null pointer dereference warnings in the
dc_dmub_srv_cmd_list_queue_execute() and dc_dmub_srv_is_hw_pwr_up()
functions.
In both functions, the 'dc_dmub_srv' variable was being dereferenced
before it was checked for null. This could lead to a null pointer
dereference if 'dc_dmub_srv' is null. The fix is to check if
'dc_dmub_srv' is null before dereferencing it.
Thus moving the null checks for 'dc_dmub_srv' to the beginning of the
functions to ensure that 'dc_dmub_srv' is not null when it is
dereferenced.
Found by smatch & thus fixing the below:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c:133 dc_dmub_srv_cmd_list_queue_execute() warn: variable dereferenced before check 'dc_dmub_srv' (see line 128)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c:1167 dc_dmub_srv_is_hw_pwr_up() warn: variable dereferenced before check 'dc_dmub_srv' (see line 1164) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: fix null-pointer dereference on edid reading
Use i2c adapter when there isn't aux_mode in dc_link to fix a
null-pointer derefence that happens when running
igt@kms_force_connector_basic in a system with DCN2.1 and HDMI connector
detected as below:
[ +0.178146] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000004c0
[ +0.000010] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ +0.000005] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ +0.000004] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ +0.000006] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ +0.000006] CPU: 15 PID: 2368 Comm: kms_force_conne Not tainted 6.5.0-asdn+ #152
[ +0.000005] Hardware name: HP HP ENVY x360 Convertible 13-ay1xxx/8929, BIOS F.01 07/14/2021
[ +0.000004] RIP: 0010:i2c_transfer+0xd/0x100
[ +0.000011] Code: ea fc ff ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 53 <48> 8b 47 10 48 89 fb 48 83 38 00 0f 84 b3 00 00 00 83 3d 2f 80 16
[ +0.000004] RSP: 0018:ffff9c4f89c0fad0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ +0.000005] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 0000000000000080
[ +0.000003] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffff9c4f89c0fb20 RDI: 00000000000004b0
[ +0.000003] RBP: ffff9c4f89c0fb80 R08: 0000000000000080 R09: ffff8d8e0b15b980
[ +0.000003] R10: 00000000000380e0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000080
[ +0.000002] R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffff9c4f89c0fb0e R15: ffff9c4f89c0fb0f
[ +0.000004] FS: 00007f9ad2176c40(0000) GS:ffff8d90fe9c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ +0.000003] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ +0.000004] CR2: 00000000000004c0 CR3: 0000000121bc4000 CR4: 0000000000750ee0
[ +0.000003] PKRU: 55555554
[ +0.000003] Call Trace:
[ +0.000006] <TASK>
[ +0.000006] ? __die+0x23/0x70
[ +0.000011] ? page_fault_oops+0x17d/0x4c0
[ +0.000008] ? preempt_count_add+0x6e/0xa0
[ +0.000008] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[ +0.000011] ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x180
[ +0.000009] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
[ +0.000013] ? i2c_transfer+0xd/0x100
[ +0.000010] drm_do_probe_ddc_edid+0xc2/0x140 [drm]
[ +0.000067] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[ +0.000006] ? _drm_do_get_edid+0x97/0x3c0 [drm]
[ +0.000043] ? __pfx_drm_do_probe_ddc_edid+0x10/0x10 [drm]
[ +0.000042] edid_block_read+0x3b/0xd0 [drm]
[ +0.000043] _drm_do_get_edid+0xb6/0x3c0 [drm]
[ +0.000041] ? __pfx_drm_do_probe_ddc_edid+0x10/0x10 [drm]
[ +0.000043] drm_edid_read_custom+0x37/0xd0 [drm]
[ +0.000044] amdgpu_dm_connector_mode_valid+0x129/0x1d0 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000153] drm_connector_mode_valid+0x3b/0x60 [drm_kms_helper]
[ +0.000000] __drm_helper_update_and_validate+0xfe/0x3c0 [drm_kms_helper]
[ +0.000000] ? amdgpu_dm_connector_get_modes+0xb6/0x520 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000000] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[ +0.000000] drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x2ab/0x540 [drm_kms_helper]
[ +0.000000] status_store+0xb2/0x1f0 [drm]
[ +0.000000] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x136/0x1d0
[ +0.000000] vfs_write+0x24d/0x440
[ +0.000000] ksys_write+0x6f/0xf0
