| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: use hdev->workqueue when queuing hdev->{cmd,ncmd}_timer works
syzbot is reporting attempt to schedule hdev->cmd_work work from system_wq
WQ into hdev->workqueue WQ which is under draining operation [1], for
commit c8efcc2589464ac7 ("workqueue: allow chained queueing during
destruction") does not allow such operation.
The check introduced by commit 877afadad2dce8aa ("Bluetooth: When HCI work
queue is drained, only queue chained work") was incomplete.
Use hdev->workqueue WQ when queuing hdev->{cmd,ncmd}_timer works because
hci_{cmd,ncmd}_timeout() calls queue_work(hdev->workqueue). Also, protect
the queuing operation with RCU read lock in order to avoid calling
queue_delayed_work() after cancel_delayed_work() completed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stream: purge sk_error_queue in sk_stream_kill_queues()
Changheon Lee reported TCP socket leaks, with a nice repro.
It seems we leak TCP sockets with the following sequence:
1) SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_ACK is enabled on the socket.
Each ACK will cook an skb put in error queue, from __skb_tstamp_tx().
__skb_tstamp_tx() is using skb_clone(), unless
SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_TSONLY was also requested.
2) If the application is also using MSG_ZEROCOPY, then we put in the
error queue cloned skbs that had a struct ubuf_info attached to them.
Whenever an struct ubuf_info is allocated, sock_zerocopy_alloc()
does a sock_hold().
As long as the cloned skbs are still in sk_error_queue,
socket refcount is kept elevated.
3) Application closes the socket, while error queue is not empty.
Since tcp_close() no longer purges the socket error queue,
we might end up with a TCP socket with at least one skb in
error queue keeping the socket alive forever.
This bug can be (ab)used to consume all kernel memory
and freeze the host.
We need to purge the error queue, with proper synchronization
against concurrent writers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pstore: Avoid kcore oops by vmap()ing with VM_IOREMAP
An oops can be induced by running 'cat /proc/kcore > /dev/null' on
devices using pstore with the ram backend because kmap_atomic() assumes
lowmem pages are accessible with __va().
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffff807ff2b000
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x96000006
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006
CM = 0, WnR = 0
swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000081d87000
[ffffff807ff2b000] pgd=180000017fe18003, p4d=180000017fe18003, pud=180000017fe18003, pmd=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 96000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: dm_integrity
CPU: 7 PID: 21179 Comm: perf Not tainted 5.15.67-10882-ge4eb2eb988cd #1 baa443fb8e8477896a370b31a821eb2009f9bfba
Hardware name: Google Lazor (rev3 - 8) (DT)
pstate: a0400009 (NzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
lr : vread+0x194/0x294
sp : ffffffc013ee39d0
x29: ffffffc013ee39f0 x28: 0000000000001000 x27: ffffff807ff2b000
x26: 0000000000001000 x25: ffffffc0085a2000 x24: ffffff802d4b3000
x23: ffffff80f8a60000 x22: ffffff802d4b3000 x21: ffffffc0085a2000
x20: ffffff8080b7bc68 x19: 0000000000001000 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffffffd3073f2e60
x14: ffffffffad588000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000001
x11: 00000000000001a2 x10: 00680000fff2bf0b x9 : 03fffffff807ff2b
x8 : 0000000000000001 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : ffffff802d4b4000 x4 : ffffff807ff2c000 x3 : ffffffc013ee3a78
x2 : 0000000000001000 x1 : ffffff807ff2b000 x0 : ffffff802d4b3000
Call trace:
__memcpy+0x110/0x260
read_kcore+0x584/0x778
proc_reg_read+0xb4/0xe4
During early boot, memblock reserves the pages for the ramoops reserved
memory node in DT that would otherwise be part of the direct lowmem
mapping. Pstore's ram backend reuses those reserved pages to change the
memory type (writeback or non-cached) by passing the pages to vmap()
(see pfn_to_page() usage in persistent_ram_vmap() for more details) with
specific flags. When read_kcore() starts iterating over the vmalloc
region, it runs over the virtual address that vmap() returned for
ramoops. In aligned_vread() the virtual address is passed to
vmalloc_to_page() which returns the page struct for the reserved lowmem
area. That lowmem page is passed to kmap_atomic(), which effectively
calls page_to_virt() that assumes a lowmem page struct must be directly
accessible with __va() and friends. These pages are mapped via vmap()
though, and the lowmem mapping was never made, so accessing them via the
lowmem virtual address oopses like above.
