| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/probes: fix error check in parse_btf_field()
btf_find_struct_member() might return NULL or an error via the
ERR_PTR() macro. However, its caller in parse_btf_field() only checks
for the NULL condition. Fix this by using IS_ERR() and returning the
error up the stack. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Use mlx5_ipsec_rx_status_destroy to correctly delete status rules
rx_create no longer allocates a modify_hdr instance that needs to be
cleaned up. The mlx5_modify_header_dealloc call will lead to a NULL pointer
dereference. A leak in the rules also previously occurred since there are
now two rules populated related to status.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 109907067 P4D 109907067 PUD 116890067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 1 PID: 484 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2-rrameshbabu+ #254
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5_modify_header_dealloc+0xd/0x70
<snip>
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs+0x60/0x70
? __die+0x24/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x15f/0x430
? free_to_partial_list.constprop.0+0x79/0x150
? do_user_addr_fault+0x2c9/0x5c0
? exc_page_fault+0x63/0x110
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
? mlx5_modify_header_dealloc+0xd/0x70
rx_create+0x374/0x590
rx_add_rule+0x3ad/0x500
? rx_add_rule+0x3ad/0x500
? mlx5_cmd_exec+0x2c/0x40
? mlx5_create_ipsec_obj+0xd6/0x200
mlx5e_accel_ipsec_fs_add_rule+0x31/0xf0
mlx5e_xfrm_add_state+0x426/0xc00
<snip> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: tproxy: bail out if IP has been disabled on the device
syzbot reports:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000003: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f]
[..]
RIP: 0010:nf_tproxy_laddr4+0xb7/0x340 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_tproxy_ipv4.c:62
Call Trace:
nft_tproxy_eval_v4 net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c:56 [inline]
nft_tproxy_eval+0xa9a/0x1a00 net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c:168
__in_dev_get_rcu() can return NULL, so check for this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-af: fix the double free in rvu_npc_freemem()
Clang static checker(scan-build) warning：
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_npc.c:line 2184, column 2
Attempt to free released memory.
npc_mcam_rsrcs_deinit() has released 'mcam->counters.bmap'. Deleted this
redundant kfree() to fix this double free problem. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Julia Lawall reported this null pointer dereference, this should fix it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix slab-use-after-free in l2cap_connect()
Extend a critical section to prevent chan from early freeing.
Also make the l2cap_connect() return type void. Nothing is using the
returned value but it is ugly to return a potentially freed pointer.
Making it void will help with backports because earlier kernels did use
the return value. Now the compile will break for kernels where this
patch is not a complete fix.
Call stack summary:
[use]
l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd
l2cap_connect
┌ mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock);
│ chan = pchan->ops->new_connection(pchan); <- alloc chan
│ __l2cap_chan_add(conn, chan);
│ l2cap_chan_hold(chan);
│ list_add(&chan->list, &conn->chan_l); ... (1)
└ mutex_unlock(&conn->chan_lock);
chan->conf_state ... (4) <- use after free
[free]
l2cap_conn_del
┌ mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock);
│ foreach chan in conn->chan_l: ... (2)
│ l2cap_chan_put(chan);
│ l2cap_chan_destroy
│ kfree(chan) ... (3) <- chan freed
└ mutex_unlock(&conn->chan_lock);
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read
include/linux/instrumented.h:68 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _test_bit
include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in l2cap_connect+0xa67/0x11a0
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4260
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810bf040a0 by task kworker/u3:1/311 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: msft: fix slab-use-after-free in msft_do_close()
Tying the msft->data lifetime to hdev by freeing it in
hci_release_dev() to fix the following case:
[use]
msft_do_close()
msft = hdev->msft_data;
if (!msft) ...(1) <- passed.
return;
mutex_lock(&msft->filter_lock); ...(4) <- used after freed.
[free]
msft_unregister()
msft = hdev->msft_data;
hdev->msft_data = NULL; ...(2)
kfree(msft); ...(3) <- msft is freed.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mutex_lock_common
kernel/locking/mutex.c:587 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mutex_lock+0x8f/0xc30
kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888106cbbca8 by task kworker/u5:2/309 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: check for NULL idev in ip_route_use_hint()
syzbot was able to trigger a NULL deref in fib_validate_source()
in an old tree [1].
It appears the bug exists in latest trees.
