| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the boa formRoute functionality of Realtek rtl819x Jungle SDK v3.4.11. A specially crafted series of HTTP requests can lead to remote code execution. An attacker can send an HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability. |
| A vulnerability in the SonicWall SMA100 SSLVPN firmware 10.2.1.13-72sv and earlier versions mod_httprp library loaded by the Apache web server allows remote attackers to cause Stack-based buffer overflow and potentially lead to code execution. |
| A vulnerability in the SonicWall SMA100 SSLVPN web management interface allows remote attackers to cause Stack-based buffer overflow and potentially lead to code execution. |
| PJSIP is a free and open source multimedia communication library written in C. Versions 2.12 and prior contain a stack buffer overflow vulnerability that affects PJSUA2 users or users that call the API `pjmedia_sdp_print(), pjmedia_sdp_media_print()`. Applications that do not use PJSUA2 and do not directly call `pjmedia_sdp_print()` or `pjmedia_sdp_media_print()` should not be affected. A patch is available on the `master` branch of the `pjsip/pjproject` GitHub repository. There are currently no known workarounds. |
| Stack overflow in PJSUA API when calling pjsua_playlist_create. An attacker-controlled 'file_names' argument may cause a buffer overflow since it is copied to a fixed-size stack buffer without any size validation. |
| Stack overflow in PJSUA API when calling pjsua_recorder_create. An attacker-controlled 'filename' argument may cause a buffer overflow since it is copied to a fixed-size stack buffer without any size validation. |
| Stack overflow in PJSUA API when calling pjsua_player_create. An attacker-controlled 'filename' argument may cause a buffer overflow since it is copied to a fixed-size stack buffer without any size validation. |
| GIMP ILBM File Parsing Stack-based Buffer Overflow Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of GIMP. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file.
The specific flaw exists within the parsing of ILBM files. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of the length of user-supplied data prior to copying it to a stack-based buffer. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current process. Was ZDI-CAN-27793. |
| GeographicLib 2.5 is vulnerable to Buffer Overflow in GeoConvert DMS::InternalDecode. |
| editorconfig-core-c is theEditorConfig core library written in C (for use by plugins supporting EditorConfig parsing). In affected versions several overflows may occur in switch case '[' when the input pattern contains many escaped characters. The added backslashes leave too little space in the output pattern when processing nested brackets such that the remaining input length exceeds the output capacity. This issue has been addressed in release version 0.12.7. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: dax: fix overflowing extents beyond inode size when partially writing
The dax_iomap_rw() does two things in each iteration: map written blocks
and copy user data to blocks. If the process is killed by user(See signal
handling in dax_iomap_iter()), the copied data will be returned and added
on inode size, which means that the length of written extents may exceed
the inode size, then fsck will fail. An example is given as:
dd if=/dev/urandom of=file bs=4M count=1
dax_iomap_rw
iomap_iter // round 1
ext4_iomap_begin
ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 0~2M extents(written flag)
dax_iomap_iter // copy 2M data
iomap_iter // round 2
iomap_iter_advance
iter->pos += iter->processed // iter->pos = 2M
ext4_iomap_begin
ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 2~4M extents(written flag)
dax_iomap_iter
fatal_signal_pending
done = iter->pos - iocb->ki_pos // done = 2M
ext4_handle_inode_extension
ext4_update_inode_size // inode size = 2M
fsck reports: Inode 13, i_size is 2097152, should be 4194304. Fix?
Fix the problem by truncating extents if the written length is smaller
than expected. |
| GStreamer is a library for constructing graphs of media-handling components. stack-buffer overflow has been detected in the gst_opus_dec_parse_header function within `gstopusdec.c'. The pos array is a stack-allocated buffer of size 64. If n_channels exceeds 64, the for loop will write beyond the boundaries of the pos array. The value written will always be GST_AUDIO_CHANNEL_POSITION_NONE. This bug allows to overwrite the EIP address allocated in the stack. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.24.10. |
| GStreamer is a library for constructing graphs of media-handling components. A stack-buffer overflow has been detected in the `vorbis_handle_identification_packet` function within `gstvorbisdec.c`. The position array is a stack-allocated buffer of size 64. If vd->vi.channels exceeds 64, the for loop will write beyond the boundaries of the position array. The value written will always be `GST_AUDIO_CHANNEL_POSITION_NONE`. This vulnerability allows someone to overwrite the EIP address allocated in the stack. Additionally, this bug can overwrite the `GstAudioInfo` info structure. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.24.10. |
| XStream is a simple library to serialize objects to XML and back again. This vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to terminate the application with a stack overflow error resulting in a denial of service only by manipulating the processed input stream when XStream is configured to use the BinaryStreamDriver. XStream 1.4.21 has been patched to detect the manipulation in the binary input stream causing the the stack overflow and raises an InputManipulationException instead. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may catch the StackOverflowError in the client code calling XStream if XStream is configured to use the BinaryStreamDriver. |
| libxml2 before 2.12.10 and 2.13.x before 2.13.6 has a stack-based buffer overflow in xmlSnprintfElements in valid.c. To exploit this, DTD validation must occur for an untrusted document or untrusted DTD. NOTE: this is similar to CVE-2017-9047. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/dpaa2: Avoid explicit cpumask var allocation on stack
For CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=y kernel, explicit allocation of cpumask
variable on stack is not recommended since it can cause potential stack
overflow.
