| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: PAD: fix crash in exit_round_robin()
The kernel occasionally crashes in cpumask_clear_cpu(), which is called
within exit_round_robin(), because when executing clear_bit(nr, addr) with
nr set to 0xffffffff, the address calculation may cause misalignment within
the memory, leading to access to an invalid memory address.
----------
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffe0740618
...
CPU: 3 PID: 2919323 Comm: acpi_pad/14 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE X --------- - - 4.18.0-425.19.2.el8_7.x86_64 #1
...
RIP: 0010:power_saving_thread+0x313/0x411 [acpi_pad]
Code: 89 cd 48 89 d3 eb d1 48 c7 c7 55 70 72 c0 e8 64 86 b0 e4 c6 05 0d a1 02 00 01 e9 bc fd ff ff 45 89 e4 42 8b 04 a5 20 82 72 c0 <f0> 48 0f b3 05 f4 9c 01 00 42 c7 04 a5 20 82 72 c0 ff ff ff ff 31
RSP: 0018:ff72a5d51fa77ec8 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000ffffffff RBX: ff462981e5d8cb80 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: 0000000000000246
RBP: ff46297556959d80 R08: 0000000000000382 R09: ff46297c8d0f38d8
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 000000000000000e
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffffffffffffff R15: 000000000000000e
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff46297a800c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffe0740618 CR3: 0000007e20410004 CR4: 0000000000771ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? acpi_pad_add+0x120/0x120 [acpi_pad]
kthread+0x10b/0x130
? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
...
CR2: ffffffffe0740618
crash> dis -lr ffffffffc0726923
...
/usr/src/debug/kernel-4.18.0-425.19.2.el8_7/linux-4.18.0-425.19.2.el8_7.x86_64/./include/linux/cpumask.h: 114
0xffffffffc0726918 <power_saving_thread+776>: mov %r12d,%r12d
/usr/src/debug/kernel-4.18.0-425.19.2.el8_7/linux-4.18.0-425.19.2.el8_7.x86_64/./include/linux/cpumask.h: 325
0xffffffffc072691b <power_saving_thread+779>: mov -0x3f8d7de0(,%r12,4),%eax
/usr/src/debug/kernel-4.18.0-425.19.2.el8_7/linux-4.18.0-425.19.2.el8_7.x86_64/./arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h: 80
0xffffffffc0726923 <power_saving_thread+787>: lock btr %rax,0x19cf4(%rip) # 0xffffffffc0740620 <pad_busy_cpus_bits>
crash> px tsk_in_cpu[14]
$66 = 0xffffffff
crash> px 0xffffffffc072692c+0x19cf4
$99 = 0xffffffffc0740620
crash> sym 0xffffffffc0740620
ffffffffc0740620 (b) pad_busy_cpus_bits [acpi_pad]
crash> px pad_busy_cpus_bits[0]
$42 = 0xfffc0
----------
To fix this, ensure that tsk_in_cpu[tsk_index] != -1 before calling
cpumask_clear_cpu() in exit_round_robin(), just as it is done in
round_robin_cpu().
