| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/hns: Fix accessing invalid dip_ctx during destroying QP
If it fails to modify QP to RTR, dip_ctx will not be attached. And
during detroying QP, the invalid dip_ctx pointer will be accessed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/bnxt_re: Fix max SGEs for the Work Request
Gen P7 supports up to 13 SGEs for now. WQE software structure
can hold only 6 now. Since the max send sge is reported as
13, the stack can give requests up to 13 SGEs. This is causing
traffic failures and system crashes.
Use the define for max SGE supported for variable size. This
will work for both static and variable WQEs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix the (non-)cancellation of copy when cache is temporarily disabled
When the caching for a cookie is temporarily disabled (e.g. due to a DIO
write on that file), future copying to the cache for that file is disabled
until all fds open on that file are closed. However, if netfslib is using
the deprecated PG_private_2 method (such as is currently used by ceph), and
decides it wants to copy to the cache, netfs_advance_write() will just bail
at the first check seeing that the cache stream is unavailable, and
indicate that it dealt with all the content.
This means that we have no subrequests to provide notifications to drive
the state machine or even to pin the request and the request just gets
discarded, leaving the folios with PG_private_2 set.
Fix this by jumping directly to cancel the request if the cache is not
available. That way, we don't remove mark3 from the folio_queue list and
netfs_pgpriv2_cancel() will clean up the folios.
This was found by running the generic/013 xfstest against ceph with an
active cache and the "-o fsc" option passed to ceph. That would usually
hang |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix ceph copy to cache on write-begin
At the end of netfs_unlock_read_folio() in which folios are marked
appropriately for copying to the cache (either with by being marked dirty
and having their private data set or by having PG_private_2 set) and then
unlocked, the folio_queue struct has the entry pointing to the folio
cleared. This presents a problem for netfs_pgpriv2_write_to_the_cache(),
which is used to write folios marked with PG_private_2 to the cache as it
expects to be able to trawl the folio_queue list thereafter to find the
relevant folios, leading to a hang.
Fix this by not clearing the folio_queue entry if we're going to do the
deprecated copy-to-cache. The clearance will be done instead as the folios
are written to the cache.
This can be reproduced by starting cachefiles, mounting a ceph filesystem
with "-o fsc" and writing to it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched_ext: Replace rq_lock() to raw_spin_rq_lock() in scx_ops_bypass()
scx_ops_bypass() iterates all CPUs to re-enqueue all the scx tasks.
For each CPU, it acquires a lock using rq_lock() regardless of whether
a CPU is offline or the CPU is currently running a task in a higher
scheduler class (e.g., deadline). The rq_lock() is supposed to be used
for online CPUs, and the use of rq_lock() may trigger an unnecessary
warning in rq_pin_lock(). Therefore, replace rq_lock() to
raw_spin_rq_lock() in scx_ops_bypass().
Without this change, we observe the following warning:
===== START =====
[ 6.615205] rq->balance_callback && rq->balance_callback != &balance_push_callback
[ 6.615208] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at kernel/sched/sched.h:1730 __schedule+0x1130/0x1c90
===== END ===== |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netdev: prevent accessing NAPI instances from another namespace
The NAPI IDs were not fully exposed to user space prior to the netlink
API, so they were never namespaced. The netlink API must ensure that
at the very least NAPI instance belongs to the same netns as the owner
of the genl sock.
napi_by_id() can become static now, but it needs to move because of
dev_get_by_napi_id(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: dwmac-tegra: Read iommu stream id from device tree
Nvidia's Tegra MGBE controllers require the IOMMU "Stream ID" (SID) to be
written to the MGBE_WRAP_AXI_ASID0_CTRL register.
The current driver is hard coded to use MGBE0's SID for all controllers.
This causes softirq time outs and kernel panics when using controllers
other than MGBE0.
Example dmesg errors when an ethernet cable is connected to MGBE1:
[ 116.133290] tegra-mgbe 6910000.ethernet eth1: Link is Up - 1Gbps/Full - flow control rx/tx
[ 121.851283] tegra-mgbe 6910000.ethernet eth1: NETDEV WATCHDOG: CPU: 5: transmit queue 0 timed out 5690 ms
[ 121.851782] tegra-mgbe 6910000.ethernet eth1: Reset adapter.