Let's side-step this problem by passing VM_IOREMAP to vmap(). This will
tell vread() to not include the ramoops region in the kcore. Instead the
area will look like a bunch of zeros. The alternative is to teach kmap()
about vmalloc areas that intersect with lowmem. Presumably such a change
isn't a one-liner, and there isn't much interest in inspecting the
ramoops region in kcore files anyway, so the most expedient route is
taken for now. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7921: fix use after free in mt7921_acpi_read()
Don't dereference "sar_root" after it has been freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4: Fix a credential leak in _nfs4_discover_trunking() |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: Finish converting the NFSv2 GETACL result encoder
The xdr_stream conversion inadvertently left some code that set the
page_len of the send buffer. The XDR stream encoders should handle
this automatically now.
This oversight adds garbage past the end of the Reply message.
Clients typically ignore the garbage, but NFSD does not need to send
it, as it leaks stale memory contents onto the wire. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hsr: avoid possible NULL deref in skb_clone()
syzbot got a crash [1] in skb_clone(), caused by a bug
in hsr_get_untagged_frame().
When/if create_stripped_skb_hsr() returns NULL, we must
not attempt to call skb_clone().
While we are at it, replace a WARN_ONCE() by netdev_warn_once().
[1]
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000f: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000078-0x000000000000007f]
CPU: 1 PID: 754 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.0.0-syzkaller-02734-g0326074ff465 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/22/2022
RIP: 0010:skb_clone+0x108/0x3c0 net/core/skbuff.c:1641
Code: 93 02 00 00 49 83 7c 24 28 00 0f 85 e9 00 00 00 e8 5d 4a 29 fa 4c 8d 75 7e 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 4c 89 f2 83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 9e 01 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003ccf4e0 EFLAGS: 00010207
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffc90003ccf5f8 RCX: ffffc9000c24b000
RDX: 000000000000000f RSI: ffffffff8751cb13 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00000000000000f0 R09: 0000000000000140
R10: fffffbfff181d972 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888161fc3640
R13: 0000000000000a20 R14: 000000000000007e R15: ffffffff8dc5f620
FS: 00007feb621e4700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007feb621e3ff8 CR3: 00000001643a9000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
hsr_get_untagged_frame+0x4e/0x610 net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:164
hsr_forward_do net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:461 [inline]
hsr_forward_skb+0xcca/0x1d50 net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:623
hsr_handle_frame+0x588/0x7c0 net/hsr/hsr_slave.c:69
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x9fe/0x38f0 net/core/dev.c:5379
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xae/0x180 net/core/dev.c:5483
__netif_receive_skb+0x1f/0x1c0 net/core/dev.c:5599
netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5685 [inline]
netif_receive_skb+0x12f/0x8d0 net/core/dev.c:5744
tun_rx_batched+0x4ab/0x7a0 drivers/net/tun.c:1544
tun_get_user+0x2686/0x3a00 drivers/net/tun.c:1995
tun_chr_write_iter+0xdb/0x200 drivers/net/tun.c:2025
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2187 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]
vfs_write+0x9e9/0xdd0 fs/read_write.c:584
ksys_write+0x127/0x250 fs/read_write.c:637
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: fix a signed-integer-overflow bug in tcp_add_backlog()
The type of sk_rcvbuf and sk_sndbuf in struct sock is int, and
in tcp_add_backlog(), the variable limit is caculated by adding
sk_rcvbuf, sk_sndbuf and 64 * 1024, it may exceed the max value
of int and overflow. This patch reduces the limit budget by
halving the sndbuf to solve this issue since ACK packets are much
smaller than the payload. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: ensure sane device mtu in tunnels
Another syzbot report [1] with no reproducer hints
at a bug in ip6_gre tunnel (dev:ip6gretap0)
Since ipv6 mcast code makes sure to read dev->mtu once
and applies a sanity check on it (see commit b9b312a7a451
"ipv6: mcast: better catch silly mtu values"), a remaining
possibility is that a layer is able to set dev->mtu to
an underflowed value (high order bit set).