[ rjw: Subject edit, avoid updates to the same value ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/inode: Prevent dump_mapping() accessing invalid dentry.d_name.name
It's observed that a crash occurs during hot-remove a memory device,
in which user is accessing the hugetlb. See calltrace as following:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 14045 at arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1278 do_user_addr_fault+0x2a0/0x790
Modules linked in: kmem device_dax cxl_mem cxl_pmem cxl_port cxl_pci dax_hmem dax_pmem nd_pmem cxl_acpi nd_btt cxl_core crc32c_intel nvme virtiofs fuse nvme_core nfit libnvdimm dm_multipath scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc s
mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
CPU: 1 PID: 14045 Comm: daxctl Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-lizhijian+ #492
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:do_user_addr_fault+0x2a0/0x790
Code: 48 8b 00 a8 04 0f 84 b5 fe ff ff e9 1c ff ff ff 4c 89 e9 4c 89 e2 be 01 00 00 00 bf 02 00 00 00 e8 b5 ef 24 00 e9 42 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 48 83 c4 08 4c 89 ea 48 89 ee 4c 89 e7 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41
RSP: 0000:ffffc90000a575f0 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: ffff88800c303600 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: ffffffff82504162 RDI: ffffffff824b2c36
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffc90000a57658
R13: 0000000000001000 R14: ffff88800bc2e040 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f51cb57d880(0000) GS:ffff88807fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000001000 CR3: 00000000072e2004 CR4: 00000000001706f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x8d/0x190
? do_user_addr_fault+0x2a0/0x790
? report_bug+0x1c3/0x1d0
? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? do_user_addr_fault+0x2a0/0x790
? exc_page_fault+0x31/0x200
exc_page_fault+0x68/0x200
<...snip...>
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000001000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 800000000ad92067 P4D 800000000ad92067 PUD 7677067 PMD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000001000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 800000000ad92067 P4D 800000000ad92067 PUD 7677067 PMD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 14045 Comm: daxctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc2-lizhijian+ #492
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:dentry_name+0x1f4/0x440
<...snip...>
? dentry_name+0x2fa/0x440
vsnprintf+0x1f3/0x4f0
vprintk_store+0x23a/0x540
vprintk_emit+0x6d/0x330
_printk+0x58/0x80
dump_mapping+0x10b/0x1a0
? __pfx_free_object_rcu+0x10/0x10
__dump_page+0x26b/0x3e0
? vprintk_emit+0xe0/0x330
? _printk+0x58/0x80
? dump_page+0x17/0x50
dump_page+0x17/0x50
do_migrate_range+0x2f7/0x7f0
? do_migrate_range+0x42/0x7f0
? offline_pages+0x2f4/0x8c0
offline_pages+0x60a/0x8c0
memory_subsys_offline+0x9f/0x1c0
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x77/0x100
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x38/0x60
device_offline+0xe3/0x110
state_store+0x6e/0xc0
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x143/0x200
vfs_write+0x39f/0x560
ksys_write+0x65/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0x62/0x130
Previously, some sanity check have been done in dump_mapping() before
the print facility parsing '%pd' though, it's still possible to run into
an invalid dentry.d_name.name.
Since dump_mapping() only needs to dump the filename only, retrieve it
by itself in a safer way to prevent an unnecessary crash.
Note that either retrieving the filename with '%pd' or
strncpy_from_kernel_nofault(), the filename could be unreliable. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/ioapic: Handle allocation failures gracefully
Breno observed panics when using failslab under certain conditions during
runtime:
can not alloc irq_pin_list (-1,0,20)
Kernel panic - not syncing: IO-APIC: failed to add irq-pin. Can not proceed
panic+0x4e9/0x590
mp_irqdomain_alloc+0x9ab/0xa80
irq_domain_alloc_irqs_locked+0x25d/0x8d0
__irq_domain_alloc_irqs+0x80/0x110
mp_map_pin_to_irq+0x645/0x890
acpi_register_gsi_ioapic+0xe6/0x150
hpet_open+0x313/0x480
That's a pointless panic which is a leftover of the historic IO/APIC code
which panic'ed during early boot when the interrupt allocation failed.
The only place which might justify panic is the PIT/HPET timer_check() code
which tries to figure out whether the timer interrupt is delivered through
the IO/APIC. But that code does not require to handle interrupt allocation
failures. If the interrupt cannot be allocated then timer delivery fails
and it either panics due to that or falls back to legacy mode.
Cure this by removing the panic wrapper around __add_pin_to_irq_node() and
making mp_irqdomain_alloc() aware of the failure condition and handle it as
any other failure in this function gracefully. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: avoid use-after-free in ext4_ext_show_leaf()
In ext4_find_extent(), path may be freed by error or be reallocated, so
using a previously saved *ppath may have been freed and thus may trigger
use-after-free, as follows:
ext4_split_extent
path = *ppath;
ext4_split_extent_at(ppath)
path = ext4_find_extent(ppath)
ext4_split_extent_at(ppath)
// ext4_find_extent fails to free path
// but zeroout succeeds
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path)
eh = path[depth].p_hdr
// path use-after-free !!!
Similar to ext4_split_extent_at(), we use *ppath directly as an input to
ext4_ext_show_leaf(). Fix a spelling error by the way.
Same problem in ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents(). Since 'path' is only
used in ext4_ext_show_leaf(), remove 'path' and use *ppath directly.
This issue is triggered only when EXT_DEBUG is defined and therefore does
not affect functionality. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: map the EBADMSG to nfserr_io to avoid warning
Ext4 will throw -EBADMSG through ext4_readdir when a checksum error
occurs, resulting in the following WARNING.
