| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: Use 64 bit variable to avoid 32 bit overflow
For example, in the expression:
vbo = 2 * vbo + skip |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
kunit/fortify: Fix mismatched kvalloc()/vfree() usage
The kv*() family of tests were accidentally freeing with vfree() instead
of kvfree(). Use kvfree() instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpufreq: exit() callback is optional
The exit() callback is optional and shouldn't be called without checking
a valid pointer first.
Also, we must clear freq_table pointer even if the exit() callback isn't
present. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
openrisc: traps: Don't send signals to kernel mode threads
OpenRISC exception handling sends signals to user processes on floating
point exceptions and trap instructions (for debugging) among others.
There is a bug where the trap handling logic may send signals to kernel
threads, we should not send these signals to kernel threads, if that
happens we treat it as an error.
This patch adds conditions to die if the kernel receives these
exceptions in kernel mode code. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
macintosh/via-macii: Fix "BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context"
The via-macii ADB driver calls request_irq() after disabling hard
interrupts. But disabling interrupts isn't necessary here because the
VIA shift register interrupt was masked during VIA1 initialization. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: refine the EOF check in blkdev_iomap_begin
blkdev_iomap_begin rounds down the offset to the logical block size
before stashing it in iomap->offset and checking that it still is
inside the inode size.
Check the i_size check to the raw pos value so that we don't try a
zero size write if iter->pos is unaligned. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/io-wq: Use set_bit() and test_bit() at worker->flags
Utilize set_bit() and test_bit() on worker->flags within io_uring/io-wq
to address potential data races.
The structure io_worker->flags may be accessed through various data
paths, leading to concurrency issues. When KCSAN is enabled, it reveals
data races occurring in io_worker_handle_work and
io_wq_activate_free_worker functions.
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in io_worker_handle_work / io_wq_activate_free_worker
write to 0xffff8885c4246404 of 4 bytes by task 49071 on cpu 28:
io_worker_handle_work (io_uring/io-wq.c:434 io_uring/io-wq.c:569)
io_wq_worker (io_uring/io-wq.c:?)
<snip>
read to 0xffff8885c4246404 of 4 bytes by task 49024 on cpu 5:
io_wq_activate_free_worker (io_uring/io-wq.c:? io_uring/io-wq.c:285)
io_wq_enqueue (io_uring/io-wq.c:947)
io_queue_iowq (io_uring/io_uring.c:524)
io_req_task_submit (io_uring/io_uring.c:1511)
io_handle_tw_list (io_uring/io_uring.c:1198)
<snip>
Line numbers against commit 18daea77cca6 ("Merge tag 'for-linus' of
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm").
These races involve writes and reads to the same memory location by
different tasks running on different CPUs. To mitigate this, refactor
the code to use atomic operations such as set_bit(), test_bit(), and
clear_bit() instead of basic "and" and "or" operations. This ensures
thread-safe manipulation of worker flags.
Also, move `create_index` to avoid holes in the structure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-cgroup: fix list corruption from resetting io stat
Since commit 3b8cc6298724 ("blk-cgroup: Optimize blkcg_rstat_flush()"),
each iostat instance is added to blkcg percpu list, so blkcg_reset_stats()
can't reset the stat instance by memset(), otherwise the llist may be
corrupted.
Fix the issue by only resetting the counter part. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: Only use reserved BCS instances for usm migrate exec queue
The GuC context scheduling queue is 2 entires deep, thus it is possible
for a migration job to be stuck behind a fault if migration exec queue
shares engines with user jobs. This can deadlock as the migrate exec
queue is required to service page faults. Avoid deadlock by only using
reserved BCS instances for usm migrate exec queue.
(cherry picked from commit 04f4a70a183a688a60fe3882d6e4236ea02cfc67) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: multidev: fix to recognize valid zero block address
As reported by Yi Zhang in mailing list [1], kernel warning was catched
during zbd/010 test as below:
./check zbd/010
zbd/010 (test gap zone support with F2FS) [failed]
runtime ... 3.752s
something found in dmesg:
[ 4378.146781] run blktests zbd/010 at 2024-02-18 11:31:13
[ 4378.192349] null_blk: module loaded
[ 4378.209860] null_blk: disk nullb0 created
[ 4378.413285] scsi_debug:sdebug_driver_probe: scsi_debug: trim
poll_queues to 0. poll_q/nr_hw = (0/1)
[ 4378.422334] scsi host15: scsi_debug: version 0191 [20210520]
dev_size_mb=1024, opts=0x0, submit_queues=1, statistics=0
[ 4378.434922] scsi 15:0:0:0: Direct-Access-ZBC Linux
scsi_debug 0191 PQ: 0 ANSI: 7
[ 4378.443343] scsi 15:0:0:0: Power-on or device reset occurred
[ 4378.449371] sd 15:0:0:0: Attached scsi generic sg5 type 20
[ 4378.449418] sd 15:0:0:0: [sdf] Host-managed zoned block device
...