This could happen indeed in ip6gre_tnl_link_config_route(),
ip6_tnl_link_config() and ipip6_tunnel_bind_dev()
Make sure to sanitize mtu value in a local variable before
it is written once on dev->mtu, as lockless readers could
catch wrong temporary value.
[1]
skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffff80000b7a2f38 len:40 put:40 head:ffff000149dcf200 data:ffff000149dcf2b0 tail:0xd8 end:0xc0 dev:ip6gretap0
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:120
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 10241 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc7-syzkaller-18095-gbbed346d5a96 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/30/2022
Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : skb_panic+0x4c/0x50 net/core/skbuff.c:116
lr : skb_panic+0x4c/0x50 net/core/skbuff.c:116
sp : ffff800020dd3b60
x29: ffff800020dd3b70 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff00010df2a800
x26: 00000000000000c0 x25: 00000000000000b0 x24: ffff000149dcf200
x23: 00000000000000c0 x22: 00000000000000d8 x21: ffff80000b7a2f38
x20: ffff00014c2f7800 x19: 0000000000000028 x18: 00000000000001a9
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff80000db49158 x15: ffff000113bf1a80
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 00000000ffffffff x12: ffff000113bf1a80
x11: ff808000081c0d5c x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 73f125dc5c63ba00
x8 : 73f125dc5c63ba00 x7 : ffff800008161d1c x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 0000000000000080 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : ffff0001fefddcd0 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 0000000000000089
Call trace:
skb_panic+0x4c/0x50 net/core/skbuff.c:116
skb_over_panic net/core/skbuff.c:125 [inline]
skb_put+0xd4/0xdc net/core/skbuff.c:2049
ip6_mc_hdr net/ipv6/mcast.c:1714 [inline]
mld_newpack+0x14c/0x270 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1765
add_grhead net/ipv6/mcast.c:1851 [inline]
add_grec+0xa20/0xae0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1989
mld_send_cr+0x438/0x5a8 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2115
mld_ifc_work+0x38/0x290 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2653
process_one_work+0x2d8/0x504 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
worker_thread+0x340/0x610 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
kthread+0x12c/0x158 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:860
Code: 91011400 aa0803e1 a90027ea 94373093 (d4210000) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: Don't leak netobj memory when gss_read_proxy_verf() fails |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/irdma: Fix data race on CQP completion stats
CQP completion statistics is read lockesly in irdma_wait_event and
irdma_check_cqp_progress while it can be updated in the completion
thread irdma_sc_ccq_get_cqe_info on another CPU as KCSAN reports.
Make completion statistics an atomic variable to reflect coherent updates
to it. This will also avoid load/store tearing logic bug potentially
possible by compiler optimizations.
