| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: gpib: Fix Oops after disconnect in agilent usb
If the agilent usb dongle is disconnected subsequent calls to the
driver cause a NULL dereference Oops as the bus_interface
is set to NULL on disconnect.
This problem was introduced by setting usb_dev from the bus_interface
for dev_xxx messages.
Previously bus_interface was checked for NULL only in the functions
directly calling usb_fill_bulk_urb or usb_control_msg.
Check for valid bus_interface on all interface entry points
and return -ENODEV if it is NULL. |
| Improper Input Validation vulnerability in Salesforce Tableau Server on Windows, Linux (tabdoc api - create-data-source-from-file-upload modules) allows Absolute Path Traversal.This issue affects Tableau Server: before 2025.1.3, before 2024.2.12, before 2023.3.19. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thermal/netlink: Prevent userspace segmentation fault by adjusting UAPI header
The intel-lpmd tool [1], which uses the THERMAL_GENL_ATTR_CPU_CAPABILITY
attribute to receive HFI events from kernel space, encounters a
segmentation fault after commit 1773572863c4 ("thermal: netlink: Add the
commands and the events for the thresholds").
The issue arises because the THERMAL_GENL_ATTR_CPU_CAPABILITY raw value
was changed while intel_lpmd still uses the old value.
Although intel_lpmd can be updated to check the THERMAL_GENL_VERSION and
use the appropriate THERMAL_GENL_ATTR_CPU_CAPABILITY value, the commit
itself is questionable.
The commit introduced a new element in the middle of enum thermal_genl_attr,
which affects many existing attributes and introduces potential risks
and unnecessary maintenance burdens for userspace thermal netlink event
users.
Solve the issue by moving the newly introduced
THERMAL_GENL_ATTR_TZ_PREV_TEMP attribute to the end of the
enum thermal_genl_attr. This ensures that all existing thermal generic
netlink attributes remain unaffected.
[ rjw: Subject edits ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpufreq/amd-pstate: Fix cpufreq_policy ref counting
amd_pstate_update_limits() takes a cpufreq_policy reference but doesn't
decrement the refcount in one of the exit paths, fix that. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
amdkfd: properly free gang_ctx_bo when failed to init user queue
The destructor of a gtt bo is declared as
void amdgpu_amdkfd_free_gtt_mem(struct amdgpu_device *adev, void **mem_obj);
Which takes void** as the second parameter.
GCC allows passing void* to the function because void* can be implicitly
casted to any other types, so it can pass compiling.
However, passing this void* parameter into the function's
execution process(which expects void** and dereferencing void**)
will result in errors. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/code-patching: Disable KASAN report during patching via temporary mm
Erhard reports the following KASAN hit on Talos II (power9) with kernel 6.13:
[ 12.028126] ==================================================================
[ 12.028198] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in copy_to_kernel_nofault+0x8c/0x1a0
[ 12.028260] Write of size 8 at addr 0000187e458f2000 by task systemd/1
[ 12.028346] CPU: 87 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Tainted: G T 6.13.0-P9-dirty #3
[ 12.028408] Tainted: [T]=RANDSTRUCT
[ 12.028446] Hardware name: T2P9D01 REV 1.01 POWER9 0x4e1202 opal:skiboot-bc106a0 PowerNV
[ 12.028500] Call Trace:
[ 12.028536] [c000000008dbf3b0] [c000000001656a48] dump_stack_lvl+0xbc/0x110 (unreliable)
[ 12.028609] [c000000008dbf3f0] [c0000000006e2fc8] print_report+0x6b0/0x708
[ 12.028666] [c000000008dbf4e0] [c0000000006e2454] kasan_report+0x164/0x300
[ 12.028725] [c000000008dbf600] [c0000000006e54d4] kasan_check_range+0x314/0x370
[ 12.028784] [c000000008dbf640] [c0000000006e6310] __kasan_check_write+0x20/0x40