All calls to __in_dev_get_rcu() must be checked for a NULL result.
[1]
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 2 PID: 3257 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.10.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:fib_validate_source+0xbf/0x15a0 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:425
Code: 18 f2 f2 f2 f2 42 c7 44 20 23 f3 f3 f3 f3 48 89 44 24 78 42 c6 44 20 27 f3 e8 5d 88 48 fc 4c 89 e8 48 c1 e8 03 48 89 44 24 18 <42> 80 3c 20 00 74 08 4c 89 ef e8 d2 15 98 fc 48 89 5c 24 10 41 bf
RSP: 0018:ffffc900015fee40 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88800f7a4000 RCX: ffff88800f4f90c0
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000004001eac RDI: ffff8880160c64c0
RBP: ffffc900015ff060 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88800f7a4000
R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff88800f4f90c0 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88800f7a4000
FS: 00007f938acfe6c0(0000) GS:ffff888058c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f938acddd58 CR3: 000000001248e000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
ip_route_use_hint+0x410/0x9b0 net/ipv4/route.c:2231
ip_rcv_finish_core+0x2c4/0x1a30 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:327
ip_list_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:612 [inline]
ip_sublist_rcv+0x3ed/0xe50 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:638
ip_list_rcv+0x422/0x470 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:673
__netif_receive_skb_list_ptype net/core/dev.c:5572 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x6b1/0x890 net/core/dev.c:5620
__netif_receive_skb_list net/core/dev.c:5672 [inline]
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x9f9/0xdc0 net/core/dev.c:5764
netif_receive_skb_list+0x55/0x3e0 net/core/dev.c:5816
xdp_recv_frames net/bpf/test_run.c:257 [inline]
xdp_test_run_batch net/bpf/test_run.c:335 [inline]
bpf_test_run_xdp_live+0x1818/0x1d00 net/bpf/test_run.c:363
bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x81f/0x1170 net/bpf/test_run.c:1376
bpf_prog_test_run+0x349/0x3c0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3736
__sys_bpf+0x45c/0x710 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5115
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5201 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5199 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5199 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: fix LAG and VF lock dependency in ice_reset_vf()
9f74a3dfcf83 ("ice: Fix VF Reset paths when interface in a failed over
aggregate"), the ice driver has acquired the LAG mutex in ice_reset_vf().
The commit placed this lock acquisition just prior to the acquisition of
the VF configuration lock.
If ice_reset_vf() acquires the configuration lock via the ICE_VF_RESET_LOCK
flag, this could deadlock with ice_vc_cfg_qs_msg() because it always
acquires the locks in the order of the VF configuration lock and then the
LAG mutex.
Lockdep reports this violation almost immediately on creating and then
removing 2 VF:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.8.0-rc6 #54 Tainted: G W O
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/60:3/6771 is trying to acquire lock:
ff40d43e099380a0 (&vf->cfg_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
but task is already holding lock:
ff40d43ea1961210 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0xb7/0x4d0 [ice]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40
lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0
__mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0
ice_vc_cfg_qs_msg+0x45/0x690 [ice]
ice_vc_process_vf_msg+0x4f5/0x870 [ice]
__ice_clean_ctrlq+0x2b5/0x600 [ice]
ice_service_task+0x2c9/0x480 [ice]
process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0
worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0
kthread+0x104/0x140
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
-> #0 (&vf->cfg_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
check_prev_add+0xe2/0xc50
validate_chain+0x558/0x800
__lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40
lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0
__mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0
ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
ice_process_vflr_event+0x98/0xd0 [ice]
ice_service_task+0x1cc/0x480 [ice]
process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0
worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0
kthread+0x104/0x140
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&pf->lag_mutex);
lock(&vf->cfg_lock);
lock(&pf->lag_mutex);
lock(&vf->cfg_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
4 locks held by kworker/60:3/6771:
#0: ff40d43e05428b38 ((wq_completion)ice){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0
#1: ff50d06e05197e58 ((work_completion)(&pf->serv_task)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0
#2: ff40d43ea1960e50 (&pf->vfs.table_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_process_vflr_event+0x48/0xd0 [ice]
#3: ff40d43ea1961210 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0xb7/0x4d0 [ice]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 60 PID: 6771 Comm: kworker/60:3 Tainted: G W O 6.8.0-rc6 #54
Hardware name:
Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80
check_noncircular+0x12d/0x150
check_prev_add+0xe2/0xc50
? save_trace+0x59/0x230
? add_chain_cache+0x109/0x450
validate_chain+0x558/0x800
__lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100
lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0
? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
? lock_is_held_type+0xc7/0x120
__mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0
? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0x50
? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
? process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0
ice_process_vflr_event+0x98/0xd0 [ice]
ice_service_task+0x1cc/0x480 [ice]
process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0
worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x104/0x140
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK>
To avoid deadlock, we must acquire the LAG
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: i2c-hid: remove I2C_HID_READ_PENDING flag to prevent lock-up
The flag I2C_HID_READ_PENDING is used to serialize I2C operations.
