| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
geneve: make sure to pull inner header in geneve_rx()
syzbot triggered a bug in geneve_rx() [1]
Issue is similar to the one I fixed in commit 8d975c15c0cd
("ip6_tunnel: make sure to pull inner header in __ip6_tnl_rcv()")
We have to save skb->network_header in a temporary variable
in order to be able to recompute the network_header pointer
after a pskb_inet_may_pull() call.
pskb_inet_may_pull() makes sure the needed headers are in skb->head.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in IP_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:302 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in geneve_rx drivers/net/geneve.c:279 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in geneve_udp_encap_recv+0x36f9/0x3c10 drivers/net/geneve.c:391
IP_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:302 [inline]
geneve_rx drivers/net/geneve.c:279 [inline]
geneve_udp_encap_recv+0x36f9/0x3c10 drivers/net/geneve.c:391
udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x1d39/0x1f20 net/ipv4/udp.c:2108
udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x6ae/0x6e0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2186
udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x184/0x4b0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2346
__udp4_lib_rcv+0x1c6b/0x3010 net/ipv4/udp.c:2422
udp_rcv+0x7d/0xa0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2604
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x264/0x1300 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2b8/0x440 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
ip_local_deliver+0x21f/0x490 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254
dst_input include/net/dst.h:461 [inline]
ip_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:449 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
ip_rcv+0x46f/0x760 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5534 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x1a6/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:5648
process_backlog+0x480/0x8b0 net/core/dev.c:5976
__napi_poll+0xe3/0x980 net/core/dev.c:6576
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6645 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x8b8/0x1870 net/core/dev.c:6778
__do_softirq+0x1b7/0x7c5 kernel/softirq.c:553
do_softirq+0x9a/0xf0 kernel/softirq.c:454
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x9b/0xa0 kernel/softirq.c:381
local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline]
rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:820 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x2768/0x51c0 net/core/dev.c:4378
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3171 [inline]
packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x8aef/0x9f10 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
__sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3819 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5cb/0xbc0 mm/slub.c:3903
kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:560
__alloc_skb+0x352/0x790 net/core/skbuff.c:651
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1296 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xbd0 net/core/skbuff.c:6394
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa80/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2783
packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2930 [inline]
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3024 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x70c2/0x9f10 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
__sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
igc: avoid returning frame twice in XDP_REDIRECT
When a frame can not be transmitted in XDP_REDIRECT
(e.g. due to a full queue), it is necessary to free
it by calling xdp_return_frame_rx_napi.
However, this is the responsibility of the caller of
the ndo_xdp_xmit (see for example bq_xmit_all in
kernel/bpf/devmap.c) and thus calling it inside
igc_xdp_xmit (which is the ndo_xdp_xmit of the igc
driver) as well will lead to memory corruption.
In fact, bq_xmit_all expects that it can return all
frames after the last successfully transmitted one.
Therefore, break for the first not transmitted frame,
but do not call xdp_return_frame_rx_napi in igc_xdp_xmit.
This is equally implemented in other Intel drivers
such as the igb.
There are two alternatives to this that were rejected:
1. Return num_frames as all the frames would have been
transmitted and release them inside igc_xdp_xmit.
While it might work technically, it is not what
the return value is meant to represent (i.e. the
number of SUCCESSFULLY transmitted packets).
2. Rework kernel/bpf/devmap.c and all drivers to
support non-consecutively dropped packets.
Besides being complex, it likely has a negative
performance impact without a significant gain
since it is anyway unlikely that the next frame
can be transmitted if the previous one was dropped.
The memory corruption can be reproduced with
the following script which leads to a kernel panic
after a few seconds. It basically generates more
traffic than a i225 NIC can transmit and pushes it
via XDP_REDIRECT from a virtual interface to the
physical interface where frames get dropped.