Fix it by mapping EBADMSG to nfserr_io.
nfsd_buffered_readdir
iterate_dir // -EBADMSG -74
ext4_readdir // .iterate_shared
ext4_dx_readdir
ext4_htree_fill_tree
htree_dirblock_to_tree
ext4_read_dirblock
__ext4_read_dirblock
ext4_dirblock_csum_verify
warn_no_space_for_csum
__warn_no_space_for_csum
return ERR_PTR(-EFSBADCRC) // -EBADMSG -74
nfserrno // WARNING
[ 161.115610] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 161.116465] nfsd: non-standard errno: -74
[ 161.117315] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 780 at fs/nfsd/nfsproc.c:878 nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0
[ 161.118596] Modules linked in:
[ 161.119243] CPU: 1 PID: 780 Comm: nfsd Not tainted 5.10.0-00014-g79679361fd5d #138
[ 161.120684] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qe
mu.org 04/01/2014
[ 161.123601] RIP: 0010:nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0
[ 161.124676] Code: 0f 87 da 30 dd 00 83 e3 01 b8 00 00 00 05 75 d7 44 89 ee 48 c7 c7 c0 57 24 98 89 44 24 04 c6
05 ce 2b 61 03 01 e8 99 20 d8 00 <0f> 0b 8b 44 24 04 eb b5 4c 89 e6 48 c7 c7 a0 6d a4 99 e8 cc 15 33
[ 161.127797] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000e2f9c0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 161.128794] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 161.130089] RDX: 1ffff1103ee16f6d RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: fffff520001c5f2a
[ 161.131379] RBP: 0000000000000022 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8881f70c1827
[ 161.132664] R10: ffffed103ee18304 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000021
[ 161.133949] R13: 00000000ffffffb6 R14: ffff8881317c0000 R15: ffffc90000e2fbd8
[ 161.135244] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881f7080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 161.136695] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 161.137761] CR2: 00007fcaad70b348 CR3: 0000000144256006 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[ 161.139041] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 161.140291] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 161.141519] PKRU: 55555554
[ 161.142076] Call Trace:
[ 161.142575] ? __warn+0x9b/0x140
[ 161.143229] ? nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0
[ 161.143872] ? report_bug+0x125/0x150
[ 161.144595] ? handle_bug+0x41/0x90
[ 161.145284] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
[ 161.146009] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x12/0x20
[ 161.146816] ? nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0
[ 161.147487] nfsd_buffered_readdir+0x28b/0x2b0
[ 161.148333] ? nfsd4_encode_dirent_fattr+0x380/0x380
[ 161.149258] ? nfsd_buffered_filldir+0xf0/0xf0
[ 161.150093] ? wait_for_concurrent_writes+0x170/0x170
[ 161.151004] ? generic_file_llseek_size+0x48/0x160
[ 161.151895] nfsd_readdir+0x132/0x190
[ 161.152606] ? nfsd4_encode_dirent_fattr+0x380/0x380
[ 161.153516] ? nfsd_unlink+0x380/0x380
[ 161.154256] ? override_creds+0x45/0x60
[ 161.155006] nfsd4_encode_readdir+0x21a/0x3d0
[ 161.155850] ? nfsd4_encode_readlink+0x210/0x210
[ 161.156731] ? write_bytes_to_xdr_buf+0x97/0xe0
[ 161.157598] ? __write_bytes_to_xdr_buf+0xd0/0xd0
[ 161.158494] ? lock_downgrade+0x90/0x90
[ 161.159232] ? nfs4svc_decode_voidarg+0x10/0x10
[ 161.160092] nfsd4_encode_operation+0x15a/0x440
[ 161.160959] nfsd4_proc_compound+0x718/0xe90
[ 161.161818] nfsd_dispatch+0x18e/0x2c0
[ 161.162586] svc_process_common+0x786/0xc50
[ 161.163403] ? nfsd_svc+0x380/0x380
[ 161.164137] ? svc_printk+0x160/0x160
[ 161.164846] ? svc_xprt_do_enqueue.part.0+0x365/0x380
[ 161.165808] ? nfsd_svc+0x380/0x380
[ 161.166523] ? rcu_is_watching+0x23/0x40
[ 161.167309] svc_process+0x1a5/0x200
[ 161.168019] nfsd+0x1f5/0x380
[ 161.168663] ? nfsd_shutdown_threads+0x260/0x260
[ 161.169554] kthread+0x1c4/0x210
[ 161.170224] ? kthread_insert_work_sanity_check+0x80/0x80
[ 161.171246] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()
The remap_file_pages syscall handler calls do_mmap() directly, which
doesn't contain the LSM security check. And if the process has called
personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) before and remap_file_pages() is called for
RW pages, this will actually result in remapping the pages to RWX,
bypassing a W^X policy enforced by SELinux.