[ 12.028842] [c000000008dbf660] [c000000000578e8c] copy_to_kernel_nofault+0x8c/0x1a0
[ 12.028902] [c000000008dbf6a0] [c0000000000acfe4] __patch_instructions+0x194/0x210
[ 12.028965] [c000000008dbf6e0] [c0000000000ade80] patch_instructions+0x150/0x590
[ 12.029026] [c000000008dbf7c0] [c0000000001159bc] bpf_arch_text_copy+0x6c/0xe0
[ 12.029085] [c000000008dbf800] [c000000000424250] bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize+0x40/0xc0
[ 12.029147] [c000000008dbf830] [c000000000115dec] bpf_int_jit_compile+0x3bc/0x930
[ 12.029206] [c000000008dbf990] [c000000000423720] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x1f0/0x280
[ 12.029266] [c000000008dbfa00] [c000000000434b18] bpf_prog_load+0xbb8/0x1370
[ 12.029324] [c000000008dbfb70] [c000000000436ebc] __sys_bpf+0x5ac/0x2e00
[ 12.029379] [c000000008dbfd00] [c00000000043a228] sys_bpf+0x28/0x40
[ 12.029435] [c000000008dbfd20] [c000000000038eb4] system_call_exception+0x334/0x610
[ 12.029497] [c000000008dbfe50] [c00000000000c270] system_call_vectored_common+0xf0/0x280
[ 12.029561] --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x3fff82f5cfa8
[ 12.029608] NIP: 00003fff82f5cfa8 LR: 00003fff82f5cfa8 CTR: 0000000000000000
[ 12.029660] REGS: c000000008dbfe80 TRAP: 3000 Tainted: G T (6.13.0-P9-dirty)
[ 12.029735] MSR: 900000000280f032 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 42004848 XER: 00000000
[ 12.029855] IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: 0000000000000169 00003fffdcf789a0 00003fff83067100 0000000000000005
GPR04: 00003fffdcf78a98 0000000000000090 0000000000000000 0000000000000008
GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR12: 0000000000000000 00003fff836ff7e0 c000000000010678 0000000000000000
GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00003fffdcf78f28 00003fffdcf78f90
GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00003fffdcf78f80
GPR24: 00003fffdcf78f70 00003fffdcf78d10 00003fff835c7239 00003fffdcf78bd8
GPR28: 00003fffdcf78a98 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000000011f547580
[ 12.030316] NIP [00003fff82f5cfa8] 0x3fff82f5cfa8
[ 12.030361] LR [00003fff82f5cfa8] 0x3fff82f5cfa8
[ 12.030405] --- interrupt: 3000
[ 12.030444] ==================================================================
Commit c28c15b6d28a ("powerpc/code-patching: Use temporary mm for
Radix MMU") is inspired from x86 but unlike x86 is doesn't disable
KASAN reports during patching. This wasn't a problem at the begining
because __patch_mem() is not instrumented.
Commit 465cabc97b42 ("powerpc/code-patching: introduce
patch_instructions()") use copy_to_kernel_nofault() to copy several
instructions at once. But when using temporary mm the destination is
not regular kernel memory but a kind of kernel-like memory located
in user address space.
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: ipc4-topology: Harden loops for looking up ALH copiers
Other, non DAI copier widgets could have the same stream name (sname) as
the ALH copier and in that case the copier->data is NULL, no alh_data is
attached, which could lead to NULL pointer dereference.
We could check for this NULL pointer in sof_ipc4_prepare_copier_module()
and avoid the crash, but a similar loop in sof_ipc4_widget_setup_comp_dai()
will miscalculate the ALH device count, causing broken audio.
The correct fix is to harden the matching logic by making sure that the
1. widget is a DAI widget - so dai = w->private is valid
2. the dai (and thus the copier) is ALH copier |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: Avoid putting some root ports into D3 on TUXEDO Sirius Gen1
commit 9d26d3a8f1b0 ("PCI: Put PCIe ports into D3 during suspend") sets the
policy that all PCIe ports are allowed to use D3. When the system is
suspended if the port is not power manageable by the platform and won't be
used for wakeup via a PME this sets up the policy for these ports to go
into D3hot.