#!/bin/bash
INTERFACE=enp4s0
INTERFACE_IDX=`cat /sys/class/net/$INTERFACE/ifindex`
sudo ip link add dev veth1 type veth peer name veth2
sudo ip link set up $INTERFACE
sudo ip link set up veth1
sudo ip link set up veth2
cat << EOF > redirect.bpf.c
SEC("prog")
int redirect(struct xdp_md *ctx)
{
return bpf_redirect($INTERFACE_IDX, 0);
}
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
EOF
clang -O2 -g -Wall -target bpf -c redirect.bpf.c -o redirect.bpf.o
sudo ip link set veth2 xdp obj redirect.bpf.o
cat << EOF > pass.bpf.c
SEC("prog")
int pass(struct xdp_md *ctx)
{
return XDP_PASS;
}
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
EOF
clang -O2 -g -Wall -target bpf -c pass.bpf.c -o pass.bpf.o
sudo ip link set $INTERFACE xdp obj pass.bpf.o
cat << EOF > trafgen.cfg
{
/* Ethernet Header */
0xe8, 0x6a, 0x64, 0x41, 0xbf, 0x46,
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
const16(ETH_P_IP),
/* IPv4 Header */
0b01000101, 0, # IPv4 version, IHL, TOS
const16(1028), # IPv4 total length (UDP length + 20 bytes (IP header))
const16(2), # IPv4 ident
0b01000000, 0, # IPv4 flags, fragmentation off
64, # IPv4 TTL
17, # Protocol UDP
csumip(14, 33), # IPv4 checksum
/* UDP Header */
10, 0, 1, 1, # IP Src - adapt as needed
10, 0, 1, 2, # IP Dest - adapt as needed
const16(6666), # UDP Src Port
const16(6666), # UDP Dest Port
const16(1008), # UDP length (UDP header 8 bytes + payload length)
csumudp(14, 34), # UDP checksum
/* Payload */
fill('W', 1000),
}
EOF
sudo trafgen -i trafgen.cfg -b3000MB -o veth1 --cpp |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: Add protection for bmp length out of range
UBSAN load reports an exception of BRK#5515 SHIFT_ISSUE:Bitwise shifts
that are out of bounds for their data type.
vmlinux get_bitmap(b=75) + 712
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:0>
vmlinux decode_seq(bs=0xFFFFFFD008037000, f=0xFFFFFFD008037018, level=134443100) + 1956
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:592>
vmlinux decode_choice(base=0xFFFFFFD0080370F0, level=23843636) + 1216
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:814>
vmlinux decode_seq(f=0xFFFFFFD0080371A8, level=134443500) + 812
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:576>
vmlinux decode_choice(base=0xFFFFFFD008037280, level=0) + 1216
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:814>
vmlinux DecodeRasMessage() + 304
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:833>
vmlinux ras_help() + 684
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_main.c:1728>
vmlinux nf_confirm() + 188
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c:137>
Due to abnormal data in skb->data, the extension bitmap length
exceeds 32 when decoding ras message then uses the length to make
a shift operation. It will change into negative after several loop.
UBSAN load could detect a negative shift as an undefined behaviour
and reports exception.
So we add the protection to avoid the length exceeding 32. Or else
it will return out of range error and stop decoding. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i40e: Do not allow untrusted VF to remove administratively set MAC
Currently when PF administratively sets VF's MAC address and the VF
is put down (VF tries to delete all MACs) then the MAC is removed
from MAC filters and primary VF MAC is zeroed.
Do not allow untrusted VF to remove primary MAC when it was set
administratively by PF.
Reproducer:
1) Create VF
2) Set VF interface up
3) Administratively set the VF's MAC
4) Put VF interface down
[root@host ~]# echo 1 > /sys/class/net/enp2s0f0/device/sriov_numvfs
[root@host ~]# ip link set enp2s0f0v0 up
[root@host ~]# ip link set enp2s0f0 vf 0 mac fe:6c:b5:da:c7:7d
[root@host ~]# ip link show enp2s0f0
23: enp2s0f0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc mq state UP mode DEFAULT group default qlen 1000
link/ether 3c:ec:ef:b7:dd:04 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
vf 0 link/ether fe:6c:b5:da:c7:7d brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff, spoof checking on, link-state auto, trust off
[root@host ~]# ip link set enp2s0f0v0 down
[root@host ~]# ip link show enp2s0f0
23: enp2s0f0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc mq state UP mode DEFAULT group default qlen 1000
link/ether 3c:ec:ef:b7:dd:04 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
vf 0 link/ether 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff, spoof checking on, link-state auto, trust off |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: fix data re-injection from stale subflow
When the MPTCP PM detects that a subflow is stale, all the packet
scheduler must re-inject all the mptcp-level unacked data. To avoid
acquiring unneeded locks, it first try to check if any unacked data
is present at all in the RTX queue, but such check is currently
broken, as it uses TCP-specific helper on an MPTCP socket.
Funnily enough fuzzers and static checkers are happy, as the accessed
memory still belongs to the mptcp_sock struct, and even from a
functional perspective the recovery completed successfully, as
the short-cut test always failed.