So we should check prot by security_mmap_file LSM hook in the
remap_file_pages syscall handler before do_mmap() is called. Otherwise, it
potentially permits an attacker to bypass a W^X policy enforced by
SELinux.
The bypass is similar to CVE-2016-10044, which bypass the same thing via
AIO and can be found in [1].
The PoC:
$ cat > test.c
int main(void) {
size_t pagesz = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE);
int mfd = syscall(SYS_memfd_create, "test", 0);
const char *buf = mmap(NULL, 4 * pagesz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED, mfd, 0);
unsigned int old = syscall(SYS_personality, 0xffffffff);
syscall(SYS_personality, READ_IMPLIES_EXEC | old);
syscall(SYS_remap_file_pages, buf, pagesz, 0, 2, 0);
syscall(SYS_personality, old);
// show the RWX page exists even if W^X policy is enforced
int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY);
unsigned char buf2[1024];
while (1) {
int ret = read(fd, buf2, 1024);
if (ret <= 0) break;
write(1, buf2, ret);
}
close(fd);
}
$ gcc test.c -o test
$ ./test | grep rwx
7f1836c34000-7f1836c35000 rwxs 00002000 00:01 2050 /memfd:test (deleted)
[PM: subject line tweaks] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
lib/generic-radix-tree.c: Fix rare race in __genradix_ptr_alloc()
If we need to increase the tree depth, allocate a new node, and then
race with another thread that increased the tree depth before us, we'll
still have a preallocated node that might be used later.
If we then use that node for a new non-root node, it'll still have a
pointer to the old root instead of being zeroed - fix this by zeroing it
in the cmpxchg failure path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fsnotify: clear PARENT_WATCHED flags lazily
In some setups directories can have many (usually negative) dentries.
Hence __fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags() function can take a
significant amount of time. Since the bulk of this function happens
under inode->i_lock this causes a significant contention on the lock
when we remove the watch from the directory as the
__fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags() call from fsnotify_recalc_mask()
races with __fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags() calls from
__fsnotify_parent() happening on children. This can lead upto softlockup
reports reported by users.
Fix the problem by calling fsnotify_update_children_dentry_flags() to
set PARENT_WATCHED flags only when parent starts watching children.
When parent stops watching children, clear false positive PARENT_WATCHED
flags lazily in __fsnotify_parent() for each accessed child. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pinmux: Use sequential access to access desc->pinmux data
When two client of the same gpio call pinctrl_select_state() for the
same functionality, we are seeing NULL pointer issue while accessing
desc->mux_owner.
Let's say two processes A, B executing in pin_request() for the same pin
and process A updates the desc->mux_usecount but not yet updated the
desc->mux_owner while process B see the desc->mux_usecount which got
updated by A path and further executes strcmp and while accessing
desc->mux_owner it crashes with NULL pointer.
Serialize the access to mux related setting with a mutex lock.
cpu0 (process A) cpu1(process B)
pinctrl_select_state() { pinctrl_select_state() {
pin_request() { pin_request() {
...
....
} else {
desc->mux_usecount++;
desc->mux_usecount && strcmp(desc->mux_owner, owner)) {
if (desc->mux_usecount > 1)
return 0;
desc->mux_owner = owner;
} } |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ELF: fix kernel.randomize_va_space double read
ELF loader uses "randomize_va_space" twice. It is sysctl and can change
at any moment, so 2 loads could see 2 different values in theory with
unpredictable consequences.
Issue exactly one load for consistent value across one exec. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pci/hotplug/pnv_php: Fix hotplug driver crash on Powernv
The hotplug driver for powerpc (pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c) causes a kernel
crash when we try to hot-unplug/disable the PCIe switch/bridge from
the PHB.
The crash occurs because although the MSI data structure has been
released during disable/hot-unplug path and it has been assigned
with NULL, still during unregistration the code was again trying to
explicitly disable the MSI which causes the NULL pointer dereference and
kernel crash.