However, this is not necessary, because I2C core already has its own
locking for that.
More importantly, this flag can cause a lock-up: if the flag is set in
i2c_hid_xfer() and an interrupt happens, the interrupt handler
(i2c_hid_irq) will check this flag and return immediately without doing
anything, then the interrupt handler will be invoked again in an
infinite loop.
Since interrupt handler is an RT task, it takes over the CPU and the
flag-clearing task never gets scheduled, thus we have a lock-up.
Delete this unnecessary flag. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
phy: marvell: a3700-comphy: Fix out of bounds read
There is an out of bounds read access of 'gbe_phy_init_fix[fix_idx].addr'
every iteration after 'fix_idx' reaches 'ARRAY_SIZE(gbe_phy_init_fix)'.
Make sure 'gbe_phy_init[addr]' is used when all elements of
'gbe_phy_init_fix' array are handled.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dma: xilinx_dpdma: Fix locking
There are several places where either chan->lock or chan->vchan.lock was
not held. Add appropriate locking. This fixes lockdep warnings like
[ 31.077578] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 31.077831] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 40 at drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dpdma.c:834 xilinx_dpdma_chan_queue_transfer+0x274/0x5e0
[ 31.077953] Modules linked in:
[ 31.078019] CPU: 2 PID: 40 Comm: kworker/u12:1 Not tainted 6.6.20+ #98
[ 31.078102] Hardware name: xlnx,zynqmp (DT)
[ 31.078169] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
[ 31.078272] pstate: 600000c5 (nZCv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 31.078377] pc : xilinx_dpdma_chan_queue_transfer+0x274/0x5e0
[ 31.078473] lr : xilinx_dpdma_chan_queue_transfer+0x270/0x5e0
[ 31.078550] sp : ffffffc083bb2e10
[ 31.078590] x29: ffffffc083bb2e10 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffffff880165a168
[ 31.078754] x26: ffffff880164e920 x25: ffffff880164eab8 x24: ffffff880164d480
[ 31.078920] x23: ffffff880165a148 x22: ffffff880164e988 x21: 0000000000000000
[ 31.079132] x20: ffffffc082aa3000 x19: ffffff880164e880 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 31.079295] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000
[ 31.079453] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffffff8802263dc0 x12: 0000000000000001
[ 31.079613] x11: 0001ffc083bb2e34 x10: 0001ff880164e98f x9 : 0001ffc082aa3def
[ 31.079824] x8 : 0001ffc082aa3dec x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000516
[ 31.079982] x5 : ffffffc7f8d43000 x4 : ffffff88003c9c40 x3 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 31.080147] x2 : ffffffc7f8d43000 x1 : 00000000000000c0 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 31.080307] Call trace:
[ 31.080340] xilinx_dpdma_chan_queue_transfer+0x274/0x5e0
[ 31.080518] xilinx_dpdma_issue_pending+0x11c/0x120
[ 31.080595] zynqmp_disp_layer_update+0x180/0x3ac
[ 31.080712] zynqmp_dpsub_plane_atomic_update+0x11c/0x21c
[ 31.080825] drm_atomic_helper_commit_planes+0x20c/0x684
[ 31.080951] drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail+0x5c/0xb0
[ 31.081139] commit_tail+0x234/0x294
[ 31.081246] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x1f8/0x210
[ 31.081363] drm_atomic_commit+0x100/0x140
[ 31.081477] drm_client_modeset_commit_atomic+0x318/0x384
[ 31.081634] drm_client_modeset_commit_locked+0x8c/0x24c
[ 31.081725] drm_client_modeset_commit+0x34/0x5c
[ 31.081812] __drm_fb_helper_restore_fbdev_mode_unlocked+0x104/0x168
[ 31.081899] drm_fb_helper_set_par+0x50/0x70
[ 31.081971] fbcon_init+0x538/0xc48
[ 31.082047] visual_init+0x16c/0x23c