[ 121.892464] tegra-mgbe 6910000.ethernet eth1: Register MEM_TYPE_PAGE_POOL RxQ-0
[ 121.905920] tegra-mgbe 6910000.ethernet eth1: PHY [stmmac-1:00] driver [Aquantia AQR113] (irq=171)
[ 121.907356] tegra-mgbe 6910000.ethernet eth1: Enabling Safety Features
[ 121.907578] tegra-mgbe 6910000.ethernet eth1: IEEE 1588-2008 Advanced Timestamp supported
[ 121.908399] tegra-mgbe 6910000.ethernet eth1: registered PTP clock
[ 121.908582] tegra-mgbe 6910000.ethernet eth1: configuring for phy/10gbase-r link mode
[ 125.961292] tegra-mgbe 6910000.ethernet eth1: Link is Up - 1Gbps/Full - flow control rx/tx
[ 181.921198] rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
[ 181.921404] rcu: 7-....: (1 GPs behind) idle=540c/1/0x4000000000000002 softirq=1748/1749 fqs=2337
[ 181.921684] rcu: (detected by 4, t=6002 jiffies, g=1357, q=1254 ncpus=8)
[ 181.921878] Sending NMI from CPU 4 to CPUs 7:
[ 181.921886] NMI backtrace for cpu 7
[ 181.922131] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/7 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.13.0-rc3+ #6
[ 181.922390] Hardware name: NVIDIA CTI Forge + Orin AGX/Jetson, BIOS 202402.1-Unknown 10/28/2024
[ 181.922658] pstate: 40400009 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 181.922847] pc : handle_softirqs+0x98/0x368
[ 181.922978] lr : __do_softirq+0x18/0x20
[ 181.923095] sp : ffff80008003bf50
[ 181.923189] x29: ffff80008003bf50 x28: 0000000000000008 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 181.923379] x26: ffffce78ea277000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000001c61befda0
[ 181.924486] x23: 0000000060400009 x22: ffffce78e99918bc x21: ffff80008018bd70
[ 181.925568] x20: ffffce78e8bb00d8 x19: ffff80008018bc20 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 181.926655] x17: ffff318ebe7d3000 x16: ffff800080038000 x15: 0000000000000000
[ 181.931455] x14: ffff000080816680 x13: ffff318ebe7d3000 x12: 000000003464d91d
[ 181.938628] x11: 0000000000000040 x10: ffff000080165a70 x9 : ffffce78e8bb0160
[ 181.945804] x8 : ffff8000827b3160 x7 : f9157b241586f343 x6 : eeb6502a01c81c74
[ 181.953068] x5 : a4acfcdd2e8096bb x4 : ffffce78ea277340 x3 : 00000000ffffd1e1
[ 181.960329] x2 : 0000000000000101 x1 : ffffce78ea277340 x0 : ffff318ebe7d3000
[ 181.967591] Call trace:
[ 181.970043] handle_softirqs+0x98/0x368 (P)
[ 181.974240] __do_softirq+0x18/0x20
[ 181.977743] ____do_softirq+0x14/0x28
[ 181.981415] call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x30
[ 181.985180] do_softirq_own_stack+0x20/0x30
[ 181.989379] __irq_exit_rcu+0x114/0x140
[ 181.993142] irq_exit_rcu+0x14/0x28
[ 181.996816] el1_interrupt+0x44/0xb8
[ 182.000316] el1h_64_irq_handler+0x14/0x20
[ 182.004343] el1h_64_irq+0x80/0x88
[ 182.007755] cpuidle_enter_state+0xc4/0x4a8 (P)
[ 182.012305] cpuidle_enter+0x3c/0x58
[ 182.015980] cpuidle_idle_call+0x128/0x1c0
[ 182.020005] do_idle+0xe0/0xf0
[ 182.023155] cpu_startup_entry+0x3c/0x48
[ 182.026917] secondary_start_kernel+0xdc/0x120
[ 182.031379] __secondary_switched+0x74/0x78
[ 212.971162] rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected expedited stalls on CPUs/tasks: { 7-.... } 6103 jiffies s: 417 root: 0x80/.