[77346.170861] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in irdma_handle_cqp_op [irdma] / irdma_sc_ccq_get_cqe_info [irdma]
[77346.171383] write to 0xffff8a3250b108e0 of 8 bytes by task 9544 on cpu 4:
[77346.171483] irdma_sc_ccq_get_cqe_info+0x27a/0x370 [irdma]
[77346.171658] irdma_cqp_ce_handler+0x164/0x270 [irdma]
[77346.171835] cqp_compl_worker+0x1b/0x20 [irdma]
[77346.172009] process_one_work+0x4d1/0xa40
[77346.172024] worker_thread+0x319/0x700
[77346.172037] kthread+0x180/0x1b0
[77346.172054] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[77346.172136] read to 0xffff8a3250b108e0 of 8 bytes by task 9838 on cpu 2:
[77346.172234] irdma_handle_cqp_op+0xf4/0x4b0 [irdma]
[77346.172413] irdma_cqp_aeq_cmd+0x75/0xa0 [irdma]
[77346.172592] irdma_create_aeq+0x390/0x45a [irdma]
[77346.172769] irdma_rt_init_hw.cold+0x212/0x85d [irdma]
[77346.172944] irdma_probe+0x54f/0x620 [irdma]
[77346.173122] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x66/0xa0
[77346.173137] really_probe+0x140/0x540
[77346.173154] __driver_probe_device+0xc7/0x220
[77346.173173] driver_probe_device+0x5f/0x140
[77346.173190] __driver_attach+0xf0/0x2c0
[77346.173208] bus_for_each_dev+0xa8/0xf0
[77346.173225] driver_attach+0x29/0x30
[77346.173240] bus_add_driver+0x29c/0x2f0
[77346.173255] driver_register+0x10f/0x1a0
[77346.173272] __auxiliary_driver_register+0xbc/0x140
[77346.173287] irdma_init_module+0x55/0x1000 [irdma]
[77346.173460] do_one_initcall+0x7d/0x410
[77346.173475] do_init_module+0x81/0x2c0
[77346.173491] load_module+0x1232/0x12c0
[77346.173506] __do_sys_finit_module+0x101/0x180
[77346.173522] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x3c/0x50
[77346.173538] do_syscall_64+0x39/0x90
[77346.173553] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[77346.173634] value changed: 0x0000000000000094 -> 0x0000000000000095 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix potential user-after-free
This fixes all instances of which requires to allocate a buffer calling
alloc_skb which may release the chan lock and reacquire later which
makes it possible that the chan is disconnected in the meantime. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Fix data races around sk->sk_shutdown.
KCSAN found a data race around sk->sk_shutdown where unix_release_sock()
and unix_shutdown() update it under unix_state_lock(), OTOH unix_poll()
and unix_dgram_poll() read it locklessly.
We need to annotate the writes and reads with WRITE_ONCE() and READ_ONCE().
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_poll / unix_release_sock
write to 0xffff88800d0f8aec of 1 bytes by task 264 on cpu 0:
unix_release_sock+0x75c/0x910 net/unix/af_unix.c:631
unix_release+0x59/0x80 net/unix/af_unix.c:1042
__sock_release+0x7d/0x170 net/socket.c:653
sock_close+0x19/0x30 net/socket.c:1397
__fput+0x179/0x5e0 fs/file_table.c:321
____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:349
task_work_run+0x116/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:179
resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x174/0x180 kernel/entry/common.c:204
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:286 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1a/0x30 kernel/entry/common.c:297
do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
read to 0xffff88800d0f8aec of 1 bytes by task 222 on cpu 1:
unix_poll+0xa3/0x2a0 net/unix/af_unix.c:3170
sock_poll+0xcf/0x2b0 net/socket.c:1385
vfs_poll include/linux/poll.h:88 [inline]
ep_item_poll.isra.0+0x78/0xc0 fs/eventpoll.c:855
ep_send_events fs/eventpoll.c:1694 [inline]
ep_poll fs/eventpoll.c:1823 [inline]
do_epoll_wait+0x6c4/0xea0 fs/eventpoll.c:2258
__do_sys_epoll_wait fs/eventpoll.c:2270 [inline]
__se_sys_epoll_wait fs/eventpoll.c:2265 [inline]
__x64_sys_epoll_wait+0xcc/0x190 fs/eventpoll.c:2265
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
value changed: 0x00 -> 0x03
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 222 Comm: dbus-broker Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7-02330-gca6270c12e20 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/net_failover: fix txq exceeding warning
The failover txq is inited as 16 queues.
when a packet is transmitted from the failover device firstly,
the failover device will select the queue which is returned from
the primary device if the primary device is UP and running.