(See '/mnt/tests/gitlab.com/api/v4/projects/19168116/repository/archive.zip/storage/blktests/blk/blktests/results/nodev/zbd/010.dmesg'
WARNING: CPU: 22 PID: 44011 at fs/iomap/iter.c:51
CPU: 22 PID: 44011 Comm: fio Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3+ #1
RIP: 0010:iomap_iter+0x32b/0x350
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__iomap_dio_rw+0x1df/0x830
f2fs_file_read_iter+0x156/0x3d0 [f2fs]
aio_read+0x138/0x210
io_submit_one+0x188/0x8c0
__x64_sys_io_submit+0x8c/0x1a0
do_syscall_64+0x86/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
Shinichiro Kawasaki helps to analyse this issue and proposes a potential
fixing patch in [2].
Quoted from reply of Shinichiro Kawasaki:
"I confirmed that the trigger commit is dbf8e63f48af as Yi reported. I took a
look in the commit, but it looks fine to me. So I thought the cause is not
in the commit diff.
I found the WARN is printed when the f2fs is set up with multiple devices,
and read requests are mapped to the very first block of the second device in the
direct read path. In this case, f2fs_map_blocks() and f2fs_map_blocks_cached()
modify map->m_pblk as the physical block address from each block device. It
becomes zero when it is mapped to the first block of the device. However,
f2fs_iomap_begin() assumes that map->m_pblk is the physical block address of the
whole f2fs, across the all block devices. It compares map->m_pblk against
NULL_ADDR == 0, then go into the unexpected branch and sets the invalid
iomap->length. The WARN catches the invalid iomap->length.
This WARN is printed even for non-zoned block devices, by following steps.
- Create two (non-zoned) null_blk devices memory backed with 128MB size each:
nullb0 and nullb1.
# mkfs.f2fs /dev/nullb0 -c /dev/nullb1
# mount -t f2fs /dev/nullb0 "${mount_dir}"
# dd if=/dev/zero of="${mount_dir}/test.dat" bs=1M count=192
# dd if="${mount_dir}/test.dat" of=/dev/null bs=1M count=192 iflag=direct
..."
So, the root cause of this issue is: when multi-devices feature is on,
f2fs_map_blocks() may return zero blkaddr in non-primary device, which is
a verified valid block address, however, f2fs_iomap_begin() treats it as
an invalid block address, and then it triggers the warning in iomap
framework code.
Finally, as discussed, we decide to use a more simple and direct way that
checking (map.m_flags & F2FS_MAP_MAPPED) condition instead of
(map.m_pblk != NULL_ADDR) to fix this issue.
Thanks a lot for the effort of Yi Zhang and Shinichiro Kawasaki on this
issue.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/CAHj4cs-kfojYC9i0G73PRkYzcxCTex=-vugRFeP40g_URGvnfQ@mail.gmail.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/gngdj77k4picagsfdtiaa7gpgnup6fsgwzsltx6milmhegmjff@iax2n4wvrqye/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: idxd: Avoid unnecessary destruction of file_ida
file_ida is allocated during cdev open and is freed accordingly
during cdev release. This sequence is guaranteed by driver file
operations. Therefore, there is no need to destroy an already empty
file_ida when the WQ cdev is removed.
Worse, ida_free() in cdev release may happen after destruction of
file_ida per WQ cdev. This can lead to accessing an id in file_ida
after it has been destroyed, resulting in a kernel panic.
Remove ida_destroy(&file_ida) to address these issues. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: clear FR_SENT when re-adding requests into pending list
The following warning was reported by lee bruce:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8264 at fs/fuse/dev.c:300
fuse_request_end+0x685/0x7e0 fs/fuse/dev.c:300
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 8264 Comm: ab2 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:fuse_request_end+0x685/0x7e0 fs/fuse/dev.c:300
......
Call Trace:
<TASK>
fuse_dev_do_read.constprop.0+0xd36/0x1dd0 fs/fuse/dev.c:1334
fuse_dev_read+0x166/0x200 fs/fuse/dev.c:1367
call_read_iter include/linux/fs.h:2104 [inline]
new_sync_read fs/read_write.c:395 [inline]
vfs_read+0x85b/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:476
ksys_read+0x12f/0x260 fs/read_write.c:619
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xce/0x260 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
......