[ +0.000000] do_syscall_64+0x60/0xc0
[ +0.000000] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[ +0.000000] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2b/0x40
[ +0.000000] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[ +0.000000] ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0xc0
[ +0.000000] ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0xc0
[ +0.000000] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
[ +0.000000] RIP: 0033:0x7f9ad46b4b00
[ +0.000000] Code: 40 00 48 8b 15 19 b3 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 80 3d e1 3a 0e 00 00 74 17 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 58 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89
[ +0.000000] RSP: 002b:00007ffcbd3bd6d8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[ +0.000000] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f9ad46b4b00
[ +0.000000] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00007f9ad48a7417 RDI: 0000000000000009
[ +0.000000] RBP: 0000000000000002 R08
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dpll: fix possible deadlock during netlink dump operation
Recently, I've been hitting following deadlock warning during dpll pin
dump:
[52804.637962] ======================================================
[52804.638536] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[52804.639111] 6.8.0-rc2jiri+ #1 Not tainted
[52804.639529] ------------------------------------------------------
[52804.640104] python3/2984 is trying to acquire lock:
[52804.640581] ffff88810e642678 (nlk_cb_mutex-GENERIC){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: netlink_dump+0xb3/0x780
[52804.641417]
but task is already holding lock:
[52804.642010] ffffffff83bde4c8 (dpll_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpll_lock_dumpit+0x13/0x20
[52804.642747]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
[52804.643551]
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[52804.644259]
-> #1 (dpll_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[52804.644836] lock_acquire+0x174/0x3e0
[52804.645271] __mutex_lock+0x119/0x1150
[52804.645723] dpll_lock_dumpit+0x13/0x20
[52804.646169] genl_start+0x266/0x320
[52804.646578] __netlink_dump_start+0x321/0x450
[52804.647056] genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x155/0x1e0
[52804.647575] genl_rcv_msg+0x1ed/0x3b0
[52804.648001] netlink_rcv_skb+0xdc/0x210
[52804.648440] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
[52804.648831] netlink_unicast+0x2f1/0x490
[52804.649290] netlink_sendmsg+0x36d/0x660
[52804.649742] __sock_sendmsg+0x73/0xc0
[52804.650165] __sys_sendto+0x184/0x210
[52804.650597] __x64_sys_sendto+0x72/0x80
[52804.651045] do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x140
[52804.651474] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e
[52804.652001]
-> #0 (nlk_cb_mutex-GENERIC){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[52804.652650] check_prev_add+0x1ae/0x1280
[52804.653107] __lock_acquire+0x1ed3/0x29a0
[52804.653559] lock_acquire+0x174/0x3e0
[52804.653984] __mutex_lock+0x119/0x1150
[52804.654423] netlink_dump+0xb3/0x780
[52804.654845] __netlink_dump_start+0x389/0x450
[52804.655321] genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x155/0x1e0
[52804.655842] genl_rcv_msg+0x1ed/0x3b0
[52804.656272] netlink_rcv_skb+0xdc/0x210
[52804.656721] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
[52804.657119] netlink_unicast+0x2f1/0x490
[52804.657570] netlink_sendmsg+0x36d/0x660
[52804.658022] __sock_sendmsg+0x73/0xc0
[52804.658450] __sys_sendto+0x184/0x210
[52804.658877] __x64_sys_sendto+0x72/0x80
[52804.659322] do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x140
[52804.659752] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e
[52804.660281]
other info that might help us debug this:
[52804.661077] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[52804.661671] CPU0 CPU1
[52804.662129] ---- ----
[52804.662577] lock(dpll_lock);
[52804.662924] lock(nlk_cb_mutex-GENERIC);
[52804.663538] lock(dpll_lock);
[52804.664073] lock(nlk_cb_mutex-GENERIC);
[52804.664490]
The issue as follows: __netlink_dump_start() calls control->start(cb)
with nlk->cb_mutex held. In control->start(cb) the dpll_lock is taken.