The patch fixes the check during unregistration path to prevent invoking
pci_disable_msi/msix() since its data structure is already freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (adc128d818) Fix underflows seen when writing limit attributes
DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST() after kstrtol() results in an underflow if a large
negative number such as -9223372036854775808 is provided by the user.
Fix it by reordering clamp_val() and DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST() operations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: Add missing bridge lock to pci_bus_lock()
One of the true positives that the cfg_access_lock lockdep effort
identified is this sequence:
WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 1 at drivers/pci/pci.c:4886 pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70
RIP: 0010:pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x8c/0x190
? pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70
? report_bug+0x1f8/0x200
? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70
pci_reset_bus+0x1d8/0x270
vmd_probe+0x778/0xa10
pci_device_probe+0x95/0x120
Where pci_reset_bus() users are triggering unlocked secondary bus resets.
Ironically pci_bus_reset(), several calls down from pci_reset_bus(), uses
pci_bus_lock() before issuing the reset which locks everything *but* the
bridge itself.
For the same motivation as adding:
bridge = pci_upstream_bridge(dev);
if (bridge)
pci_dev_lock(bridge);
to pci_reset_function() for the "bus" and "cxl_bus" reset cases, add
pci_dev_lock() for @bus->self to pci_bus_lock().
[bhelgaas: squash in recursive locking deadlock fix from Keith Busch:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240711193650.701834-1-kbusch@meta.com] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: cougar: fix slab-out-of-bounds Read in cougar_report_fixup
report_fixup for the Cougar 500k Gaming Keyboard was not verifying
that the report descriptor size was correct before accessing it |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: uinput - reject requests with unreasonable number of slots
When exercising uinput interface syzkaller may try setting up device
with a really large number of slots, which causes memory allocation
failure in input_mt_init_slots(). While this allocation failure is
handled properly and request is rejected, it results in syzkaller
reports. Additionally, such request may put undue burden on the
system which will try to free a lot of memory for a bogus request.
Fix it by limiting allowed number of slots to 100. This can easily
be extended if we see devices that can track more than 100 contacts. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
of/irq: Prevent device address out-of-bounds read in interrupt map walk
When of_irq_parse_raw() is invoked with a device address smaller than
the interrupt parent node (from #address-cells property), KASAN detects
the following out-of-bounds read when populating the initial match table
(dyndbg="func of_irq_parse_* +p"):
OF: of_irq_parse_one: dev=/soc@0/picasso/watchdog, index=0
OF: parent=/soc@0/pci@878000000000/gpio0@17,0, intsize=2
OF: intspec=4
OF: of_irq_parse_raw: ipar=/soc@0/pci@878000000000/gpio0@17,0, size=2
OF: -> addrsize=3
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in of_irq_parse_raw+0x2b8/0x8d0
Read of size 4 at addr ffffff81beca5608 by task bash/764
CPU: 1 PID: 764 Comm: bash Tainted: G O 6.1.67-484c613561-nokia_sm_arm64 #1
Hardware name: Unknown Unknown Product/Unknown Product, BIOS 2023.01-12.24.03-dirty 01/01/2023
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0xdc/0x130
show_stack+0x1c/0x30
dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x84
print_report+0x150/0x448
kasan_report+0x98/0x140
__asan_load4+0x78/0xa0
of_irq_parse_raw+0x2b8/0x8d0
of_irq_parse_one+0x24c/0x270
parse_interrupts+0xc0/0x120
of_fwnode_add_links+0x100/0x2d0
fw_devlink_parse_fwtree+0x64/0xc0
device_add+0xb38/0xc30
of_device_add+0x64/0x90
of_platform_device_create_pdata+0xd0/0x170
of_platform_bus_create+0x244/0x600
of_platform_notify+0x1b0/0x254
blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x9c/0xd0
__of_changeset_entry_notify+0x1b8/0x230
__of_changeset_apply_notify+0x54/0xe4
of_overlay_fdt_apply+0xc04/0xd94
...
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffffff81beca5600
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
The buggy address is located 8 bytes inside of
128-byte region [ffffff81beca5600, ffffff81beca5680)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:00000000230d3d03 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1beca4
head:00000000230d3d03 order:1 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0x8000000000010200(slab|head|zone=2)
raw: 8000000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffffff810000c300
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffffff81beca5500: 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffffff81beca5580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffffff81beca5600: 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffffff81beca5680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffffff81beca5700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
OF: -> got it !