[ 31.082207] do_bind_con_driver.isra.0+0x2d0/0x634
[ 31.082320] do_take_over_console+0x24c/0x33c
[ 31.082429] do_fbcon_takeover+0xbc/0x1b0
[ 31.082503] fbcon_fb_registered+0x2d0/0x34c
[ 31.082663] register_framebuffer+0x27c/0x38c
[ 31.082767] __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x5c0/0x91c
[ 31.082939] drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x50/0x74
[ 31.083012] drm_fbdev_dma_client_hotplug+0xb8/0x108
[ 31.083115] drm_client_register+0xa0/0xf4
[ 31.083195] drm_fbdev_dma_setup+0xb0/0x1cc
[ 31.083293] zynqmp_dpsub_drm_init+0x45c/0x4e0
[ 31.083431] zynqmp_dpsub_probe+0x444/0x5e0
[ 31.083616] platform_probe+0x8c/0x13c
[ 31.083713] really_probe+0x258/0x59c
[ 31.083793] __driver_probe_device+0xc4/0x224
[ 31.083878] driver_probe_device+0x70/0x1c0
[ 31.083961] __device_attach_driver+0x108/0x1e0
[ 31.084052] bus_for_each_drv+0x9c/0x100
[ 31.084125] __device_attach+0x100/0x298
[ 31.084207] device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20
[ 31.084292] bus_probe_device+0xd8/0xdc
[ 31.084368] deferred_probe_work_func+0x11c/0x180
[ 31.084451] process_one_work+0x3ac/0x988
[ 31.084643] worker_thread+0x398/0x694
[ 31.084752] kthread+0x1bc/0x1c0
[ 31.084848] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 31.084932] irq event stamp: 64549
[ 31.084970] hardirqs last enabled at (64548): [<ffffffc081adf35c>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x80/0x90
[ 31.085157]
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: idxd: Fix oops during rmmod on single-CPU platforms
During the removal of the idxd driver, registered offline callback is
invoked as part of the clean up process. However, on systems with only
one CPU online, no valid target is available to migrate the
perf context, resulting in a kernel oops:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000000002a2b8
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD 1470e1067 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 20 Comm: cpuhp/0 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc6-dsa+ #57
Hardware name: Intel Corporation AvenueCity/AvenueCity, BIOS BHSDCRB1.86B.2492.D03.2307181620 07/18/2023
RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x2e/0x50
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__die+0x24/0x70
page_fault_oops+0x82/0x160
do_user_addr_fault+0x65/0x6b0
__pfx___rdmsr_safe_on_cpu+0x10/0x10
exc_page_fault+0x7d/0x170
asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
mutex_lock+0x2e/0x50
mutex_lock+0x1e/0x50
perf_pmu_migrate_context+0x87/0x1f0
perf_event_cpu_offline+0x76/0x90 [idxd]
cpuhp_invoke_callback+0xa2/0x4f0
__pfx_perf_event_cpu_offline+0x10/0x10 [idxd]
cpuhp_thread_fun+0x98/0x150
smpboot_thread_fn+0x27/0x260
smpboot_thread_fn+0x1af/0x260
__pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x103/0x140
__pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
__pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
<TASK>
Fix the issue by preventing the migration of the perf context to an
invalid target. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
phy: ti: tusb1210: Resolve charger-det crash if charger psy is unregistered
The power_supply frame-work is not really designed for there to be
long living in kernel references to power_supply devices.
Specifically unregistering a power_supply while some other code has
a reference to it triggers a WARN in power_supply_unregister():
WARN_ON(atomic_dec_return(&psy->use_cnt));
Folllowed by the power_supply still getting removed and the
backing data freed anyway, leaving the tusb1210 charger-detect code
with a dangling reference, resulting in a crash the next time
tusb1210_get_online() is called.