</TASK>
The warning is due to the FUSE_NOTIFY_RESEND notify sent by the write()
syscall in the reproducer program and it happens as follows:
(1) calls fuse_dev_read() to read the INIT request
The read succeeds. During the read, bit FR_SENT will be set on the
request.
(2) calls fuse_dev_write() to send an USE_NOTIFY_RESEND notify
The resend notify will resend all processing requests, so the INIT
request is moved from processing list to pending list again.
(3) calls fuse_dev_read() with an invalid output address
fuse_dev_read() will try to copy the same INIT request to the output
address, but it will fail due to the invalid address, so the INIT
request is ended and triggers the warning in fuse_request_end().
Fix it by clearing FR_SENT when re-adding requests into pending list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: remove vsock from connected table when connect is interrupted by a signal
vsock_connect() expects that the socket could already be in the
TCP_ESTABLISHED state when the connecting task wakes up with a signal
pending. If this happens the socket will be in the connected table, and
it is not removed when the socket state is reset. In this situation it's
common for the process to retry connect(), and if the connection is
successful the socket will be added to the connected table a second
time, corrupting the list.
Prevent this by calling vsock_remove_connected() if a signal is received
while waiting for a connection. This is harmless if the socket is not in
the connected table, and if it is in the table then removing it will
prevent list corruption from a double add.
Note for backporting: this patch requires d5afa82c977e ("vsock: correct
removal of socket from the list"), which is in all current stable trees
except 4.9.y. |
| NVIDIA CUDA Toolkit for all platforms contains a vulnerability in the cuobjdump binary, where a failure to check the length of a buffer could allow a user to cause the tool to crash or execute arbitrary code by passing in a malformed ELF file. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to arbitrary code execution. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: mcast: use rcu-safe version of ipv6_get_lladdr()
Some time ago 8965779d2c0e ("ipv6,mcast: always hold idev->lock before mca_lock")
switched ipv6_get_lladdr() to __ipv6_get_lladdr(), which is rcu-unsafe
version. That was OK, because idev->lock was held for these codepaths.
In 88e2ca308094 ("mld: convert ifmcaddr6 to RCU") these external locks were
removed, so we probably need to restore the original rcu-safe call.
Otherwise, we occasionally get a machine crashed/stalled with the following
in dmesg:
[ 3405.966610][T230589] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead00000000008c: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 3405.982083][T230589] CPU: 44 PID: 230589 Comm: kworker/44:3 Tainted: G O 5.15.19-cloudflare-2022.2.1 #1
[ 3405.998061][T230589] Hardware name: SUPA-COOL-SERV
[ 3406.009552][T230589] Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work
[ 3406.017224][T230589] RIP: 0010:__ipv6_get_lladdr+0x34/0x60
[ 3406.025780][T230589] Code: 57 10 48 83 c7 08 48 89 e5 48 39 d7 74 3e 48 8d 82 38 ff ff ff eb 13 48 8b 90 d0 00 00 00 48 8d 82 38 ff ff ff 48 39 d7 74 22 <66> 83 78 32 20 77 1b 75 e4 89 ca 23 50 2c 75 dd 48 8b 50 08 48 8b
[ 3406.055748][T230589] RSP: 0018:ffff94e4b3fc3d10 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 3406.065617][T230589] RAX: dead00000000005a RBX: ffff94e4b3fc3d30 RCX: 0000000000000040
[ 3406.077477][T230589] RDX: dead000000000122 RSI: ffff94e4b3fc3d30 RDI: ffff8c3a31431008
[ 3406.089389][T230589] RBP: ffff94e4b3fc3d10 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 3406.101445][T230589] R10: ffff8c3a31430000 R11: 000000000000000b R12: ffff8c2c37887100
[ 3406.113553][T230589] R13: ffff8c3a39537000 R14: 00000000000005dc R15: ffff8c3a31431000
[ 3406.125730][T230589] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8c3b9fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 3406.138992][T230589] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 3406.149895][T230589] CR2: 00007f0dfea1db60 CR3: 000000387b5f2000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
[ 3406.162421][T230589] Call Trace:
[ 3406.170235][T230589] <TASK>
[ 3406.177736][T230589] mld_newpack+0xfe/0x1a0
[ 3406.186686][T230589] add_grhead+0x87/0xa0
[ 3406.195498][T230589] add_grec+0x485/0x4e0
[ 3406.204310][T230589] ? newidle_balance+0x126/0x3f0
[ 3406.214024][T230589] mld_ifc_work+0x15d/0x450
[ 3406.223279][T230589] process_one_work+0x1e6/0x380