Prevent the out-of-bounds read by copying the device address into a
buffer of sufficient size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: dwc3: core: Prevent USB core invalid event buffer address access
This commit addresses an issue where the USB core could access an
invalid event buffer address during runtime suspend, potentially causing
SMMU faults and other memory issues in Exynos platforms. The problem
arises from the following sequence.
1. In dwc3_gadget_suspend, there is a chance of a timeout when
moving the USB core to the halt state after clearing the
run/stop bit by software.
2. In dwc3_core_exit, the event buffer is cleared regardless of
the USB core's status, which may lead to an SMMU faults and
other memory issues. if the USB core tries to access the event
buffer address.
To prevent this hardware quirk on Exynos platforms, this commit ensures
that the event buffer address is not cleared by software when the USB
core is active during runtime suspend by checking its status before
clearing the buffer address. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: prevent potential speculation leaks in gpio_device_get_desc()
Userspace may trigger a speculative read of an address outside the gpio
descriptor array.
Users can do that by calling gpio_ioctl() with an offset out of range.
Offset is copied from user and then used as an array index to get
the gpio descriptor without sanitization in gpio_device_get_desc().
This change ensures that the offset is sanitized by using
array_index_nospec() to mitigate any possibility of speculative
information leaks.
This bug was discovered and resolved using Coverity Static Analysis
Security Testing (SAST) by Synopsys, Inc. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/raid5: avoid BUG_ON() while continue reshape after reassembling
Currently, mdadm support --revert-reshape to abort the reshape while
reassembling, as the test 07revert-grow. However, following BUG_ON()
can be triggerred by the test:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/raid5.c:6278!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
irq event stamp: 158985
CPU: 6 PID: 891 Comm: md0_reshape Not tainted 6.9.0-03335-g7592a0b0049a #94
RIP: 0010:reshape_request+0x3f1/0xe60
Call Trace:
<TASK>
raid5_sync_request+0x43d/0x550
md_do_sync+0xb7a/0x2110
md_thread+0x294/0x2b0
kthread+0x147/0x1c0
ret_from_fork+0x59/0x70
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Root cause is that --revert-reshape update the raid_disks from 5 to 4,
while reshape position is still set, and after reassembling the array,
reshape position will be read from super block, then during reshape the
checking of 'writepos' that is caculated by old reshape position will
fail.
Fix this panic the easy way first, by converting the BUG_ON() to
WARN_ON(), and stop the reshape if checkings fail.
Noted that mdadm must fix --revert-shape as well, and probably md/raid
should enhance metadata validation as well, however this means
reassemble will fail and there must be user tools to fix the wrong
metadata. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exec: Fix ToCToU between perm check and set-uid/gid usage
When opening a file for exec via do_filp_open(), permission checking is
done against the file's metadata at that moment, and on success, a file
pointer is passed back. Much later in the execve() code path, the file
metadata (specifically mode, uid, and gid) is used to determine if/how
to set the uid and gid. However, those values may have changed since the
permissions check, meaning the execution may gain unintended privileges.
For example, if a file could change permissions from executable and not
set-id:
---------x 1 root root 16048 Aug 7 13:16 target
to set-id and non-executable:
---S------ 1 root root 16048 Aug 7 13:16 target
it is possible to gain root privileges when execution should have been
disallowed.
While this race condition is rare in real-world scenarios, it has been
observed (and proven exploitable) when package managers are updating
the setuid bits of installed programs. Such files start with being
world-executable but then are adjusted to be group-exec with a set-uid
bit. For example, "chmod o-x,u+s target" makes "target" executable only
by uid "root" and gid "cdrom", while also becoming setuid-root:
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root cdrom 16048 Aug 7 13:16 target
becomes:
-rwsr-xr-- 1 root cdrom 16048 Aug 7 13:16 target
But racing the chmod means users without group "cdrom" membership can
get the permission to execute "target" just before the chmod, and when
the chmod finishes, the exec reaches brpm_fill_uid(), and performs the
setuid to root, violating the expressed authorization of "only cdrom
group members can setuid to root".
Re-check that we still have execute permissions in case the metadata
has changed. It would be better to keep a copy from the perm-check time,
but until we can do that refactoring, the least-bad option is to do a
full inode_permission() call (under inode lock). It is understood that
this is safe against dead-locks, but hardly optimal. |