Instead, kernel code should always use *cpumask_var API(s) to allocate
cpumask var in config-neutral way, leaving allocation strategy to
CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK.
Use *cpumask_var API(s) to address it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: prefer nft_chain_validate
nft_chain_validate already performs loop detection because a cycle will
result in a call stack overflow (ctx->level >= NFT_JUMP_STACK_SIZE).
It also follows maps via ->validate callback in nft_lookup, so there
appears no reason to iterate the maps again.
nf_tables_check_loops() and all its helper functions can be removed.
This improves ruleset load time significantly, from 23s down to 12s.
This also fixes a crash bug. Old loop detection code can result in
unbounded recursion:
BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ....
Oops: stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 4 PID: 1539 Comm: nft Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5+ #1
[..]
with a suitable ruleset during validation of register stores.
I can't see any actual reason to attempt to check for this from
nft_validate_register_store(), at this point the transaction is still in
progress, so we don't have a full picture of the rule graph.
For nf-next it might make sense to either remove it or make this depend
on table->validate_state in case we could catch an error earlier
(for improved error reporting to userspace). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix overrunning reservations in ringbuf
The BPF ring buffer internally is implemented as a power-of-2 sized circular
buffer, with two logical and ever-increasing counters: consumer_pos is the
consumer counter to show which logical position the consumer consumed the
data, and producer_pos which is the producer counter denoting the amount of
data reserved by all producers.
Each time a record is reserved, the producer that "owns" the record will
successfully advance producer counter. In user space each time a record is
read, the consumer of the data advanced the consumer counter once it finished
processing. Both counters are stored in separate pages so that from user
space, the producer counter is read-only and the consumer counter is read-write.
One aspect that simplifies and thus speeds up the implementation of both
producers and consumers is how the data area is mapped twice contiguously
back-to-back in the virtual memory, allowing to not take any special measures
for samples that have to wrap around at the end of the circular buffer data
area, because the next page after the last data page would be first data page
again, and thus the sample will still appear completely contiguous in virtual
memory.
Each record has a struct bpf_ringbuf_hdr { u32 len; u32 pg_off; } header for
book-keeping the length and offset, and is inaccessible to the BPF program.
Helpers like bpf_ringbuf_reserve() return `(void *)hdr + BPF_RINGBUF_HDR_SZ`
for the BPF program to use. Bing-Jhong and Muhammad reported that it is however
possible to make a second allocated memory chunk overlapping with the first
chunk and as a result, the BPF program is now able to edit first chunk's
header.
For example, consider the creation of a BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF map with size
of 0x4000. Next, the consumer_pos is modified to 0x3000 /before/ a call to
bpf_ringbuf_reserve() is made. This will allocate a chunk A, which is in
[0x0,0x3008], and the BPF program is able to edit [0x8,0x3008]. Now, lets
allocate a chunk B with size 0x3000. This will succeed because consumer_pos
was edited ahead of time to pass the `new_prod_pos - cons_pos > rb->mask`
check. Chunk B will be in range [0x3008,0x6010], and the BPF program is able
to edit [0x3010,0x6010]. Due to the ring buffer memory layout mentioned
earlier, the ranges [0x0,0x4000] and [0x4000,0x8000] point to the same data
pages. This means that chunk B at [0x4000,0x4008] is chunk A's header.
bpf_ringbuf_submit() / bpf_ringbuf_discard() use the header's pg_off to then
locate the bpf_ringbuf itself via bpf_ringbuf_restore_from_rec(). Once chunk
B modified chunk A's header, then bpf_ringbuf_commit() refers to the wrong
page and could cause a crash.
Fix it by calculating the oldest pending_pos and check whether the range
from the oldest outstanding record to the newest would span beyond the ring
buffer size. If that is the case, then reject the request. We've tested with
the ring buffer benchmark in BPF selftests (./benchs/run_bench_ringbufs.sh)
before/after the fix and while it seems a bit slower on some benchmarks, it
is still not significantly enough to matter. |
| VMS TCPIPtrace file parser crash in Wireshark 4.0.0 to 4.0.5 and 3.6.0 to 3.6.13 allows denial of service via crafted capture file |
| Candump log parser crash in Wireshark 4.0.0 to 4.0.5 and 3.6.0 to 3.6.13 allows denial of service via crafted capture file |