Fix this by only holding the reference in tusb1210_get_online()
freeing it at the end of the function. Note this still leaves
a theoretical race window, but it avoids the issue when manually
rmmod-ing the charger chip driver during development. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/eevdf: Prevent vlag from going out of bounds in reweight_eevdf()
It was possible to have pick_eevdf() return NULL, which then causes a
NULL-deref. This turned out to be due to entity_eligible() returning
falsely negative because of a s64 multiplcation overflow.
Specifically, reweight_eevdf() computes the vlag without considering
the limit placed upon vlag as update_entity_lag() does, and then the
scaling multiplication (remember that weight is 20bit fixed point) can
overflow. This then leads to the new vruntime being weird which then
causes the above entity_eligible() to go side-ways and claim nothing
is eligible.
Thus limit the range of vlag accordingly.
All this was quite rare, but fatal when it does happen. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: smbus: fix NULL function pointer dereference
Baruch reported an OOPS when using the designware controller as target
only. Target-only modes break the assumption of one transfer function
always being available. Fix this by always checking the pointer in
__i2c_transfer.
[wsa: dropped the simplification in core-smbus to avoid theoretical regressions] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: Avoid infinite loop trying to resize local TT
If the MTU of one of an attached interface becomes too small to transmit
the local translation table then it must be resized to fit inside all
fragments (when enabled) or a single packet.
But if the MTU becomes too low to transmit even the header + the VLAN
specific part then the resizing of the local TT will never succeed. This
can for example happen when the usable space is 110 bytes and 11 VLANs are
on top of batman-adv. In this case, at least 116 byte would be needed.
There will just be an endless spam of
batman_adv: batadv0: Forced to purge local tt entries to fit new maximum fragment MTU (110)
in the log but the function will never finish. Problem here is that the
timeout will be halved all the time and will then stagnate at 0 and
therefore never be able to reduce the table even more.
There are other scenarios possible with a similar result. The number of
BATADV_TT_CLIENT_NOPURGE entries in the local TT can for example be too
high to fit inside a packet. Such a scenario can therefore happen also with
only a single VLAN + 7 non-purgable addresses - requiring at least 120
bytes.
While this should be handled proactively when:
* interface with too low MTU is added
* VLAN is added
* non-purgeable local mac is added
* MTU of an attached interface is reduced
* fragmentation setting gets disabled (which most likely requires dropping
attached interfaces)
not all of these scenarios can be prevented because batman-adv is only
consuming events without the the possibility to prevent these actions
(non-purgable MAC address added, MTU of an attached interface is reduced).
It is therefore necessary to also make sure that the code is able to handle
also the situations when there were already incompatible system
configuration are present. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio_net: Do not send RSS key if it is not supported
There is a bug when setting the RSS options in virtio_net that can break
the whole machine, getting the kernel into an infinite loop.
Running the following command in any QEMU virtual machine with virtionet
will reproduce this problem:
# ethtool -X eth0 hfunc toeplitz
This is how the problem happens:
1) ethtool_set_rxfh() calls virtnet_set_rxfh()
2) virtnet_set_rxfh() calls virtnet_commit_rss_command()
3) virtnet_commit_rss_command() populates 4 entries for the rss
scatter-gather
4) Since the command above does not have a key, then the last
scatter-gatter entry will be zeroed, since rss_key_size == 0.
sg_buf_size = vi->rss_key_size;
5) This buffer is passed to qemu, but qemu is not happy with a buffer
with zero length, and do the following in virtqueue_map_desc() (QEMU
function):
if (!sz) {
virtio_error(vdev, "virtio: zero sized buffers are not allowed");
6) virtio_error() (also QEMU function) set the device as broken
vdev->broken = true;
7) Qemu bails out, and do not repond this crazy kernel.
8) The kernel is waiting for the response to come back (function
virtnet_send_command())
9) The kernel is waiting doing the following :
while (!virtqueue_get_buf(vi->cvq, &tmp) &&
!virtqueue_is_broken(vi->cvq))
cpu_relax();
10) None of the following functions above is true, thus, the kernel
loops here forever. Keeping in mind that virtqueue_is_broken() does
not look at the qemu `vdev->broken`, so, it never realizes that the
vitio is broken at QEMU side.
Fix it by not sending RSS commands if the feature is not available in
the device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: tlb: Fix TLBI RANGE operand
KVM/arm64 relies on TLBI RANGE feature to flush TLBs when the dirty
pages are collected by VMM and the page table entries become write
protected during live migration. Unfortunately, the operand passed
to the TLBI RANGE instruction isn't correctly sorted out due to the
commit 117940aa6e5f ("KVM: arm64: Define kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_range()").