If the primary device txq is bigger than the default 16,
it can lead to the following warning:
eth0 selects TX queue 18, but real number of TX queues is 16
The warning backtrace is:
[ 32.146376] CPU: 18 PID: 9134 Comm: chronyd Tainted: G E 6.2.8-1.el7.centos.x86_64 #1
[ 32.147175] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.10.2-3.el7_4.1 04/01/2014
[ 32.147730] Call Trace:
[ 32.147971] <TASK>
[ 32.148183] dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x70
[ 32.148514] dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[ 32.148820] netdev_core_pick_tx+0xb1/0xe0
[ 32.149180] __dev_queue_xmit+0x529/0xcf0
[ 32.149533] ? __check_object_size.part.0+0x21c/0x2c0
[ 32.149967] ip_finish_output2+0x278/0x560
[ 32.150327] __ip_finish_output+0x1fe/0x2f0
[ 32.150690] ip_finish_output+0x2a/0xd0
[ 32.151032] ip_output+0x7a/0x110
[ 32.151337] ? __pfx_ip_finish_output+0x10/0x10
[ 32.151733] ip_local_out+0x5e/0x70
[ 32.152054] ip_send_skb+0x19/0x50
[ 32.152366] udp_send_skb.isra.0+0x163/0x3a0
[ 32.152736] udp_sendmsg+0xba8/0xec0
[ 32.153060] ? __folio_memcg_unlock+0x25/0x60
[ 32.153445] ? __pfx_ip_generic_getfrag+0x10/0x10
[ 32.153854] ? sock_has_perm+0x85/0xa0
[ 32.154190] inet_sendmsg+0x6d/0x80
[ 32.154508] ? inet_sendmsg+0x6d/0x80
[ 32.154838] sock_sendmsg+0x62/0x70
[ 32.155152] ____sys_sendmsg+0x134/0x290
[ 32.155499] ___sys_sendmsg+0x81/0xc0
[ 32.155828] ? _get_random_bytes.part.0+0x79/0x1a0
[ 32.156240] ? ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x5f/0x1e0
[ 32.156649] ? get_random_u16+0x69/0xf0
[ 32.156989] ? __fget_light+0xcf/0x110
[ 32.157326] __sys_sendmmsg+0xc4/0x210
[ 32.157657] ? __sys_connect+0xb7/0xe0
[ 32.157995] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xce/0x140
[ 32.158388] ? syscall_trace_enter.isra.0+0x12c/0x1a0
[ 32.158820] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x24/0x30
[ 32.159171] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[ 32.159493] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
Fix that by reducing txq number as the non-existent primary-dev does. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mlx5: fix skb leak while fifo resync and push
During ptp resync operation SKBs were poped from the fifo but were never
freed neither by napi_consume nor by dev_kfree_skb_any. Add call to
napi_consume_skb to properly free SKBs.
Another leak was happening because mlx5e_skb_fifo_has_room() had an error
in the check. Comparing free running counters works well unless C promotes
the types to something wider than the counter. In this case counters are
u16 but the result of the substraction is promouted to int and it causes
wrong result (negative value) of the check when producer have already
overlapped but consumer haven't yet. Explicit cast to u16 fixes the issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: TC, Fix using eswitch mapping in nic mode
Cited patch is using the eswitch object mapping pool while
in nic mode where it isn't initialized. This results in the
trace below [0].
Fix that by using either nic or eswitch object mapping pool
depending if eswitch is enabled or not.
[0]:
[ 826.446057] ==================================================================
[ 826.446729] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mlx5_add_flow_rules+0x30/0x490 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.447515] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888194485830 by task tc/6233
[ 826.448243] CPU: 16 PID: 6233 Comm: tc Tainted: G W 6.3.0-rc6+ #1
[ 826.448890] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 826.449785] Call Trace:
[ 826.450052] <TASK>
[ 826.450302] dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x50
[ 826.450650] print_report+0xc2/0x610
[ 826.450998] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xb1/0x130
[ 826.451385] ? mlx5_add_flow_rules+0x30/0x490 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.451935] kasan_report+0xae/0xe0