[ 212.985935] rcu: blocking rcu_node structures (internal RCU debug):
[ 212.992758] Sending NMI from CPU 0 to CPUs 7:
[ 212.998539] NMI backtrace for cpu 7
[ 213.004304] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PI
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pfcp: Destroy device along with udp socket's netns dismantle.
pfcp_newlink() links the device to a list in dev_net(dev) instead
of net, where a udp tunnel socket is created.
Even when net is removed, the device stays alive on dev_net(dev).
Then, removing net triggers the splat below. [0]
In this example, pfcp0 is created in ns2, but the udp socket is
created in ns1.
ip netns add ns1
ip netns add ns2
ip -n ns1 link add netns ns2 name pfcp0 type pfcp
ip netns del ns1
Let's link the device to the socket's netns instead.
Now, pfcp_net_exit() needs another netdev iteration to remove
all pfcp devices in the netns.
pfcp_dev_list is not used under RCU, so the list API is converted
to the non-RCU variant.
pfcp_net_exit() can be converted to .exit_batch_rtnl() in net-next.
[0]:
ref_tracker: net notrefcnt@00000000128b34dc has 1/1 users at
sk_alloc (./include/net/net_namespace.h:345 net/core/sock.c:2236)
inet_create (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:326 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:252)
__sock_create (net/socket.c:1558)
udp_sock_create4 (net/ipv4/udp_tunnel_core.c:18)
pfcp_create_sock (drivers/net/pfcp.c:168)
pfcp_newlink (drivers/net/pfcp.c:182 drivers/net/pfcp.c:197)
rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3786 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3897 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4012)
rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6922)
netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2542)
netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1321 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1347)
netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1891)
____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:711 net/socket.c:726 net/socket.c:2583)
___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2639)
__sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2669)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 11 at lib/ref_tracker.c:179 ref_tracker_dir_exit (lib/ref_tracker.c:179)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u16:0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-00147-g4c1224501e9d #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
RIP: 0010:ref_tracker_dir_exit (lib/ref_tracker.c:179)
Code: 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 26 49 bd 00 01 00 00 00 00 ad de 4c 39 f5 0f 85 df 00 00 00 48 8b 74 24 08 48 89 df e8 a5 cc 12 02 90 <0f> 0b 90 48 8d 6b 44 be 04 00 00 00 48 89 ef e8 80 de 67 ff 48 89
RSP: 0018:ff11000007f3fb60 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 00000000000020ef RBX: ff1100000d6481e0 RCX: 1ffffffff0e40d82
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff8423ee3c
RBP: ff1100000d648230 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff0e395af
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff1100000d648230
R13: dead000000000100 R14: ff1100000d648230 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff1100006ce80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005620e1363990 CR3: 000000000eeb2002 CR4: 0000000000771ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn (kernel/panic.c:748)
? ref_tracker_dir_exit (lib/ref_tracker.c:179)
? report_bug (lib/bug.c:201 lib/bug.c:219)
? handle_bug (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:285)
? exc_invalid_op (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:309 (discriminator 1))
? asm_exc_invalid_op (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:621)
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:97 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:155 ./include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:151 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:194)
? ref_tracker_dir_exit (lib/ref_tracker.c:179)
? __pfx_ref_tracker_dir_exit (lib/ref_tracker.c:158)
? kfree (mm/slub.c:4613 mm/slub.c:4761)
net_free (net/core/net_namespace.c:476 net/core/net_namespace.c:467)
cleanup_net (net/cor
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: add the missing error handling inside get_canonical_dev_path
Inside function get_canonical_dev_path(), we call d_path() to get the
final device path.
But d_path() can return error, and in that case the next strscpy() call
will trigger an invalid memory access.