A recent unrelated TCP change - commit d5fed5addb2b ("tcp: reorganize
tcp_sock fast path variables") - exposed the issue, as the tcp field
reorganization makes the mptcp code always skip the re-inection.
Fix the issue dropping the bogus call: we are on a slow path, the early
optimization proved once again to be evil. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: algif_hash - Remove bogus SGL free on zero-length error path
When a zero-length message is hashed by algif_hash, and an error
is triggered, it tries to free an SG list that was never allocated
in the first place. Fix this by not freeing the SG list on the
zero-length error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
irqchip/gic-v3-its: Restore quirk probing for ACPI-based systems
While refactoring the way the ITSs are probed, the handling of quirks
applicable to ACPI-based platforms was lost. As a result, systems such as
HIP07 lose their GICv4 functionnality, and some other may even fail to
boot, unless they are configured to boot with DT.
Move the enabling of quirks into its_probe_one(), making it common to all
firmware implementations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: Disable IRQ before init_fn() for nonboot CPUs
Disable IRQ before init_fn() for nonboot CPUs when hotplug, in order to
silence such warnings (and also avoid potential errors due to unexpected
interrupts):
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at kernel/rcu/tree.c:4503 rcu_cpu_starting+0x214/0x280
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 6.6.17+ #1198
pc 90000000048e3334 ra 90000000047bd56c tp 900000010039c000 sp 900000010039fdd0
a0 0000000000000001 a1 0000000000000006 a2 900000000802c040 a3 0000000000000000
a4 0000000000000001 a5 0000000000000004 a6 0000000000000000 a7 90000000048e3f4c
t0 0000000000000001 t1 9000000005c70968 t2 0000000004000000 t3 000000000005e56e
t4 00000000000002e4 t5 0000000000001000 t6 ffffffff80000000 t7 0000000000040000
t8 9000000007931638 u0 0000000000000006 s9 0000000000000004 s0 0000000000000001
s1 9000000006356ac0 s2 9000000007244000 s3 0000000000000001 s4 0000000000000001
s5 900000000636f000 s6 7fffffffffffffff s7 9000000002123940 s8 9000000001ca55f8
ra: 90000000047bd56c tlb_init+0x24c/0x528
ERA: 90000000048e3334 rcu_cpu_starting+0x214/0x280
CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE)
PRMD: 00000000 (PPLV0 -PIE -PWE)
EUEN: 00000000 (-FPE -SXE -ASXE -BTE)
ECFG: 00071000 (LIE=12 VS=7)
ESTAT: 000c0000 [BRK] (IS= ECode=12 EsubCode=0)
PRID: 0014c010 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A5000)
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 6.6.17+ #1198
Stack : 0000000000000000 9000000006375000 9000000005b61878 900000010039c000
900000010039fa30 0000000000000000 900000010039fa38 900000000619a140
9000000006456888 9000000006456880 900000010039f950 0000000000000001
0000000000000001 cb0cb028ec7e52e1 0000000002b90000 9000000100348700
0000000000000000 0000000000000001 ffffffff916d12f1 0000000000000003
0000000000040000 9000000007930370 0000000002b90000 0000000000000004
9000000006366000 900000000619a140 0000000000000000 0000000000000004
0000000000000000 0000000000000009 ffffffffffc681f2 9000000002123940
9000000001ca55f8 9000000006366000 90000000047a4828 00007ffff057ded8
00000000000000b0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000071000
...
Call Trace:
[<90000000047a4828>] show_stack+0x48/0x1a0
[<9000000005b61874>] dump_stack_lvl+0x84/0xcc
[<90000000047f60ac>] __warn+0x8c/0x1e0
[<9000000005b0ab34>] report_bug+0x1b4/0x280
[<9000000005b63110>] do_bp+0x2d0/0x480
[<90000000047a2e20>] handle_bp+0x120/0x1c0
[<90000000048e3334>] rcu_cpu_starting+0x214/0x280
[<90000000047bd568>] tlb_init+0x248/0x528
[<90000000047a4c44>] per_cpu_trap_init+0x124/0x160
[<90000000047a19f4>] cpu_probe+0x494/0xa00
[<90000000047b551c>] start_secondary+0x3c/0xc0
[<9000000005b66134>] smpboot_entry+0x50/0x58 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/pci: Fix disabling memory if DVSEC CXL Range does not match a CFMWS window
The Linux CXL subsystem is built on the assumption that HPA == SPA.