[ 826.452276] ? mlx5_add_flow_rules+0x30/0x490 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.452829] mlx5_add_flow_rules+0x30/0x490 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.453368] ? __kmalloc_node+0x5a/0x120
[ 826.453733] esw_add_restore_rule+0x20f/0x270 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.454288] ? mlx5_eswitch_add_send_to_vport_meta_rule+0x260/0x260 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.455011] ? mutex_unlock+0x80/0xd0
[ 826.455361] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.constprop.0+0x210/0x210
[ 826.455862] ? mapping_add+0x2cb/0x440 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.456425] mlx5e_tc_action_miss_mapping_get+0x139/0x180 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.457058] ? mlx5e_tc_update_skb_nic+0xb0/0xb0 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.457636] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x77/0x90
[ 826.458000] ? __kmalloc+0x57/0x120
[ 826.458336] mlx5_tc_ct_flow_offload+0x325/0xe40 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.458916] ? ct_kernel_enter.constprop.0+0x48/0xa0
[ 826.459360] ? mlx5_tc_ct_parse_action+0xf0/0xf0 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.459933] ? mlx5e_mod_hdr_attach+0x491/0x520 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.460507] ? mlx5e_mod_hdr_get+0x12/0x20 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.461046] ? mlx5e_tc_attach_mod_hdr+0x154/0x170 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.461635] mlx5e_configure_flower+0x969/0x2110 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.462217] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x85/0xe0
[ 826.462597] ? __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow+0x750/0x750 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.463163] ? kasan_save_stack+0x2e/0x40
[ 826.463534] ? down_read+0x115/0x1b0
[ 826.463878] ? down_write_killable+0x110/0x110
[ 826.464288] ? tc_setup_action.part.0+0x9f/0x3b0
[ 826.464701] ? mlx5e_is_uplink_rep+0x4c/0x90 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.465253] ? mlx5e_tc_reoffload_flows_work+0x130/0x130 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.465878] tc_setup_cb_add+0x112/0x250
[ 826.466247] fl_hw_replace_filter+0x230/0x310 [cls_flower]
[ 826.466724] ? fl_hw_destroy_filter+0x1a0/0x1a0 [cls_flower]
[ 826.467212] fl_change+0x14e1/0x2030 [cls_flower]
[ 826.467636] ? sock_def_readable+0x89/0x120
[ 826.468019] ? fl_tmplt_create+0x2d0/0x2d0 [cls_flower]
[ 826.468509] ? kasan_unpoison+0x23/0x50
[ 826.468873] ? get_random_u16+0x180/0x180
[ 826.469244] ? __radix_tree_lookup+0x2b/0x130
[ 826.469640] ? fl_get+0x7b/0x140 [cls_flower]
[ 826.470042] ? fl_mask_put+0x200/0x200 [cls_flower]
[ 826.470478] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.constprop.0+0x210/0x210
[ 826.470973] ? fl_tmplt_create+0x2d0/0x2d0 [cls_flower]
[ 826.471427] tc_new_tfilter+0x644/0x1050
[ 826.471795] ? tc_get_tfilter+0x860/0x860
[ 826.472170] ? __thaw_task+0x130/0x130
[ 826.472525] ? arch_stack_walk+0x98/0xf0
[ 826.472892] ? cap_capable+0x9f/0xd0
[ 826.473235] ? security_capable+0x47/0x60
[ 826.473608] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1d5/0x550
[ 826.473985] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x1f0/0x1f0
[ 826.474383] ? __stack_depot_save+0x35/0x4c0
[ 826.474779] ? kasan_save_stack+0x2e/0x40
[ 826.475149] ? kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
[ 826.475518] ? __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x9f/0xb0
[ 826.475939] ? task_work_add+0x77/0x1c0
[ 826.476305] netlink_rcv_skb+0xe0/0x210
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd: Check for uptr overflow
syzkaller found that setting up a map with a user VA that wraps past zero
can trigger WARN_ONs, particularly from pin_user_pages weirdly returning 0
due to invalid arguments.