[ 3406.232982][T230589] worker_thread+0x50/0x3a0
[ 3406.242371][T230589] ? rescuer_thread+0x360/0x360
[ 3406.252175][T230589] kthread+0x127/0x150
[ 3406.261197][T230589] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
[ 3406.271287][T230589] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 3406.280812][T230589] </TASK>
[ 3406.288937][T230589] Modules linked in: ... [last unloaded: kheaders]
[ 3406.476714][T230589] ---[ end trace 3525a7655f2f3b9e ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: Avoid overwriting the copies of clcsock callback functions
The callback functions of clcsock will be saved and replaced during
the fallback. But if the fallback happens more than once, then the
copies of these callback functions will be overwritten incorrectly,
resulting in a loop call issue:
clcsk->sk_error_report
|- smc_fback_error_report() <------------------------------|
|- smc_fback_forward_wakeup() | (loop)
|- clcsock_callback() (incorrectly overwritten) |
|- smc->clcsk_error_report() ------------------|
So this patch fixes the issue by saving these function pointers only
once in the fallback and avoiding overwriting. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vmxnet3: disable rx data ring on dma allocation failure
When vmxnet3_rq_create() fails to allocate memory for rq->data_ring.base,
the subsequent call to vmxnet3_rq_destroy_all_rxdataring does not reset
rq->data_ring.desc_size for the data ring that failed, which presumably
causes the hypervisor to reference it on packet reception.
To fix this bug, rq->data_ring.desc_size needs to be set to 0 to tell
the hypervisor to disable this feature.
[ 95.436876] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:207!
[ 95.439074] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 95.440411] CPU: 7 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/7 Not tainted 6.9.3-dirty #1
[ 95.441558] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual
Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 12/12/2018
[ 95.443481] RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x4d/0x4f
[ 95.444404] Code: 4f 70 50 8b 87 c0 00 00 00 50 8b 87 bc 00 00 00 50
ff b7 d0 00 00 00 4c 8b 8f c8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 68 e8 be 9f e8 63 58 f9
ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 14 24 48 c7 c1 d0 73 65 9f e8 a1 ff ff ff 48 8b 14 24
[ 95.447684] RSP: 0018:ffffa13340274dd0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 95.448762] RAX: 0000000000000089 RBX: ffff8fbbc72b02d0 RCX: 000000000000083f
[ 95.450148] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000000f6 RDI: 000000000000083f
[ 95.451520] RBP: 000000000000002d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffa13340274c60
[ 95.452886] R10: ffffffffa04ed468 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 95.454293] R13: ffff8fbbdab3c2d0 R14: ffff8fbbdbd829e0 R15: ffff8fbbdbd809e0
[ 95.455682] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8fbeefd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 95.457178] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 95.458340] CR2: 00007fd0d1f650c8 CR3: 0000000115f28000 CR4: 00000000000406f0
[ 95.459791] Call Trace:
[ 95.460515] <IRQ>
[ 95.461180] ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27
[ 95.462150] ? die+0x2e/0x50
[ 95.462976] ? do_trap+0xca/0x110
[ 95.463973] ? do_error_trap+0x6a/0x90
[ 95.464966] ? skb_panic+0x4d/0x4f
[ 95.465901] ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70
[ 95.466849] ? skb_panic+0x4d/0x4f
[ 95.467718] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 95.468758] ? skb_panic+0x4d/0x4f
[ 95.469655] skb_put.cold+0x10/0x10
[ 95.470573] vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete+0x862/0x11e0 [vmxnet3]
[ 95.471853] vmxnet3_poll_rx_only+0x36/0xb0 [vmxnet3]
[ 95.473185] __napi_poll+0x2b/0x160
[ 95.474145] net_rx_action+0x2c6/0x3b0
[ 95.475115] handle_softirqs+0xe7/0x2a0
[ 95.476122] __irq_exit_rcu+0x97/0xb0
[ 95.477109] common_interrupt+0x85/0xa0
[ 95.478102] </IRQ>
[ 95.478846] <TASK>
[ 95.479603] asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40
[ 95.480657] RIP: 0010:pv_native_safe_halt+0xf/0x20
[ 95.481801] Code: 22 d7 e9 54 87 01 00 0f 1f 40 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa eb 07 0f 00 2d 93 ba 3b 00 fb f4 <e9> 2c 87 01 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90
[ 95.485563] RSP: 0018:ffffa133400ffe58 EFLAGS: 00000246
[ 95.486882] RAX: 0000000000004000 RBX: ffff8fbbc1d14064 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 95.488477] RDX: ffff8fbeefd80000 RSI: ffff8fbbc1d14000 RDI: 0000000000000001