This policy generally makes sense from an OSPM perspective but it leads to
problems with wakeup from suspend on the TUXEDO Sirius 16 Gen 1 with a
specific old BIOS. This manifests as a system hang.
On the affected Device + BIOS combination, add a quirk for the root port of
the problematic controller to ensure that these root ports are not put into
D3hot at suspend.
This patch is based on
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pci/20230708214457.1229-2-mario.limonciello@amd.com
but with the added condition both in the documentation and in the code to
apply only to the TUXEDO Sirius 16 Gen 1 with a specific old BIOS and only
the affected root ports. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering
When attaching uretprobes to processes running inside docker, the attached
process is segfaulted when encountering the retprobe.
The reason is that now that uretprobe is a system call the default seccomp
filters in docker block it as they only allow a specific set of known
syscalls. This is true for other userspace applications which use seccomp
to control their syscall surface.
Since uretprobe is a "kernel implementation detail" system call which is
not used by userspace application code directly, it is impractical and
there's very little point in forcing all userspace applications to
explicitly allow it in order to avoid crashing tracked processes.
Pass this systemcall through seccomp without depending on configuration.
Note: uretprobe is currently only x86_64 and isn't expected to ever be
supported in i386.
[kees: minimized changes for easier backporting, tweaked commit log] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/kbuf: reallocate buf lists on upgrade
IORING_REGISTER_PBUF_RING can reuse an old struct io_buffer_list if it
was created for legacy selected buffer and has been emptied. It violates
the requirement that most of the field should stay stable after publish.
Always reallocate it instead. |
| Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Salesforce Tableau Server on Windows, Linux (EPS Server modules) allows Resource Location Spoofing. This issue affects Tableau Server: before 2025.1.3, before 2024.2.12, before 2023.3.19. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix the recovery flow of the UMR QP
This patch addresses an issue in the recovery flow of the UMR QP,
ensuring tasks do not get stuck, as highlighted by the call trace [1].
During recovery, before transitioning the QP to the RESET state, the
software must wait for all outstanding WRs to complete.
Failing to do so can cause the firmware to skip sending some flushed
CQEs with errors and simply discard them upon the RESET, as per the IB
specification.
This race condition can result in lost CQEs and tasks becoming stuck.
To resolve this, the patch sends a final WR which serves only as a
barrier before moving the QP state to RESET.
Once a CQE is received for that final WR, it guarantees that no
outstanding WRs remain, making it safe to transition the QP to RESET and
subsequently back to RTS, restoring proper functionality.
Note:
For the barrier WR, we simply reuse the failed and ready WR.
Since the QP is in an error state, it will only receive
IB_WC_WR_FLUSH_ERR. However, as it serves only as a barrier we don't
care about its status.
[1]
INFO: task rdma_resource_l:1922 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
Tainted: G W 6.12.0-rc7+ #1626
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:rdma_resource_l state:D stack:0 pid:1922 tgid:1922 ppid:1369
flags:0x00004004
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x420/0xd30
schedule+0x47/0x130
schedule_timeout+0x280/0x300
? mark_held_locks+0x48/0x80
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xe5/0x1a0
wait_for_completion+0x75/0x130
mlx5r_umr_post_send_wait+0x3c2/0x5b0 [mlx5_ib]
? __pfx_mlx5r_umr_done+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_ib]
mlx5r_umr_revoke_mr+0x93/0xc0 [mlx5_ib]
__mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x299/0x520 [mlx5_ib]
? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x40
? wait_for_completion+0xfe/0x130
? rdma_restrack_put+0x63/0xe0 [ib_core]
ib_dereg_mr_user+0x5f/0x120 [ib_core]
? lock_release+0xc6/0x280
destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x1d/0x60 [ib_uverbs]
uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x58/0x1d0 [ib_uverbs]
uobj_destroy+0x3f/0x70 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x3e4/0xbb0 [ib_uverbs]
? __pfx_uverbs_destroy_def_handler+0x10/0x10 [ib_uverbs]
? __lock_acquire+0x64e/0x2080
? mark_held_locks+0x48/0x80
? find_held_lock+0x2d/0xa0
? lock_acquire+0xc1/0x2f0
? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xcb/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
? __fget_files+0xc3/0x1b0
ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xe7/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xcb/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x1b0/0xa70
do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x140
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f99c918b17b
RSP: 002b:00007ffc766d0468 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc766d0578 RCX:
00007f99c918b17b
RDX: 00007ffc766d0560 RSI: 00000000c0181b01 RDI:
0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffc766d0540 R08: 00007f99c8f99010 R09:
000000000000bd7e
R10: 00007f99c94c1c70 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:
00007ffc766d0530
R13: 000000000000001c R14: 0000000040246a80 R15:
0000000000000000
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs/zmap.c: Fix incorrect offset calculation
Effective offset to add to length was being incorrectly calculated,
which resulted in iomap->length being set to 0, triggering a WARN_ON
in iomap_iter_done().