That is, the host physical address (HPA) the HDM decoder registers are
programmed with are system physical addresses (SPA).
During HDM decoder setup, the DVSEC CXL range registers (cxl-3.1,
8.1.3.8) are checked if the memory is enabled and the CXL range is in
a HPA window that is described in a CFMWS structure of the CXL host
bridge (cxl-3.1, 9.18.1.3).
Now, if the HPA is not an SPA, the CXL range does not match a CFMWS
window and the CXL memory range will be disabled then. The HDM decoder
stops working which causes system memory being disabled and further a
system hang during HDM decoder initialization, typically when a CXL
enabled kernel boots.
Prevent a system hang and do not disable the HDM decoder if the
decoder's CXL range is not found in a CFMWS window.
Note the change only fixes a hardware hang, but does not implement
HPA/SPA translation. Support for this can be added in a follow on
patch series. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: Don't ignore suspended array in md_check_recovery()
mddev_suspend() never stop sync_thread, hence it doesn't make sense to
ignore suspended array in md_check_recovery(), which might cause
sync_thread can't be unregistered.
After commit f52f5c71f3d4 ("md: fix stopping sync thread"), following
hang can be triggered by test shell/integrity-caching.sh:
1) suspend the array:
raid_postsuspend
mddev_suspend
2) stop the array:
raid_dtr
md_stop
__md_stop_writes
stop_sync_thread
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery);
md_wakeup_thread_directly(mddev->sync_thread);
wait_event(..., !test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING, &mddev->recovery))
3) sync thread done:
md_do_sync
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_DONE, &mddev->recovery);
md_wakeup_thread(mddev->thread);
4) daemon thread can't unregister sync thread:
md_check_recovery
if (mddev->suspended)
return; -> return directly
md_read_sync_thread
clear_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING, &mddev->recovery);
-> MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING can't be cleared, hence step 2 hang;
This problem is not just related to dm-raid, fix it by ignoring
suspended array in md_check_recovery(). And follow up patches will
improve dm-raid better to frozen sync thread during suspend. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: Don't ignore read-only array in md_check_recovery()
Usually if the array is not read-write, md_check_recovery() won't
register new sync_thread in the first place. And if the array is
read-write and sync_thread is registered, md_set_readonly() will
unregister sync_thread before setting the array read-only. md/raid
follow this behavior hence there is no problem.
After commit f52f5c71f3d4 ("md: fix stopping sync thread"), following
hang can be triggered by test shell/integrity-caching.sh:
1) array is read-only. dm-raid update super block:
rs_update_sbs
ro = mddev->ro
mddev->ro = 0
-> set array read-write
md_update_sb
2) register new sync thread concurrently.
3) dm-raid set array back to read-only:
rs_update_sbs
mddev->ro = ro
4) stop the array:
raid_dtr
md_stop
stop_sync_thread
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery);
md_wakeup_thread_directly(mddev->sync_thread);
wait_event(..., !test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING, &mddev->recovery))
5) sync thread done:
md_do_sync
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_DONE, &mddev->recovery);
md_wakeup_thread(mddev->thread);
6) daemon thread can't unregister sync thread:
md_check_recovery
if (!md_is_rdwr(mddev) &&
!test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_NEEDED, &mddev->recovery))
return;
-> -> MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING can't be cleared, hence step 4 hang;
The root cause is that dm-raid manipulate 'mddev->ro' by itself,
however, dm-raid really should stop sync thread before setting the
array read-only. Unfortunately, I need to read more code before I
can refacter the handler of 'mddev->ro' in dm-raid, hence let's fix
the problem the easy way for now to prevent dm-raid regression. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: Don't register sync_thread for reshape directly
Currently, if reshape is interrupted, then reassemble the array will
register sync_thread directly from pers->run(), in this case
'MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING' is set directly, however, there is no guarantee
that md_do_sync() will be executed, hence stop_sync_thread() will hang
because 'MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING' can't be cleared.