Add back the missing error handling for d_path(). |
| A vulnerability in parisneo/lollms-webui v13 arises from the server's handling of multipart boundaries in file uploads. The server does not limit or validate the length of the boundary or the characters appended to it, allowing an attacker to craft requests with excessively long boundaries, leading to resource exhaustion and eventual denial of service (DoS). Despite an attempted patch in commit 483431bb, which blocked hyphen characters from being appended to the multipart boundary, the fix is insufficient. The server remains vulnerable if other characters (e.g., '4', 'a') are used instead of hyphens. This allows attackers to exploit the vulnerability using different characters, causing resource exhaustion and service unavailability. |
| In mlflow/mlflow version 2.17.2, the `/graphql` endpoint is vulnerable to a denial of service attack. An attacker can create large batches of queries that repeatedly request all runs from a given experiment. This can tie up all the workers allocated by MLFlow, rendering the application unable to respond to other requests. This vulnerability is due to uncontrolled resource consumption. |
| In version 3.25.0 of aimhubio/aim, the tracking server is vulnerable to a denial of service attack. The server overrides the maximum size for websocket messages, allowing very large images to be tracked. This causes the server to become unresponsive to other requests while processing the large image, leading to a denial of service condition. |
| In lunary-ai/lunary before version 1.4.30, a privilege escalation vulnerability exists where admins can invite new members with billing permissions, thereby gaining unauthorized access to billing resources. This issue arises because the user creation endpoint does not restrict admins from inviting users with billing roles. As a result, admins can circumvent the intended access control, posing a risk to the organization's financial resources. |
| In lunary-ai/lunary version 1.4.28, the /checklists/:id route allows low-privilege users to modify checklists by sending a PATCH request. The route lacks proper access control, such as middleware to ensure that only authorized users (e.g., project owners or admins) can modify checklist data. This vulnerability allows any user associated with the project, regardless of their role, to modify checklists, including changing the slug or data fields, which can lead to tampering with essential project workflows, altering business logic, and introducing errors that undermine integrity. |
| In lunary-ai/lunary version v1.4.28, the /bigquery API route lacks proper access control, allowing any logged-in user to create a Datastream to Google BigQuery and export the entire database. This includes sensitive data such as password hashes and secret API keys. The route is protected by a config check (`config.DATA_WAREHOUSE_EXPORTS_ALLOWED`), but it does not verify the user's access level or implement any access control middleware. This vulnerability can lead to the extraction of sensitive data, disruption of services, credential compromise, and service integrity breaches. |
| In lunary-ai/lunary before version 1.4.26, the checklists.post() endpoint allows users to create or modify checklists without validating whether the user has proper permissions. This missing access control permits unauthorized users to create checklists, bypassing intended permission checks. Additionally, the endpoint does not validate the uniqueness of the slug field when creating a new checklist, allowing an attacker to spoof existing checklists by reusing the slug of an already-existing checklist. This can lead to significant data integrity issues, as legitimate checklists can be replaced with malicious or altered data. |
| lunary-ai/lunary version v1.4.25 contains an improper access control vulnerability in the POST /api/v1/data-warehouse/bigquery endpoint. This vulnerability allows any user to export the entire database data by creating a stream to Google BigQuery without proper authentication or authorization. The issue is fixed in version 1.4.26. |
| A Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in berriai/litellm version v1.44.5. This vulnerability can be exploited by appending characters, such as dashes (-), to the end of a multipart boundary in an HTTP request. The server continuously processes each character, leading to excessive resource consumption and rendering the service unavailable. The issue is unauthenticated and does not require any user interaction, impacting all users of the service. |
| A vulnerability in the file upload process of gradio-app/gradio version @gradio/video@0.10.2 allows for a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. An attacker can append a large number of characters to the end of a multipart boundary, causing the system to continuously process each character and issue warnings. This can render Gradio inaccessible for extended periods, disrupting services and causing significant downtime. |
| Lunary-ai/lunary version git 105a3f6 is vulnerable to a Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attack. The application allows users to upload their own regular expressions, which are then executed on the server side. Certain regular expressions can have exponential runtime complexity relative to the input size, leading to potential denial of service. An attacker can exploit this by submitting a specially crafted regular expression, causing the server to become unresponsive for an arbitrary length of time. |