Fix that, and describe it in comments.
This was reported as a crash by syzbot under an issue about a warning
encountered in iomap_iter_done(), but unrelated to erofs.
C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=ReproC&x=1037a6b2880000
Kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=KernelConfig&x=e2021a61197ebe02
Dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a8e049cd3abd342936b6 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: fix PTE marker handling in hugetlb_change_protection()
Patch series "mm/hugetlb: uffd-wp fixes for hugetlb_change_protection()".
Playing with virtio-mem and background snapshots (using uffd-wp) on
hugetlb in QEMU, I managed to trigger a VM_BUG_ON(). Looking into the
details, hugetlb_change_protection() seems to not handle uffd-wp correctly
in all cases.
Patch #1 fixes my test case. I don't have reproducers for patch #2, as it
requires running into migration entries.
I did not yet check in detail yet if !hugetlb code requires similar care.
This patch (of 2):
There are two problematic cases when stumbling over a PTE marker in
hugetlb_change_protection():
(1) We protect an uffd-wp PTE marker a second time using uffd-wp: we will
end up in the "!huge_pte_none(pte)" case and mess up the PTE marker.
(2) We unprotect a uffd-wp PTE marker: we will similarly end up in the
"!huge_pte_none(pte)" case even though we cleared the PTE, because
the "pte" variable is stale. We'll mess up the PTE marker.
For example, if we later stumble over such a "wrongly modified" PTE marker,
we'll treat it like a present PTE that maps some garbage page.
This can, for example, be triggered by mapping a memfd backed by huge
pages, registering uffd-wp, uffd-wp'ing an unmapped page and (a)
uffd-wp'ing it a second time; or (b) uffd-unprotecting it; or (c)
unregistering uffd-wp. Then, ff we trigger fallocate(FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE)
on that file range, we will run into a VM_BUG_ON:
[ 195.039560] page:00000000ba1f2987 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x0
[ 195.039565] flags: 0x7ffffc0001000(reserved|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[ 195.039568] raw: 0007ffffc0001000 ffffe742c0000008 ffffe742c0000008 0000000000000000
[ 195.039569] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 195.039569] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(compound && !PageHead(page))
[ 195.039573] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 195.039574] kernel BUG at mm/rmap.c:1346!
[ 195.039579] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 195.039581] CPU: 7 PID: 4777 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 6.0.12-200.fc36.x86_64 #1
[ 195.039583] Hardware name: LENOVO 20WNS1F81N/20WNS1F81N, BIOS N35ET50W (1.50 ) 09/15/2022
[ 195.039584] RIP: 0010:page_remove_rmap+0x45b/0x550
[ 195.039588] Code: [...]