It leads to crash on the destination VM after live migration because
TLBs aren't flushed completely and some of the dirty pages are missed.
For example, I have a VM where 8GB memory is assigned, starting from
0x40000000 (1GB). Note that the host has 4KB as the base page size.
In the middile of migration, kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_range() is executed
to flush TLBs. It passes MAX_TLBI_RANGE_PAGES as the argument to
__kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_range() and __flush_s2_tlb_range_op(). SCALE#3
and NUM#31, corresponding to MAX_TLBI_RANGE_PAGES, isn't supported
by __TLBI_RANGE_NUM(). In this specific case, -1 has been returned
from __TLBI_RANGE_NUM() for SCALE#3/2/1/0 and rejected by the loop
in the __flush_tlb_range_op() until the variable @scale underflows
and becomes -9, 0xffff708000040000 is set as the operand. The operand
is wrong since it's sorted out by __TLBI_VADDR_RANGE() according to
invalid @scale and @num.
Fix it by extending __TLBI_RANGE_NUM() to support the combination of
SCALE#3 and NUM#31. With the changes, [-1 31] instead of [-1 30] can
be returned from the macro, meaning the TLBs for 0x200000 pages in the
above example can be flushed in one shoot with SCALE#3 and NUM#31. The
macro TLBI_RANGE_MASK is dropped since no one uses it any more. The
comments are also adjusted accordingly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
raid1: fix use-after-free for original bio in raid1_write_request()
r1_bio->bios[] is used to record new bios that will be issued to
underlying disks, however, in raid1_write_request(), r1_bio->bios[]
will set to the original bio temporarily. Meanwhile, if blocked rdev
is set, free_r1bio() will be called causing that all r1_bio->bios[]
to be freed:
raid1_write_request()
r1_bio = alloc_r1bio(mddev, bio); -> r1_bio->bios[] is NULL
for (i = 0; i < disks; i++) -> for each rdev in conf
// first rdev is normal
r1_bio->bios[0] = bio; -> set to original bio
// second rdev is blocked
if (test_bit(Blocked, &rdev->flags))
break
if (blocked_rdev)
free_r1bio()
put_all_bios()
bio_put(r1_bio->bios[0]) -> original bio is freed
Test scripts:
mdadm -CR /dev/md0 -l1 -n4 /dev/sd[abcd] --assume-clean
fio -filename=/dev/md0 -ioengine=libaio -rw=write -bs=4k -numjobs=1 \
-iodepth=128 -name=test -direct=1
echo blocked > /sys/block/md0/md/rd2/state
Test result:
BUG bio-264 (Not tainted): Object already free
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Allocated in mempool_alloc_slab+0x24/0x50 age=1 cpu=1 pid=869
kmem_cache_alloc+0x324/0x480
mempool_alloc_slab+0x24/0x50
mempool_alloc+0x6e/0x220
bio_alloc_bioset+0x1af/0x4d0
blkdev_direct_IO+0x164/0x8a0
blkdev_write_iter+0x309/0x440
aio_write+0x139/0x2f0
io_submit_one+0x5ca/0xb70
__do_sys_io_submit+0x86/0x270
__x64_sys_io_submit+0x22/0x30
do_syscall_64+0xb1/0x210
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74
Freed in mempool_free_slab+0x1f/0x30 age=1 cpu=1 pid=869
kmem_cache_free+0x28c/0x550
mempool_free_slab+0x1f/0x30
mempool_free+0x40/0x100
bio_free+0x59/0x80
bio_put+0xf0/0x220
free_r1bio+0x74/0xb0
raid1_make_request+0xadf/0x1150
md_handle_request+0xc7/0x3b0
md_submit_bio+0x76/0x130
__submit_bio+0xd8/0x1d0
submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x1eb/0x5c0
submit_bio_noacct+0x169/0xd40
submit_bio+0xee/0x1d0
blkdev_direct_IO+0x322/0x8a0
blkdev_write_iter+0x309/0x440
aio_write+0x139/0x2f0
Since that bios for underlying disks are not allocated yet, fix this
problem by using mempool_free() directly to free the r1_bio. |