[ 95.490067] RBP: ffff8fbbc1d14064 R08: ffffffffa0652260 R09: 00000000000010d3
[ 95.491683] R10: 0000000000000018 R11: ffff8fbeefdb4764 R12: ffffffffa0652260
[ 95.493389] R13: ffffffffa06522e0 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 95.495035] acpi_safe_halt+0x14/0x20
[ 95.496127] acpi_idle_do_entry+0x2f/0x50
[ 95.497221] acpi_idle_enter+0x7f/0xd0
[ 95.498272] cpuidle_enter_state+0x81/0x420
[ 95.499375] cpuidle_enter+0x2d/0x40
[ 95.500400] do_idle+0x1e5/0x240
[ 95.501385] cpu_startup_entry+0x29/0x30
[ 95.502422] start_secondary+0x11c/0x140
[ 95.503454] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
[ 95.504466] </TASK>
[ 95.505197] Modules linked in: nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4
nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6
nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ip
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/rsrc: don't lock while !TASK_RUNNING
There is a report of io_rsrc_ref_quiesce() locking a mutex while not
TASK_RUNNING, which is due to forgetting restoring the state back after
io_run_task_work_sig() and attempts to break out of the waiting loop.
do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at
[<ffffffff815d2494>] prepare_to_wait+0xa4/0x380
kernel/sched/wait.c:237
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 397056 at kernel/sched/core.c:10099
__might_sleep+0x114/0x160 kernel/sched/core.c:10099
RIP: 0010:__might_sleep+0x114/0x160 kernel/sched/core.c:10099
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xb4/0x940 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
io_rsrc_ref_quiesce+0x590/0x940 io_uring/rsrc.c:253
io_sqe_buffers_unregister+0xa2/0x340 io_uring/rsrc.c:799
__io_uring_register io_uring/register.c:424 [inline]
__do_sys_io_uring_register+0x5b9/0x2400 io_uring/register.c:613
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x270 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
memblock: make memblock_set_node() also warn about use of MAX_NUMNODES
On an (old) x86 system with SRAT just covering space above 4Gb:
ACPI: SRAT: Node 0 PXM 0 [mem 0x100000000-0xfffffffff] hotplug
the commit referenced below leads to this NUMA configuration no longer
being refused by a CONFIG_NUMA=y kernel (previously
NUMA: nodes only cover 6144MB of your 8185MB e820 RAM. Not used.
No NUMA configuration found
Faking a node at [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000027fffffff]
was seen in the log directly after the message quoted above), because of
memblock_validate_numa_coverage() checking for NUMA_NO_NODE (only). This
in turn led to memblock_alloc_range_nid()'s warning about MAX_NUMNODES
triggering, followed by a NULL deref in memmap_init() when trying to
access node 64's (NODE_SHIFT=6) node data.
To compensate said change, make memblock_set_node() warn on and adjust
a passed in value of MAX_NUMNODES, just like various other functions
already do. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: seville: register the mdiobus under devres
As explained in commits:
74b6d7d13307 ("net: dsa: realtek: register the MDIO bus under devres")
5135e96a3dd2 ("net: dsa: don't allocate the slave_mii_bus using devres")
mdiobus_free() will panic when called from devm_mdiobus_free() <-
devres_release_all() <- __device_release_driver(), and that mdiobus was
not previously unregistered.
The Seville VSC9959 switch is a platform device, so the initial set of
constraints that I thought would cause this (I2C or SPI buses which call
->remove on ->shutdown) do not apply. But there is one more which
applies here.
If the DSA master itself is on a bus that calls ->remove from ->shutdown
(like dpaa2-eth, which is on the fsl-mc bus), there is a device link
between the switch and the DSA master, and device_links_unbind_consumers()
will unbind the seville switch driver on shutdown.
So the same treatment must be applied to all DSA switch drivers, which
is: either use devres for both the mdiobus allocation and registration,
or don't use devres at all.
The seville driver has a code structure that could accommodate both the
mdiobus_unregister and mdiobus_free calls, but it has an external
dependency upon mscc_miim_setup() from mdio-mscc-miim.c, which calls
devm_mdiobus_alloc_size() on its behalf. So rather than restructuring
that, and exporting yet one more symbol mscc_miim_teardown(), let's work
with devres and replace of_mdiobus_register with the devres variant.
When we use all-devres, we can ensure that devres doesn't free a
still-registered bus (it either runs both callbacks, or none). |