[ 195.039589] RSP: 0018:ffffbc03c3633ba8 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 195.039591] RAX: 0000000000000040 RBX: ffffe742c0000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 195.039592] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffff8e7aac1a RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[ 195.039592] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffbc03c3633a08
[ 195.039593] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffffff8f146328 R12: ffff9b04c42754b0
[ 195.039594] R13: ffffffff8fcc6328 R14: ffffbc03c3633c80 R15: ffff9b0484ab9100
[ 195.039595] FS: 00007fc7aaf68640(0000) GS:ffff9b0bbf7c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 195.039596] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 195.039597] CR2: 000055d402c49110 CR3: 0000000159392003 CR4: 0000000000772ee0
[ 195.039598] PKRU: 55555554
[ 195.039599] Call Trace:
[ 195.039600] <TASK>
[ 195.039602] __unmap_hugepage_range+0x33b/0x7d0
[ 195.039605] unmap_hugepage_range+0x55/0x70
[ 195.039608] hugetlb_vmdelete_list+0x77/0xa0
[ 195.039611] hugetlbfs_fallocate+0x410/0x550
[ 195.039612] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x23/0x40
[ 195.039616] vfs_fallocate+0x12e/0x360
[ 195.039618] __x64_sys_fallocate+0x40/0x70
[ 195.039620] do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80
[ 195.039623] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40
[ 195.039624] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[ 195.039626] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 195.039628] RIP: 0033:0x7fc7b590651f
[ 195.039653] Code: [...]
[ 195.039654] RSP: 002b:00007fc7aaf66e70 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000011d
[ 195.039655] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000558ef4b7f370 RCX: 00007fc7b590651f
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Skip invalid kfunc call in backtrack_insn
The verifier skips invalid kfunc call in check_kfunc_call(), which
would be captured in fixup_kfunc_call() if such insn is not eliminated
by dead code elimination. However, this can lead to the following
warning in backtrack_insn(), also see [1]:
------------[ cut here ]------------
verifier backtracking bug
WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 8646 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2756 backtrack_insn
kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2756
__mark_chain_precision kernel/bpf/verifier.c:3065
mark_chain_precision kernel/bpf/verifier.c:3165
adjust_reg_min_max_vals kernel/bpf/verifier.c:10715
check_alu_op kernel/bpf/verifier.c:10928
do_check kernel/bpf/verifier.c:13821 [inline]
do_check_common kernel/bpf/verifier.c:16289
[...]
So make backtracking conservative with this by returning ENOTSUPP.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CACkBjsaXNceR8ZjkLG=dT3P=4A8SBsg0Z5h5PWLryF5=ghKq=g@mail.gmail.com/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: dts: imx8mm-verdin: Do not power down eth-phy
Currently if suspending using either freeze or memory state, the fec
driver tries to power down the phy which leads to crash of the kernel
and non-responsible kernel with the following call trace:
[ 24.839889 ] Call trace:
[ 24.839892 ] phy_error+0x18/0x60
[ 24.839898 ] kszphy_handle_interrupt+0x6c/0x80
[ 24.839903 ] phy_interrupt+0x20/0x2c
[ 24.839909 ] irq_thread_fn+0x30/0xa0
[ 24.839919 ] irq_thread+0x178/0x2c0
[ 24.839925 ] kthread+0x154/0x160
[ 24.839932 ] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Since there is currently no functionality in the phy subsystem to power
down phys let's just disable the feature of powering-down the ethernet
phy. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Check for any of tcp_bpf_prots when cloning a listener
A listening socket linked to a sockmap has its sk_prot overridden. It
points to one of the struct proto variants in tcp_bpf_prots. The variant
depends on the socket's family and which sockmap programs are attached.
A child socket cloned from a TCP listener initially inherits their sk_prot.
But before cloning is finished, we restore the child's proto to the
listener's original non-tcp_bpf_prots one. This happens in
tcp_create_openreq_child -> tcp_bpf_clone.
Today, in tcp_bpf_clone we detect if the child's proto should be restored
by checking only for the TCP_BPF_BASE proto variant. This is not
correct. The sk_prot of listening socket linked to a sockmap can point to
to any variant in tcp_bpf_prots.
If the listeners sk_prot happens to be not the TCP_BPF_BASE variant, then
the child socket unintentionally is left if the inherited sk_prot by
tcp_bpf_clone.
This leads to issues like infinite recursion on close [1], because the
child state is otherwise not set up for use with tcp_bpf_prot operations.
Adjust the check in tcp_bpf_clone to detect all of tcp_bpf_prots variants.