Prevent creating a pages with a uptr and size that would math overflow.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 518 at drivers/iommu/iommufd/pages.c:793 pfn_reader_user_pin+0x2e6/0x390
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 518 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2-eeac8ede1755+ #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pfn_reader_user_pin+0x2e6/0x390
Code: b1 11 e9 25 fe ff ff e8 28 e4 0f ff 31 ff 48 89 de e8 2e e6 0f ff 48 85 db 74 0a e8 14 e4 0f ff e9 4d ff ff ff e8 0a e4 0f ff <0f> 0b bb f2 ff ff ff e9 3c ff ff ff e8 f9 e3 0f ff ba 01 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000f9fa30 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff821e2b72
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff888014184680 RDI: 0000000000000002
RBP: ffffc90000f9fa78 R08: 00000000000000ff R09: 0000000079de6f4e
R10: ffffc90000f9f790 R11: ffff888014185418 R12: ffffc90000f9fc60
R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffff888007879800 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f4227555740(0000) GS:ffff88807dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000043 CR3: 000000000e748005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
pfn_reader_next+0x14a/0x7b0
? interval_tree_double_span_iter_update+0x11a/0x140
pfn_reader_first+0x140/0x1b0
iopt_pages_rw_slow+0x71/0x280
? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x20/0x30
iopt_pages_rw_access+0x2b2/0x5b0
iommufd_access_rw+0x19f/0x2f0
iommufd_test+0xd11/0x16f0
? write_comp_data+0x2f/0x90
iommufd_fops_ioctl+0x206/0x330
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x10e/0x160
? __pfx_iommufd_fops_ioctl+0x10/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ebtables: fix table blob use-after-free
We are not allowed to return an error at this point.
Looking at the code it looks like ret is always 0 at this
point, but its not.
t = find_table_lock(net, repl->name, &ret, &ebt_mutex);
... this can return a valid table, with ret != 0.
This bug causes update of table->private with the new
blob, but then frees the blob right away in the caller.
Syzbot report:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in __ebt_unregister_table+0xc00/0xcd0 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:1168
Read of size 4 at addr ffffc90005425000 by task kworker/u4:4/74
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
Call Trace:
kasan_report+0xbf/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:517
__ebt_unregister_table+0xc00/0xcd0 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:1168
ebt_unregister_table+0x35/0x40 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:1372
ops_exit_list+0xb0/0x170 net/core/net_namespace.c:169
cleanup_net+0x4ee/0xb10 net/core/net_namespace.c:613
...
ip(6)tables appears to be ok (ret should be 0 at this point) but make
this more obvious. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: taprio: Limit TCA_TAPRIO_ATTR_SCHED_CYCLE_TIME to INT_MAX.
syzkaller found zero division error [0] in div_s64_rem() called from
get_cycle_time_elapsed(), where sched->cycle_time is the divisor.
We have tests in parse_taprio_schedule() so that cycle_time will never
be 0, and actually cycle_time is not 0 in get_cycle_time_elapsed().
The problem is that the types of divisor are different; cycle_time is
s64, but the argument of div_s64_rem() is s32.
syzkaller fed this input and 0x100000000 is cast to s32 to be 0.
@TCA_TAPRIO_ATTR_SCHED_CYCLE_TIME={0xc, 0x8, 0x100000000}
We use s64 for cycle_time to cast it to ktime_t, so let's keep it and
set max for cycle_time.
While at it, we prevent overflow in setup_txtime() and add another
test in parse_taprio_schedule() to check if cycle_time overflows.
Also, we add a new tdc test case for this issue.
[0]:
divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 103 Comm: kworker/1:3 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00330-g60cc1f7d0605 #3
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work
RIP: 0010:div_s64_rem include/linux/math64.h:42 [inline]
RIP: 0010:get_cycle_time_elapsed net/sched/sch_taprio.c:223 [inline]
RIP: 0010:find_entry_to_transmit+0x252/0x7e0 net/sched/sch_taprio.c:344
Code: 3c 02 00 0f 85 5e 05 00 00 48 8b 4c 24 08 4d 8b bd 40 01 00 00 48 8b 7c 24 48 48 89 c8 4c 29 f8 48 63 f7 48 99 48 89 74 24 70 <48> f7 fe 48 29 d1 48 8d 04 0f 49 89 cc 48 89 44 24 20 49 8d 85 10
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000acf260 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 177450e0347560cf RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 177450e0347560cf
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000100000000
RBP: 0000000000000056 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed10020a0934
R10: ffff8880105049a7 R11: ffff88806cf3a520 R12: ffff888010504800
R13: ffff88800c00d800 R14: ffff8880105049a0 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88806cf00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0edf84f0e8 CR3: 000000000d73c002 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
get_packet_txtime net/sched/sch_taprio.c:508 [inline]
taprio_enqueue_one+0x900/0xff0 net/sched/sch_taprio.c:577