Then nlk->cb_mutex is released and taken again in netlink_dump(), while
dpll_lock still being held. That leads to ABBA deadlock when another
CPU races with the same operation.
Fix this by moving dpll_lock taking into dumpit() callback which ensures
correct lock taking order. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: DPLL, Fix possible use after free after delayed work timer triggers
I managed to hit following use after free warning recently:
[ 2169.711665] ==================================================================
[ 2169.714009] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timers.part.0+0x179/0x4c0
[ 2169.716293] Write of size 8 at addr ffff88812b326a70 by task swapper/4/0
[ 2169.719022] CPU: 4 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2jiri+ #2
[ 2169.720974] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 2169.722457] Call Trace:
[ 2169.722756] <IRQ>
[ 2169.723024] dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0xb0
[ 2169.723417] print_report+0xc5/0x630
[ 2169.723807] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x126/0x2b0
[ 2169.724268] kasan_report+0xbe/0xf0
[ 2169.724667] ? __run_timers.part.0+0x179/0x4c0
[ 2169.725116] ? __run_timers.part.0+0x179/0x4c0
[ 2169.725570] __run_timers.part.0+0x179/0x4c0
[ 2169.726003] ? call_timer_fn+0x320/0x320
[ 2169.726404] ? lock_downgrade+0x3a0/0x3a0
[ 2169.726820] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x14/0x20
[ 2169.727257] ? ktime_get+0x92/0x150
[ 2169.727630] ? lapic_next_deadline+0x35/0x60
[ 2169.728069] run_timer_softirq+0x40/0x80
[ 2169.728475] __do_softirq+0x1a1/0x509
[ 2169.728866] irq_exit_rcu+0x95/0xc0
[ 2169.729241] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6b/0x80
[ 2169.729718] </IRQ>
[ 2169.729993] <TASK>
[ 2169.730259] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20
[ 2169.730755] RIP: 0010:default_idle+0x13/0x20
[ 2169.731190] Code: c0 08 00 00 00 4d 29 c8 4c 01 c7 4c 29 c2 e9 72 ff ff ff cc cc cc cc 8b 05 9a 7f 1f 02 85 c0 7e 07 0f 00 2d cf 69 43 00 fb f4 <fa> c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 93 04 00
[ 2169.732759] RSP: 0018:ffff888100dbfe10 EFLAGS: 00000242
[ 2169.733264] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff888100d9c200 RCX: ffffffff8241bd62
[ 2169.733925] RDX: ffffed109a848b15 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff8127ac55
[ 2169.734566] RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed109a848b14
[ 2169.735200] R10: ffff8884d42458a3 R11: 000000000000ba7e R12: ffffffff83d7d3a0
[ 2169.735835] R13: 1ffff110201b7fc6 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888100d9c200
[ 2169.736478] ? ct_kernel_exit.constprop.0+0xa2/0xc0
[ 2169.736954] ? do_idle+0x285/0x290
[ 2169.737323] default_idle_call+0x63/0x90
[ 2169.737730] do_idle+0x285/0x290
[ 2169.738089] ? arch_cpu_idle_exit+0x30/0x30
[ 2169.738511] ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x80
[ 2169.738917] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x12e/0x200
[ 2169.739417] cpu_startup_entry+0x30/0x40
[ 2169.739825] start_secondary+0x19a/0x1c0
[ 2169.740229] ? set_cpu_sibling_map+0xbd0/0xbd0
[ 2169.740673] secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x15d/0x16b
[ 2169.741179] </TASK>
[ 2169.741686] Allocated by task 1098:
[ 2169.742058] kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2169.742456] kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
[ 2169.742852] __kasan_kmalloc+0x83/0x90
[ 2169.743246] mlx5_dpll_probe+0xf5/0x3c0 [mlx5_dpll]
[ 2169.743730] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x62/0xb0
[ 2169.744148] really_probe+0x127/0x590
[ 2169.744534] __driver_probe_device+0xd2/0x200
[ 2169.744973] device_driver_attach+0x6b/0xf0
[ 2169.745402] bind_store+0x90/0xe0
[ 2169.745761] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1df/0x2a0
[ 2169.746210] vfs_write+0x41f/0x790
[ 2169.746579] ksys_write+0xc7/0x160
[ 2169.746947] do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x140
[ 2169.747333] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e
[ 2169.748049] Freed by task 1220:
[ 2169.748393] kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2169.748789] kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
[ 2169.749188] kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x50
[ 2169.749621] poison_slab_object+0x106/0x180
[ 2169.750044] __kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x50
[ 2169.750451] kfree+0x118/0x330
[ 2169.750792] mlx5_dpll_remove+0xf5/0x110 [mlx5_dpll]
[ 2169.751271] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x2e/0x40
[ 2169.751694] device_release_driver_internal+0x24b/0x2e0
[ 2169.752191] unbind_store+0xa6/0xb0
[ 2169.752563] kernfs_fo
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
lan966x: Fix crash when adding interface under a lag
There is a crash when adding one of the lan966x interfaces under a lag
interface. The issue can be reproduced like this:
ip link add name bond0 type bond miimon 100 mode balance-xor
ip link set dev eth0 master bond0
The reason is because when adding a interface under the lag it would go
through all the ports and try to figure out which other ports are under
that lag interface. And the issue is that lan966x can have ports that are
NULL pointer as they are not probed. So then iterating over these ports
it would just crash as they are NULL pointers.
The fix consists in actually checking for NULL pointers before accessing
something from the ports. Like we do in other places. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: rt5645: Fix deadlock in rt5645_jack_detect_work()
There is a path in rt5645_jack_detect_work(), where rt5645->jd_mutex
is left locked forever. That may lead to deadlock
when rt5645_jack_detect_work() is called for the second time.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/dsc: Fix the macro that calculates DSCC_/DSCA_ PPS reg address
Commit bd077259d0a9 ("drm/i915/vdsc: Add function to read any PPS
register") defines a new macro to calculate the DSC PPS register
addresses with PPS number as an input. This macro correctly calculates
the addresses till PPS 11 since the addresses increment by 4. So in that
case the following macro works correctly to give correct register
address:
_MMIO(_DSCA_PPS_0 + (pps) * 4)
However after PPS 11, the register address for PPS 12 increments by 12
because of RC Buffer memory allocation in between. Because of this
discontinuity in the address space, the macro calculates wrong addresses
for PPS 12 - 16 resulting into incorrect DSC PPS parameter value
read/writes causing DSC corruption.
This fixes it by correcting this macro to add the offset of 12 for PPS
>=12.
v3: Add correct paranthesis for pps argument (Jani Nikula)
(cherry picked from commit 6074be620c31dc2ae11af96a1a5ea95580976fb5) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-crypt, dm-verity: disable tasklets
Tasklets have an inherent problem with memory corruption. The function
tasklet_action_common calls tasklet_trylock, then it calls the tasklet
callback and then it calls tasklet_unlock. If the tasklet callback frees
the structure that contains the tasklet or if it calls some code that may
free it, tasklet_unlock will write into free memory.
The commits 8e14f610159d and d9a02e016aaf try to fix it for dm-crypt, but
it is not a sufficient fix and the data corruption can still happen [1].
There is no fix for dm-verity and dm-verity will write into free memory
with every tasklet-processed bio.
There will be atomic workqueues implemented in the kernel 6.9 [2]. They
will have better interface and they will not suffer from the memory
corruption problem.
But we need something that stops the memory corruption now and that can be
backported to the stable kernels. So, I'm proposing this commit that
disables tasklets in both dm-crypt and dm-verity. This commit doesn't
remove the tasklet support, because the tasklet code will be reused when
atomic workqueues will be implemented.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/d390d7ee-f142-44d3-822a-87949e14608b@suse.de/T/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240130091300.2968534-1-tj@kernel.org/ |