Last patch make sure that md_do_sync() will set MD_RECOVERY_DONE,
however, following hang can still be triggered by dm-raid test
shell/lvconvert-raid-reshape.sh occasionally:
[root@fedora ~]# cat /proc/1982/stack
[<0>] stop_sync_thread+0x1ab/0x270 [md_mod]
[<0>] md_frozen_sync_thread+0x5c/0xa0 [md_mod]
[<0>] raid_presuspend+0x1e/0x70 [dm_raid]
[<0>] dm_table_presuspend_targets+0x40/0xb0 [dm_mod]
[<0>] __dm_destroy+0x2a5/0x310 [dm_mod]
[<0>] dm_destroy+0x16/0x30 [dm_mod]
[<0>] dev_remove+0x165/0x290 [dm_mod]
[<0>] ctl_ioctl+0x4bb/0x7b0 [dm_mod]
[<0>] dm_ctl_ioctl+0x11/0x20 [dm_mod]
[<0>] vfs_ioctl+0x21/0x60
[<0>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0xb9/0xe0
[<0>] do_syscall_64+0xc6/0x230
[<0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74
Meanwhile mddev->recovery is:
MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING |
MD_RECOVERY_INTR |
MD_RECOVERY_RESHAPE |
MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN
Fix this problem by remove the code to register sync_thread directly
from raid10 and raid5. And let md_check_recovery() to register
sync_thread. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/dsc: Fix the macro that calculates DSCC_/DSCA_ PPS reg address
Commit bd077259d0a9 ("drm/i915/vdsc: Add function to read any PPS
register") defines a new macro to calculate the DSC PPS register
addresses with PPS number as an input. This macro correctly calculates
the addresses till PPS 11 since the addresses increment by 4. So in that
case the following macro works correctly to give correct register
address:
_MMIO(_DSCA_PPS_0 + (pps) * 4)
However after PPS 11, the register address for PPS 12 increments by 12
because of RC Buffer memory allocation in between. Because of this
discontinuity in the address space, the macro calculates wrong addresses
for PPS 12 - 16 resulting into incorrect DSC PPS parameter value
read/writes causing DSC corruption.
This fixes it by correcting this macro to add the offset of 12 for PPS
>=12.
v3: Add correct paranthesis for pps argument (Jani Nikula)
(cherry picked from commit 6074be620c31dc2ae11af96a1a5ea95580976fb5) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
interconnect: qcom: sc8180x: Mark CO0 BCM keepalive
The CO0 BCM needs to be up at all times, otherwise some hardware (like
the UFS controller) loses its connection to the rest of the SoC,
resulting in a hang of the platform, accompanied by a spectacular
logspam.
Mark it as keepalive to prevent such cases. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: atlantic: Fix DMA mapping for PTP hwts ring
Function aq_ring_hwts_rx_alloc() maps extra AQ_CFG_RXDS_DEF bytes
for PTP HWTS ring but then generic aq_ring_free() does not take this
into account.
Create and use a specific function to free HWTS ring to fix this
issue.
Trace:
[ 215.351607] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 215.351612] DMA-API: atlantic 0000:4b:00.0: device driver frees DMA memory with different size [device address=0x00000000fbdd0000] [map size=34816 bytes] [unmap size=32768 bytes]
[ 215.351635] WARNING: CPU: 33 PID: 10759 at kernel/dma/debug.c:988 check_unmap+0xa6f/0x2360
...
[ 215.581176] Call Trace:
[ 215.583632] <TASK>
[ 215.585745] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
[ 215.590114] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
[ 215.594497] ? debug_dma_free_coherent+0x196/0x210
[ 215.599305] ? check_unmap+0xa6f/0x2360
[ 215.603147] ? __warn+0xca/0x1d0
[ 215.606391] ? check_unmap+0xa6f/0x2360
[ 215.610237] ? report_bug+0x1ef/0x370
[ 215.613921] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
[ 215.617423] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x50
[ 215.621269] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[ 215.625480] ? check_unmap+0xa6f/0x2360
[ 215.629331] ? mark_lock.part.0+0xca/0xa40
[ 215.633445] debug_dma_free_coherent+0x196/0x210
[ 215.638079] ? __pfx_debug_dma_free_coherent+0x10/0x10
[ 215.643242] ? slab_free_freelist_hook+0x11d/0x1d0
[ 215.648060] dma_free_attrs+0x6d/0x130
[ 215.651834] aq_ring_free+0x193/0x290 [atlantic]
[ 215.656487] aq_ptp_ring_free+0x67/0x110 [atlantic]
...