taprio_enqueue+0x378/0xae0 net/sched/sch_taprio.c:658
dev_qdisc_enqueue+0x46/0x170 net/core/dev.c:3732
__dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3821 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x1b2f/0x3000 net/core/dev.c:4169
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3088 [inline]
neigh_resolve_output net/core/neighbour.c:1552 [inline]
neigh_resolve_output+0x4a7/0x780 net/core/neighbour.c:1532
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:544 [inline]
ip6_finish_output2+0x924/0x17d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:135
__ip6_finish_output+0x620/0xaa0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:196
ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:207 [inline]
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:292 [inline]
ip6_output+0x206/0x410 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:228
dst_output include/net/dst.h:458 [inline]
NF_HOOK.constprop.0+0xea/0x260 include/linux/netfilter.h:303
ndisc_send_skb+0x872/0xe80 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:508
ndisc_send_ns+0xb5/0x130 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:666
addrconf_dad_work+0xc14/0x13f0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:4175
process_one_work+0x92c/0x13a0 kernel/workqueue.c:2597
worker_thread+0x60f/0x1240 kernel/workqueue.c:2748
kthread+0x2fe/0x3f0 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308
</TASK>
Modules linked in: |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Don't clone flow post action attributes second time
The code already clones post action attributes in
mlx5e_clone_flow_attr_for_post_act(). Creating another copy in
mlx5e_tc_post_act_add() is a erroneous leftover from original
implementation. Instead, assign handle->attribute to post_attr provided by
the caller. Note that cloning the attribute second time is not just
wasteful but also causes issues like second copy not being properly updated
in neigh update code which leads to following use-after-free:
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mlx5_cmd_set_fte+0x200d/0x24c0 [mlx5_core]
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: kasan_report+0xbb/0x1a0
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: __kasan_kmalloc+0x7a/0x90
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: kasan_save_free_info+0x2a/0x40
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: ____kasan_slab_free+0x11a/0x1b0
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: mlx5_core 0000:08:00.0: mlx5_cmd_out_err:803:(pid 8833): SET_FLOW_TABLE_ENTRY(0x936) op_mod(0x0) failed, status bad resource state(0x9), syndrome (0xf2ff71), err(-22)
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: mlx5_core 0000:08:00.0 enp8s0f0: Failed to add post action rule
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: mlx5_core 0000:08:00.0: mlx5e_tc_encap_flows_add:190:(pid 8833): Failed to update flow post acts, -22
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: Call Trace:
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: <TASK>
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: print_report+0x170/0x471
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: ? mlx5_cmd_set_fte+0x200d/0x24c0 [mlx5_core]
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: kasan_report+0xbb/0x1a0
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: ? mlx5_cmd_set_fte+0x200d/0x24c0 [mlx5_core]
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: mlx5_cmd_set_fte+0x200d/0x24c0 [mlx5_core]
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: ? __module_address.part.0+0x62/0x200
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: ? mlx5_cmd_stub_create_flow_table+0xd0/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: ? __raw_spin_lock_init+0x3b/0x110
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: mlx5_cmd_create_fte+0x80/0xb0 [mlx5_core]
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: add_rule_fg+0xe80/0x19c0 [mlx5_core]
--
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: Allocated by task 13476:
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: __kasan_kmalloc+0x7a/0x90
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: mlx5_packet_reformat_alloc+0x7b/0x230 [mlx5_core]
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: mlx5e_tc_tun_create_header_ipv4+0x977/0xf10 [mlx5_core]
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: mlx5e_attach_encap+0x15b4/0x1e10 [mlx5_core]
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: post_process_attr+0x305/0xa30 [mlx5_core]
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow+0x4c0/0xcf0 [mlx5_core]
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow+0x7cf/0xe90 [mlx5_core]
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: mlx5e_configure_flower+0xcaa/0x4b90 [mlx5_core]
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cls_flower+0x99/0x1b0 [mlx5_core]
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cb+0x133/0x1e0 [mlx5_core]
--
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: Freed by task 8833:
Feb 21 09:02:00 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: kasan_save_s
---truncated--- |