Note that it wouldn't be sufficient to check the socket state when
overriding the sk_prot in tcp_bpf_update_proto in order to always use the
TCP_BPF_BASE variant for listening sockets. Since commit
b8b8315e39ff ("bpf, sockmap: Remove unhash handler for BPF sockmap usage")
it is possible for a socket to transition to TCP_LISTEN state while already
linked to a sockmap, e.g. connect() -> insert into map ->
connect(AF_UNSPEC) -> listen().
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/00000000000073b14905ef2e7401@google.com/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: ipc4-mtrace: prevent underflow in sof_ipc4_priority_mask_dfs_write()
The "id" comes from the user. Change the type to unsigned to prevent
an array underflow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Skip task with pid=1 in send_signal_common()
The following kernel panic can be triggered when a task with pid=1 attaches
a prog that attempts to send killing signal to itself, also see [1] for more
details:
Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b
CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 6.1.0-09652-g59fe41b5255f #148
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x178 lib/dump_stack.c:106
panic+0x2c4/0x60f kernel/panic.c:275
do_exit.cold+0x63/0xe4 kernel/exit.c:789
do_group_exit+0xd4/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:950
get_signal+0x2460/0x2600 kernel/signal.c:2858
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x78/0x5d0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:306
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:168 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x15f/0x250 kernel/entry/common.c:203
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:296
do_syscall_64+0x44/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
So skip task with pid=1 in bpf_send_signal_common() to avoid the panic.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221222043507.33037-1-sunhao.th@gmail.com |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv/kprobe: Fix instruction simulation of JALR
Set kprobe at 'jalr 1140(ra)' of vfs_write results in the following
crash:
[ 32.092235] Unable to handle kernel access to user memory without uaccess routines at virtual address 00aaaaaad77b1170
[ 32.093115] Oops [#1]
[ 32.093251] Modules linked in:
[ 32.093626] CPU: 0 PID: 135 Comm: ftracetest Not tainted 6.2.0-rc2-00013-gb0aa5e5df0cb-dirty #16
[ 32.093985] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
[ 32.094280] epc : ksys_read+0x88/0xd6
[ 32.094855] ra : ksys_read+0xc0/0xd6
[ 32.095016] epc : ffffffff801cda80 ra : ffffffff801cdab8 sp : ff20000000d7bdc0
[ 32.095227] gp : ffffffff80f14000 tp : ff60000080f9cb40 t0 : ffffffff80f13e80
[ 32.095500] t1 : ffffffff8000c29c t2 : ffffffff800dbc54 s0 : ff20000000d7be60
[ 32.095716] s1 : 0000000000000000 a0 : ffffffff805a64ae a1 : ffffffff80a83708
[ 32.095921] a2 : ffffffff80f160a0 a3 : 0000000000000000 a4 : f229b0afdb165300
[ 32.096171] a5 : f229b0afdb165300 a6 : ffffffff80eeebd0 a7 : 00000000000003ff
[ 32.096411] s2 : ff6000007ff76800 s3 : fffffffffffffff7 s4 : 00aaaaaad77b1170
[ 32.096638] s5 : ffffffff80f160a0 s6 : ff6000007ff76800 s7 : 0000000000000030
[ 32.096865] s8 : 00ffffffc3d97be0 s9 : 0000000000000007 s10: 00aaaaaad77c9410
[ 32.097092] s11: 0000000000000000 t3 : ffffffff80f13e48 t4 : ffffffff8000c29c
[ 32.097317] t5 : ffffffff8000c29c t6 : ffffffff800dbc54
[ 32.097505] status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: 00aaaaaad77b1170 cause: 000000000000000d
[ 32.098011] [<ffffffff801cdb72>] ksys_write+0x6c/0xd6
[ 32.098222] [<ffffffff801cdc06>] sys_write+0x2a/0x38
[ 32.098405] [<ffffffff80003c76>] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x2
Since the rs1 and rd might be the same one, such as 'jalr 1140(ra)',
hence it requires obtaining the target address from rs1 followed by
updating rd.
[Palmer: Pick Guo's cleanup] |