[ 216.127540] ---[ end trace 6467e5964dd2640b ]---
[ 216.132160] DMA-API: Mapped at:
[ 216.132162] debug_dma_alloc_coherent+0x66/0x2f0
[ 216.132165] dma_alloc_attrs+0xf5/0x1b0
[ 216.132168] aq_ring_hwts_rx_alloc+0x150/0x1f0 [atlantic]
[ 216.132193] aq_ptp_ring_alloc+0x1bb/0x540 [atlantic]
[ 216.132213] aq_nic_init+0x4a1/0x760 [atlantic] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/efistub: Use 1:1 file:memory mapping for PE/COFF .compat section
The .compat section is a dummy PE section that contains the address of
the 32-bit entrypoint of the 64-bit kernel image if it is bootable from
32-bit firmware (i.e., CONFIG_EFI_MIXED=y)
This section is only 8 bytes in size and is only referenced from the
loader, and so it is placed at the end of the memory view of the image,
to avoid the need for padding it to 4k, which is required for sections
appearing in the middle of the image.
Unfortunately, this violates the PE/COFF spec, and even if most EFI
loaders will work correctly (including the Tianocore reference
implementation), PE loaders do exist that reject such images, on the
basis that both the file and memory views of the file contents should be
described by the section headers in a monotonically increasing manner
without leaving any gaps.
So reorganize the sections to avoid this issue. This results in a slight
padding overhead (< 4k) which can be avoided if desired by disabling
CONFIG_EFI_MIXED (which is only needed in rare cases these days) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ppp_async: limit MRU to 64K
syzbot triggered a warning [1] in __alloc_pages():
WARN_ON_ONCE_GFP(order > MAX_PAGE_ORDER, gfp)
Willem fixed a similar issue in commit c0a2a1b0d631 ("ppp: limit MRU to 64K")
Adopt the same sanity check for ppp_async_ioctl(PPPIOCSMRU)
[1]:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 11 at mm/page_alloc.c:4543 __alloc_pages+0x308/0x698 mm/page_alloc.c:4543
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2-syzkaller-g41bccc98fb79 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023
Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc
pstate: 204000c5 (nzCv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __alloc_pages+0x308/0x698 mm/page_alloc.c:4543
lr : __alloc_pages+0xc8/0x698 mm/page_alloc.c:4537
sp : ffff800093967580
x29: ffff800093967660 x28: ffff8000939675a0 x27: dfff800000000000
x26: ffff70001272ceb4 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff8000939675c0
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000060820 x21: 1ffff0001272ceb8
x20: ffff8000939675e0 x19: 0000000000000010 x18: ffff800093967120
x17: ffff800083bded5c x16: ffff80008ac97500 x15: 0000000000000005
x14: 1ffff0001272cebc x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: ffff70001272cec1 x10: 1ffff0001272cec0 x9 : 0000000000000001
x8 : ffff800091c91000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f
x5 : 00000000ffffffff x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000020
x2 : 0000000000000008 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff8000939675e0
Call trace:
__alloc_pages+0x308/0x698 mm/page_alloc.c:4543
__alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:238 [inline]
alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:261 [inline]
__kmalloc_large_node+0xbc/0x1fc mm/slub.c:3926
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3969 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x418/0x620 mm/slub.c:4001
kmalloc_reserve+0x17c/0x23c net/core/skbuff.c:590
__alloc_skb+0x1c8/0x3d8 net/core/skbuff.c:651
__netdev_alloc_skb+0xb8/0x3e8 net/core/skbuff.c:715
netdev_alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:3235 [inline]
dev_alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:3248 [inline]
ppp_async_input drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:863 [inline]
ppp_asynctty_receive+0x588/0x186c drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:341
tty_ldisc_receive_buf+0x12c/0x15c drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:390
tty_port_default_receive_buf+0x74/0xac drivers/tty/tty_port.c:37
receive_buf drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:444 [inline]
flush_to_ldisc+0x284/0x6e4 drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:494
process_one_work+0x694/0x1204 kernel/workqueue.c:2633
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:2706 [inline]
worker_thread+0x938/0xef4 kernel/workqueue.c:2787
kthread+0x288/0x310 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:860 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: Check the bearer type before calling tipc_udp_nl_bearer_add()
syzbot reported the following general protection fault [1]:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000010: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000080-0x0000000000000087]
...
RIP: 0010:tipc_udp_is_known_peer+0x9c/0x250 net/tipc/udp_media.c:291
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tipc_udp_nl_bearer_add+0x212/0x2f0 net/tipc/udp_media.c:646
tipc_nl_bearer_add+0x21e/0x360 net/tipc/bearer.c:1089
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1fc/0x2e0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:972
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1052 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x561/0x800 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1067
netlink_rcv_skb+0x16b/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2544
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1076
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x53b/0x810 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367
netlink_sendmsg+0x8b7/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1909
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x180 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x6ac/0x940 net/socket.c:2584
___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2638
__sys_sendmsg+0x117/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2667
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
The cause of this issue is that when tipc_nl_bearer_add() is called with
the TIPC_NLA_BEARER_UDP_OPTS attribute, tipc_udp_nl_bearer_add() is called
even if the bearer is not UDP.
tipc_udp_is_known_peer() called by tipc_udp_nl_bearer_add() assumes that
the media_ptr field of the tipc_bearer has an udp_bearer type object, so
the function goes crazy for non-UDP bearers.
This patch fixes the issue by checking the bearer type before calling
tipc_udp_nl_bearer_add() in tipc_nl_bearer_add(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip6_tunnel: make sure to pull inner header in __ip6_tnl_rcv()
syzbot found __ip6_tnl_rcv() could access unitiliazed data [1].
Call pskb_inet_may_pull() to fix this, and initialize ipv6h
variable after this call as it can change skb->head.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in IP6_ECN_decapsulate+0x7df/0x1e50 include/net/inet_ecn.h:321
__INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline]
INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline]
IP6_ECN_decapsulate+0x7df/0x1e50 include/net/inet_ecn.h:321
ip6ip6_dscp_ecn_decapsulate+0x178/0x1b0 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:727
__ip6_tnl_rcv+0xd4e/0x1590 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:845
ip6_tnl_rcv+0xce/0x100 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:888
gre_rcv+0x143f/0x1870
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xda6/0x2a60 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438
ip6_input_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:483 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
ip6_input+0x15d/0x430 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:492
ip6_mc_input+0xa7e/0xc80 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:586
dst_input include/net/dst.h:461 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0x5db/0x870 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
ipv6_rcv+0xda/0x390 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:310
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5532 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x1a6/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:5646
netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5732 [inline]
netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5791
tun_rx_batched+0x3ee/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1555
tun_get_user+0x53af/0x66d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2002
tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2084 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]
vfs_write+0x786/0x1200 fs/read_write.c:590
ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:643
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:652
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook+0x129/0xa70 mm/slab.h:768
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5e9/0xb10 mm/slub.c:3523
kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:560
__alloc_skb+0x318/0x740 net/core/skbuff.c:651
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1286 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xbd0 net/core/skbuff.c:6334
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa80/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2787
tun_alloc_skb drivers/net/tun.c:1531 [inline]
tun_get_user+0x1e8a/0x66d0 drivers/net/tun.c:1846
tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2084 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]
vfs_write+0x786/0x1200 fs/read_write.c:590
ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:643
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:652
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
CPU: 0 PID: 5034 Comm: syz-executor331 Not tainted 6.7.0-syzkaller-00562-g9f8413c4a66f #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: add sanity checks to rx zerocopy
TCP rx zerocopy intent is to map pages initially allocated
from NIC drivers, not pages owned by a fs.
This patch adds to can_map_frag() these additional checks:
- Page must not be a compound one.
- page->mapping must be NULL.
This fixes the panic reported by ZhangPeng.
syzbot was able to loopback packets built with sendfile(),
mapping pages owned by an ext4 file to TCP rx zerocopy.
r3 = socket$inet_tcp(0x2, 0x1, 0x0)
mmap(&(0x7f0000ff9000/0x4000)=nil, 0x4000, 0x0, 0x12, r3, 0x0)
r4 = socket$inet_tcp(0x2, 0x1, 0x0)
bind$inet(r4, &(0x7f0000000000)={0x2, 0x4e24, @multicast1}, 0x10)
connect$inet(r4, &(0x7f00000006c0)={0x2, 0x4e24, @empty}, 0x10)
r5 = openat$dir(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f00000000c0)='./file0\x00',
0x181e42, 0x0)
fallocate(r5, 0x0, 0x0, 0x85b8)
sendfile(r4, r5, 0x0, 0x8ba0)
getsockopt$inet_tcp_TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE(r4, 0x6, 0x23,
&(0x7f00000001c0)={&(0x7f0000ffb000/0x3000)=nil, 0x3000, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0}, &(0x7f0000000440)=0x40)
r6 = openat$dir(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f00000000c0)='./file0\x00',
0x181e42, 0x0) |
